The agrarian question of extractive capital : political economy, rural change, and peasant struggle in 21st century Paraguay by Ezquerro-Cañete, Arturo
   
The Agrarian Question of Extractive Capital: 









A Thesis Submitted to 
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 




September, 2020, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
 
 








Approved:  ________________________ 




Approved:  ________________________ 




Approved:  ________________________ 





Date:  August 26, 2020 
The Agrarian Question of Extractive Capital:  
Political Economy, Rural Change, and Peasant Struggle in 21st Century Paraguay  
 




This dissertation examines the impact of contemporary capitalist globalization on class relations, 
class conflict, and economic development in the Paraguayan countryside. It offers a political 
economy analysis of agrarian change, situating this analysis in the wider historical context of the 
protracted transition to democracy between 1989 and 2008, the rural class structure of the country, 
the changing character of contemporary agro-extractive capitalism, and the long‐standing class 
struggle for redistributive land reform. Particular focus is placed on the combative but still highly 
fragmented peasantry and on the “parliamentary coup” that took place in June 2012, as this event 
reveals the major fault lines of the balance of class forces in the countryside, in particular the 
commitment of a compact and coalesced, dominant agrarian class and political elite in Congress 
to preserving the country’s unequal distribution of land and wealth. By examining the Paraguayan 
land reform impasse under the short‐lived government of Fernando Lugo (2008–2012) through an 
interactive state-society framework, this dissertation attempts to locate the sources of current social 
and political conflict in the country, and the demands of rival social groups. In doing so, it argues 
that the rise and fall of Lugo occurred in the context of structural legacies from the Stroessner era 
(1954–1989) that have remained largely unchanged and that coexist today with an expanding agro‐
extractivist development model.  
 
This dissertation also challenges the recent hailing of agricultural biotechnology as a panacea for 
food insecurity and rural poverty in countries of the global South. Based on an empirical 
investigation of the neoliberal soy regime in Paraguay, the present study documents how the 
profound transformation of this country’s agricultural mode of production over the past two 
decades, spurred by the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture and the bio-revolution, has 
jeopardized rural livelihoods. Drawing on the concept of “agrarian extractivism”, the study 
demonstrates how the transgenic soyization of Paraguay’s agriculture has led to an increased 
concentration of landholdings, as well as the displacement and disempowerment of peasants and 
rural labourers who have been rendered surplus to the requirements of agribusiness capital. At the 
same time, the consolidation of this new agro-industrial model has fostered a growing dependence 
on agrochemicals that compromise environmental quality and human health. Agrarian 
extractivism has also reshaped the political terrain of the countryside; the class struggle for land 
and agrarian reform has now expanded to include struggles against the deleterious operations of 
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The turn of the new millennium opened a new chapter in the history of capitalist development in 
Latin America. On the one hand, the exclusionary and concentrating consequences of 
neoliberalism1 provoked massive anti-neoliberal mobilizations throughout the region—
exemplified in the various mass street actions that brought down governments in Peru (2000), 
Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador (2000 and 2005)—culminating in the 
rise to office of left and centre-left governments that were unabashedly opposed to the neoliberal 
trajectories mapped out by their predecessor governments.2 On the other hand, the political 
reorientation of the Latin America scenario occurred alongside shifts in the region’s political 
                                                             
1 For the purposes of this dissertation, neoliberalism ought to be understood not as “a core set of ahistorical 
neoclassical economic policies”, often cited as the ‘Washington Consensus’ but, rather, as “a historical, class-based 
ideology that proposes all social, political, and ecological problems can be resolved through more direct free-market 
exposure, which has become an increasingly structural aspect of capitalism” (Marois 2005: 102–103). From this 
class-based perspective, the purist theory of free-market economic fundamentals that provides the bedrock for 
neoliberal ideology should be understood as a “flexible toolkit for justifying the project for restoring capitalist class 
power”, rather than as aguide to the actual policy practice of states during this period (Brabazon and Webber 2014: 
437; also see Harvey 2005). In the Latin American context, “neoliberalism failed miserably in terms of its declared 
objectives of increasing economic efficiency and improving human well-being. However, seen as a political project 
for the formation or restoration of capitalist class power, neoliberalism has been tremendously successful” (Webber 
2011). 
2 The so-called “pink tide” wave in Latin America began perhaps with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela 
(1998) and continued in Chile (2000), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador 
(2006), Nicaragua (2006), Paraguay (2008), El Salvador (2009), and Peru (2011). This process of regime change has 
resulted in the formation of what some scholars see as the beginnings of a post-neoliberal state (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2009; 2012; Petras and Veltmeyer 2009; Webber and Carr 2013). For a comprehensive review of this 




economy and its relationship to world markets, particularly as related to an impressive global 
commodity boom driven by China’s increased demand for natural resources.3 
 
The convergence of these two dynamics—which could be thought of as the “double boom” of 
the 2000s: a global commodity boom and a regional “political boom” as described by 
Hogenboom (2012a)—ignited a shift in the region’s development discourse and practice, 
whereby governments integrated an intensified export-orientated extractive model for economic 
growth, with new social policies based on poverty reduction and redistribution of earnings.4 In 
fact, governments across the heterogeneous field of Latin American politics adopted 
controversial policies of “progressive neo-extractivism” (Gudynas 2009; Burchardt and Dietz 
2014; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014), in which commodity-driven development is linked—at least 
rhetorically—to the expansion of anti-poverty programs that are largely credited with raising 
41.4 million people out of poverty and 25.4 million out of extreme poverty (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2012: 10). The controversy attached to this model, however, stems from the fact that 
this “new extractivism” is much like the old extractivism, destroying the environment, generating 
social conflict, and eroding indigenous and citizen rights.5 
 
                                                             
3 The economic impacts and political implications of the so-called “China effect” on Latin American exports are 
well discussed by Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom (2007), Jenkins et al. (2008), Cypher (2010), Jenkins (2010, 
2011; 2012), Hogenboom (2012b). 
4 Between 2000 and 2011 the percentage of primary products in total exports for South American countries rose 
from 40.9 per cent to 60.9 per cent (ECLAC 2007, 2013), “allowing states to accumulate sufficient resources for the 
redistribution and the design of new social policies” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 6). 
5 On the dynamics of these conflicts in the extractive sector within the context of Latin America, see the special 
issue on social movements and natural resource conflicts in OSAL (2005); Webber and Gordon (2008); Bebbington 




The commodity boom of the early twenty-first century has pushed the traditional boundaries of 
what has historically been considered extractivism—hydrocarbons and mining. Now the 
alarming rate of clearing of forests and grasslands to permit the agricultural production of soy 
and other plant-based biofuels has shifted the definition (Farthing and Fabricant 2019: 5). The 
concept of “agrarian extractivism” has become an increasingly recurrent term in the Latin 
American extractivist literature for understanding the new dynamics and trajectories of agrarian 
change and challenging dominant discourses, which characterize present-day forms of capitalist 
agriculture as industrial agricultural development (Teubal and Giarracca 2014; Alonso-Fradejas 
2015; Gudynas 2015; McKay 2017). While the latter would imply value-added processing, 
sectoral linkages, and employment generation, the term agro-extractivism reveals the very 
extractive nature of capitalist agriculture by highlighting the various dimensions of social, 
economic and environmental exploitation and its negative implications for rural development 
(McKay 2017).  This conceptual distinction has important implications for our understanding of 
the current meaning of the classic “agrarian question” (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a, 2010b), 
particularly in the context of contemporary land grabbing, “flex crops”, and the increasingly 
corporatized agro-food system (Borras et al. 2012; McMichael 2012; Otero 2012). 
 
Written within this global and regional context, this dissertation offers a critique and contribution 
from the Paraguayan experience, where the national model of development is increasingly 
becoming characteristic of this precise type of “agrarian extractivism” related to the production 
and export of genetically modified (GM) soy. At the same time, the socio-environmental 
degradation stemming from it has unleashed new forces of resistance (Palau and Kretschmer 




has expressed itself in an increasingly volatile and virulent fashion, as clearly evidenced in the 
June 2012 “Curuguaty massacre” and associated “parliamentary coup” against Fernando Lugo.6 
In many ways, it could be argued that the “coup” in Paraguay was the start of a region-wider 
pendulum swing back to the right, signalling the receding of the “pink tide” and end of the 
progressive cycle.7 Against this backdrop, this study aims to determine the class dynamics of 
agrarian extractivism and resistance in the Paraguayan process of rural transformation, and what 
insights can be drawn from this national experience that are relevant to the current regional 
debates on neo-extractivism and the field of critical agrarian studies within the Latin America. 
 
1.2 Problematics of the agrarian question 
As defined by Edelman and Wolford (2017: 962): 
 
Critical Agrarian Studies are simultaneously a tradition of research, thought and 
political action, an institutionalized academic field, and an informal network (or 
various networks) that links professional intellectuals, agriculturalists, scientific 
journals and alternative media, and non-governmental development organizations, as 
                                                             
6A similar procedure was used to topple Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff in 2016. 
7The right turn in Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012), Argentina (2015), Brazil (2016), Venezuela (2018), and 
Bolivia (2019) all shared similarities, especially an oligarchy in charge of the media that opportunistically found 
ways to amplify corruption charge against sitting presidents. Only in in Argentina did this work as an electoral 
strategy; in the other four countries something between a coup and an impeachment removed the left from power. 
Only in Venezuela did the left managed to hold tenuously to power (Hetherington 2020: 243n27). For a broad 




well as activists in agrarian, environmentalist, agroecology, food, feminist, 
indigenous and human rights movements.8 
 
The Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies (ICAS) has sought to re-examine the classical 
Marxist analyses of the “agrarian question”, particularly those by Kautsky, Lenin, and 
Chayanov.9 These debates revolved around discussion of the agrarian question firstly as a 
process, whereby the penetration of capitalist relations into the countryside would lead to both 
the commodification of labour and accumulation based on increased productivity. Central to 
critical agrarian studies, therefore,  is understanding the ways in which agriculture is transformed 
under capitalism.10 The classic agrarian question posed by Kautsky interrogated the extent and 
ways in which capital takes hold of agriculture, revolutionizes it, and establishes new forms of 
production and of poverty (Banaji 1980, 1990; Kautsky 1988). Other classic texts by Marx 
(1990[1887]), Engels (1950[1894]), and Lenin (1964[1899]) contributed to what is now referred 
to as the classic agrarian question, formulated by Byres (1996) as the problematics of politics, 
                                                             
8The scale and breadth of this “network of networks” was brought home to me during my participation at the 5th 
BRICS Initiative in Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS) Conference, held at the Russian Presidential Academy of 
National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Moscow, on 13-16 October 2017. “Over the course of 
four days, over 100 scholars and activists from around the world discussed and debated various themes related to the 
rise of emerging economies and the implications for national, regional and global agrarian transformations. This 
included examinations of new forms of (agro) extractivism, the dynamics of social and environmental resistance, 
and a series on agrarian questions of labour in comparative perspective across the BRICS and other countries in the 
Global South.” 
9 To date the ICAS series has published ten “little books on big ideas” written by outstanding scholars in the field of 
agrarian studies, including Henry Bernstein (2010), Jan Douwe van der Ploeg (2013), Philip McMichael (2013), Ian 
Scoones (2015), Marc Edelman and Saturnino M. Borras Jr. (2016), Raúl Delgado Wise and Henry Veltmeyer 
(2016), Peter M. Rosset and Miguel A. Altieri (2017), Jennifer Clapp and S. Ryan Isakson (2018), Walden Bello 
(2019), and Ben White (2020). 
10 This section draws from an introductory draft chapter for a forthcoming volume on the topic which I am currently 




production and accumulation and further revised by Bernstein (1996, 2004, 2006, 2009) as the 
agrarian questions of capital and labour, of which, for Bernstein, only the latter remains relevant 
in the current context of a “globalizing” capitalism. In 1899, Kautsky (1988: 297) wrote:  
 
Agricultural production has already been transformed into industrial production in a 
large number of fields, and a large number of others can be expected to undergo this 
transformation in the immediate future. No field of agriculture is completely safe. 
Every advance in this direction must inevitably multiply the pressures on farmers, 
increase their dependence on industry and undermine their security.  
 
In the contemporary period, there is no doubt that capital is indeed penetrating, taking hold of, 
and revolutionizing agriculture, albeit in variegated and uneven ways at different paces and 
trajectories across places. So-called “industrial” capitalist agriculture has become the dominant 
model for agricultural development to combat rural poverty and feed the world, as promoted by 
the most influential development institutions (World Bank 2007). This has generated many 
debates concerning the socio-economic, political, and ecological implications of the agro-
industrial model vis-à-vis alternative models based on cooperative, smallholder or peasant 
agriculture and with agroecological farming methods. This includes both old and new debates 
pertaining to the role and viability of peasant farming in generating a surplus and for feeding the 
world (McMichael 2009); the persistence or disappearance of the peasantry based on socio-
economic or demographic factors of differentiation (van der Ploeg 2018);11 between farm size 
                                                             
11 The terms “peasant” and “peasantry” are highly contested term and concepts in the literature. A fairly 
straightforward definition of a peasant is “an agricultural worker whose livelihood is based primarily on having 




and productivity (Woodhouse 2010); as well as the biophysical contradictions of the capitalist 
agro-industrial model (O’Connor 1998; Weis 2010). This dissertation examines the nature and 
character of industrial capitalist agriculture, as well as the ways and extent to which industrial 
capital has penetrated and transformed agriculture.  
 
The extractive character of “industrial” agriculture is revealed, pointing to an emerging literature 
which refers to these dynamics of agrarian change as agro- or agrarian extractivism—a concept 
which offers both analytical and political utility in the debates regarding agricultural and rural 
development and agrarian change. The extractive character of industrial capitalist agriculture 
must be understood within the changing modalities of accumulation based on industrial and 
extractive capital. While both modalities depend on the exploitation of labour and nature, the 
latter requires increasingly less labour as it is based on various combinations of financialized, 
high-technology, resource-seeking extractive capital (i.e. foreign investment in the extraction of 
natural resources) and the appropriation of resource rents. Rather than unlimited supplies of 
labour (keeping wages low) being transferred to the industrial sector for a productive and social 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
family members to work the land” (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009: 3). For Bernstein (2006: 454), however, “nothing 
is gained, and much obscured, by characterizing contemporary small farmers as ‘peasants.’” Such a view, in my 
opinion, is both analytically, but principally, politically inadequate in making sense of the series of important 
peasant, smallholder farmer and rural labour movements that have emerged throughout Latin America during the era 
of neoliberal globalization (Petras 1997, Petras and Veltmeyer 2011, Vergara-Camus 2014). Those who self-identify 
as “peasants” today often have diversified livelihood strategies within the household, have become semi-
proletarians, temporary or seasonal labourers, seasonal migrants, and engage in highly mechanized capital-intensive 
farming, among others. As a concept or subject, peasant is better understood as a cultural or political category, not as 
a class-in-itself analytic (Edelman 1999: 191). In Spanish, campesino is often translated as “peasant”, though in 
Paraguay it is again as much an identity category as a class one (Hetherington 2020: 223n1). In this study, the terms 
“peasant” and “campesino” are taken in a loose definition to mean landless and near-landless tenants and farmers, 




transformation, the current period of extractive capitalism is generating surplus populations 
whereby “labour is surplus in relation to its utility for capital” (Li 2010: 68; emphasis in 
original). In other words, rather than having a labour reserve which could keep wages depressed 
and whereby capital accumulation is largely dependent on labour exploitation, the current 
conjuncture is characterized by “one in which places (or their resources) are useful, but the 
people are not, so that dispossession is detached from any prospect of labour absorption” (Li 
2010: 69).  
 
Extractive capital is most prominent in developing countries, though the United States and 
Europe are also undergoing a process of deindustrialization and erosion of the middle class as 
manufacturing industries move to regions with cheaper production costs, such as China. Since 
the emergence of neoliberal globalization in the 1980s, developing countries have experienced 
falling manufacturing shares in both employment and real value added, eroding the gains they 
made from import-substitution policies in the 1950s and 1960s—–referred to as “premature 
deindustrialization” (Rodrik 2016). This coincided with a process of “reprimarization” (Cypher 
2010), or the expansion of activities associated with the extractive-based primary sector, 
facilitated by neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation and trade liberalization and further 
fuelled by several converging factors which strengthened the role of extractive capital in these 
economies. These include the commodity price boom that was “unprecedented in its magnitude 
and duration”, doubling real prices of energy and metals from 2003 to 2008, while food 
commodity prices increased by 75 per cent (Erten and Ocampo 2013: 14); new demands for raw 
materials from emerging economies such as the BRICS; the financialization of land and the agro-




soybeans, sugarcane, maize, and oil palm which have multiple and flexible uses as food, feed, 
fuel and industrial material (see Borras et al. 2016)—all of which should be understood in the 
context of the global land grab as land-based deals skyrocketed across the globe (White et al. 
2012; Borras et al. 2012). This rush for natural resources and changing dynamics in the global 
political economy represent a shift from industrial to extractive capitalism based, predominantly, 
on the exploitation of natural resource wealth rather than on the exploitation of labour (see 
Veltmeyer 2016).  
 
It is within this context that we must understand the new ways in which capitalism is 
transforming agriculture, its extractive character, and the social, economic, and ecological 
implications of this dominant development model. While the concept of agrarian extractivism is 
yet to experience its own “literature rush”, in the term applied by Oya (2013) to the associated 
topic of “global land grabbing”, the term undoubtedly represents something of a new research 
agenda in the field of critical agrarian studies, as evidenced, for example, in title of the fourth 
International Conference of the BRICS Initiative for Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS): “Agro-
Extractivism Inside and Outside BRICS”, held in Beijing, China, on November 28–30, 2016.12 A 
further indication of this emerging research agenda are two empirically grounded dissertations—
on Bolivia (McKay 2017a) and Guatemala (Alonso-Fradejas 2018)—recently completed by 
graduate students at the Institute of Social Science (ISS) in the Hague, which has long been an 
important centre for the political-economic study of the agrarian question.  
 
 
                                                             




1.3 Research Questions and Approach 
Framing my to the aforementioned literature “within a broad agrarian political economy 
framework, where research questions focus on the processes of agrarian transition and how the 
questions of capital and labour are solved or not” (Oya 2013: 1547), the central research question 
guiding this dissertation is the following:  
 
 How and to what extent is the development and expansion of the agro-industrial soy 
complex transforming agrarian social relations in the Paraguayan countryside in the 
contemporary context of new forms of extractive capital penetration?  
 
Here Raju Das’s (2007: 351) introductory article to the special issue on “Peasant, State and 
Class” in The Journal of Peasant Studies (JPS) is worth quoting at length, because his clear 
statement highlights the main themes informing the research objective of the rest of this 
dissertation: 
 
The first concerns the different forms taken by state interventions on behalf of 
capital, and their impact on the peasantry. A second examines the other side of this 
same coin, and looks at the way peasants have opposed and subverted government 
action/activities, with particular reference to the nature and effectiveness of 
grassroots resistance to the state. The third addresses the ideological underpinnings 
of political action undertaken by peasants in their conflict with the state, especially 





Reformulating the above themes as a set of auxiliary questions in relation to contemporary 
dynamics of agrarian extractivism in Paraguay: 
 
(i) What are the different forms of intervention taken by the Paraguayan state on behalf of 
agro-extractive capital, and what impact has this had on the peasantry?  
 
(ii) How and to what extent do different forms and particular strategies of resistance, 
adopted by the new peasant movements, influence the nature, pace, extent, and 
direction of agro-extractive implementation processes and outcomes?  
 
(iii) What are the material and ideological underpinnings of the different forms of political 
actions and strategies of resistance undertaken by peasants in their conflict with the 
Paraguayan state and the forces of agro-extractive capitalism and extractive 
imperialism? 
 
Paraguay provides an excellent case study to examine the problematic of this research. Indeed, 
the Paraguayan case is one of the clearest examples of the extractive dynamic of transnational 
agribusiness capital in Latin America. The particularities of the country’s development model 
have made it the country of transnational “agro-extractivism” par excellence: as a percentage of 
gross annual production, Paraguay exports more soy than any other country in the world 
(Ezquerro-Cañete 2016); in 2019, exports of soybeans and derivatives total $2,654 million 
equivalent to over 55.4 percent of the country’s agricultural export basket (CAS 2020: 52). 




than 3.5 million hectares and reaching a record harvest of 10.6 million metric tonnes for the 
2019-2020 agricultural season (ABC Color, 7 July 2020).13 Also, Paraguay is, perhaps, the most 
appropriate case study in the region for highlighting the limitations of the dominant “agriculture-
for-development” policy agenda of the World Bank (2007).  As noted by Kregg Hetherington 
(2009: 656n8), Paraguay is the only Latin American country to fit within the World Bank’s 
category as an “agricultural economy” (which is otherwise dominated by Sub-Saharan Africa), in 
accordance with its “three worlds” approach to development (World Bank 2007: 31).14 
 
By answering the first (auxiliary) question, this study pays particular attention to the “type of 
large‐scale farming and agribusiness [that has benefited] from [the neoliberal restructuring of the 
countryside], and how the different class fractions within the peasantries have been affected and 
have reacted to this restructuring” (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a: 242). Empirically, the 
central focus of this enquiry will be to assess to what extent the Paraguayan government has 
supported large‐scale capitalist farming and agribusiness, and to what extent it has supported 
peasant agriculture and improved rural labour conditions (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a: 241). 
 
The second and third question takes seriously the questions of “agency” of peasants and other 
working classes; after all, peasants and other working classes make their own history. Although 
as Marx already warned, they do not do it just as they please and under circumstances they 
choose (Marx 1963; see also McMichael 2008, Borras 2009: 21). Here it is worth briefly 
                                                             
13 https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/economia/2020/07/07/record-en-soja-pero-se-pierden-us-430-millones/ 
14 “Three clusters of structurally different economies emerge, each with distinct challenges for agricultural policy 
making… In the agriculture-based economies… agriculture contributes significantly to growth, and the poor are 
concentrated in rural areas. The key policy challenge is to help agriculture play its role as an engine of growth and 




highlighting some of the weaknesses of the “identity” approach, which was overwhelming 
favoured for the study of Latin American social movement studies in 1980s and 1990s. One of 
the most demonstrative examples of this tendency, in the specific case of Paraguay, is Cheryl 
Lynn Duckworth’s (2011) Land and Dignity in Paraguay which rejects class conflict as a mode 
of analysis (Duckworth 2011: 155) but without adequately demonstrating why access to land, the 
central issue of Paraguay’s peasant and indigenous movement, is better “framed” by aspirations 
to dignity. Duckworth eschews a class analysis, presenting instead—in very abbreviated and 
elliptical form—her own preferred “dignity perspective”, one that presumably (and apparently 
from her subsequent analysis) draws attention to the historically rooted institutional context for 
the actions taken and strategies pursued by the social movements that emerged in the 1990s.  
 
Kregg Hetherington’s (2011) astonishing Guerrilla Auditors is an altogether different animal, 
offering a finely-grained, intimately detailed ethnographic analysis in the best tradition of great 
agrarian anthropologists such as James C. Scott (1985, 1990) and Eric Wolf (1969).15 
Hetherington’s contribution to the land question in Paraguay is noteworthy for its erudition and 
sophistication and has been the subject to well-deserved praise (e.g., Folch 2012; Gill 2012; 
Setrini 2013; Balán 2014; Gustafson 2015). In an otherwise highly favourable review of 
Hetherington’s excellent text, Lesley Gill laments the lack of “a more detailed discussion of the 
internal differentiation of the peasantry, in the context of neoliberal reforms and the expansion of 
soy bean cultivation” (Gill 2012: 1641). Gill’s observation is a shrewd one, and it speaks directly 
to a key preoccupation within agrarian political economy, as highlighted in the “mission 
statement” of the Journal of Agrarian Change, which is to investigate “the social relations and 
                                                             




dynamics of production, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of 
change, both historical and contemporary.”  
 
The question of peasant resistance will also help address the uneven coverage within the 
Marxist-inspired Latin American peasant studies, which have focused primarily on high-profile 
cases—e.g., La Vía Campesina, the MST in Brazil, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas (Vergara-
Camus 2014)—and had yet to fully consider Paraguay’s campesino movement. The lone 
exception, within the English-language literature at least, is James Petras’s (1997) insightful, 
panoramic survey of left resurgence in rural Latin America over the course of the 1990s, which 
includes analysis of the Paraguayan National Peasant Federation (Federación Nacional 
Campesina, FNC), albeit within a comparative rather than single-case basis. One possible 
explanation for this uneven coverage is put forth by Tom Perreault in his survey of academic 
literature on Latin America social movements which concludes with the following observation: 
“academic research often creates something of a path dependency, in which existing scholarship 
attracts (and begets) more like-minded scholarship. As a consequence, there are very likely more 
Anglophone geographers at work in Oaxaca than in Paraguay and Uruguay combined” (Perreault 
2008: 1377). This is one gap which this dissertation aims to fill, by introducing and examining 
several Paraguayan campesino organizations that have not been the subject of scholarly analysis 
before within the field of critical agrarian studies: the Organización de Lucha por la Tierra 
(OLT), Coordinadora de Organizaciones Campesinas e Indígenas del Paraguay (CONAMURI), 






Two analytical focuses seem to offer appropriate strategy for approaching the research questions 
examined in this study. One is to focus on the external factors—the changing global dynamics of 
extractive capitalism, the neoliberal restructuring of the global agro-food system, the raise of 
corporate agribusiness, renewed global land grabbing, and so on. The other is to focus on the 
internal evolution of social forces within Paraguay, the dominant class alliances, and the 
formation of new social movements. In other words, 
 
one must establish an ordering of processes in order to provide a framework for 
understanding the overall process. That means identifying the initial large-scale 
shifts and the political and social action… that influenced the direction of historical 
changes (Petras and Vieux 1996: 5). 
 
In this regard, the analysis offered in this dissertation will  
 
adhere to an analytical approach which is both materialist—the tenet that the mode 
of production and the behaviour of actors determined by the rules of reproduction 
play a major role in configuring society—and historicist—the tenet that there are no 
universal, transhistorical definitions of human thought and action, but rather that 
these activities must be understood in their hieratical context (Spronk and Webber 
2015: 2–3; emphasis in original).  
 
Within this historical materialist framework, it is important to begin by identifying within the 




subsequent changes” (Petras and Vieux 1996: 5). Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation will 
address these conjectural and contextual issues in some considerable depth.  
 
The approach followed in this dissertation, therefore, resembles the Marxist inspired approach 
favoured by, among others, Cristóbal Kay (2015) for studying the agrarian question.16 As argued 
by Kay (2015: 79), 
 
the historical materialist method and concepts such as class formation and conflict, 
social and economic differentiation, social and political consciousness, processes of 
capital accumulation, forms of transition between different socio-economic 
formations, creation and appropriation of surplus value, processes of exploitation and 
domination, bring into sharper focus the key contradictions and problems facing the 
rural economy and society (Kay 2015: 79). 
 
It is, of course, not the case that historical materialism is able to explain everything; certain 
problems may require other approaches, such as the innovative feminist, ecological and 
post-colonial perspectives (Kay 2015: 80). As recent studies in the field of critical agrarian 
studies have argued, some eclecticism is helpful for gaining a more comprehensive view and 
deeper insight into the problems we wish to analyse (Wolford et al. 2013: 199; Kay 2015: 
80). In this light, it is helpful to adopt something of a mixed martial arts perspective, as 
advised by Bruce Lee, one must “absorb what is useful, discard what is not, add what is 
uniquely your own.”  
                                                             
16 For a survey of the trajectory of the historical materialist analytical framework as it has been used in critical 






It goes without saying that whatever approach is used it should be empirically informed. Recent 
agrarian studies have raised concerns regarding the methodological assumptions pervasive in 
much of the land grab literature. Many of these problems relate to epistemological and 
methodological issues such as the lack of coherence between questions and methods, sources 
with different quality, or short and poorly designed fieldwork oriented to add details to “pre-
cooked conclusions” often based on relatively simplified conceptualisations of capitalist 
dynamics influenced by neo-populist discourse (Oya 2013). Moreover, the fixation on area-
orientated analysis focussing on “messy hectares” (Edelman 2013: 485), and the quest for “killer 
facts” (Oya 2013a: 1534) tends to obscure important questions about the agrarian political 
economy related to the development of agrarian capitalism and rural social reproduction 
(Edelman 2013; Oya 2013a, 2013b). In light of these issues, Oya (2013b: 512) reminds us of the 
importance of:  
 
being patient and spending more time to collect high-quality evidence on process, 
actors and impact and systematically dealing with biases, lies, imprecise figures and 
mistakes that are unfortunately common in any research dealing with land use, labour 
and production in developing countries. 
 
In a similar vein, Gerardo Otero (2016), in his critical but appreciate review of McMichael’s 




variety of sources, including “grey sources”, and argues for the use of more systematic and 
rigorous empirical research methods. 
 
Drawing selectively from the “triptych of complementary but distinct epistemological 
approaches” within critical agrarian studies (Akram-Lodhi 2018), this dissertation combines an 
agrarian study of socioeconomic structural change with a meticulous analysis of large farm-level 
agricultural datasets, and a detailed political ethnography of peasant activism. As Akram-Lodhi 
(2018) puts it “in peasant studies agrarian political economy framed the central research 
questions, quantitative data provided the ‘what’, and ethnography provided the ‘why’.” The 
result is a combination of quantitative data on Paraguayan agriculture production and qualitative 
analysis rooted in the perspectives of a wide variety of participants but, admittedly, slanted 
heavily in favour of positions held by peasant organizations, which reflects the scholar-activist 
spirit of this study. 
 
1.4.1 Scholar-activism 
The research design for this study is based on a collaborative academic-activist research 
approach, inspired by a new generation of agrarian scholar-activists, including Johnathan Fox 
(2006), Charles R. Hale (2006, 2008), Marc Edelman (2009), and Saturnino M. (‘Jun’) Borras 
(2016), described by Haroon Akram-Lodhi as “the quintessential activist-academic in 
international rural development” (Akram-Lodhi 2013: 158). My analysis shares with this 
approach a commitment to—and indeed a celebration of—“embracing any existing relationships 
with social movements, collaborating with movements in every step of the research process, and 




the contention “that such involvement weakens or invalidates research by sullying the objectivity 
of the researcher” (Granovsky-Larsen 2014: 3–4). The practice of “activist scholarship”, 
therefore, entails “rigorous academic work… which is explicitly and unapologetically connected 
to political projects or movements (Borras 2016; emphasis added). The resulting dissemination 
of findings is intended to highlight and support the organized peasant movement in Paraguay. 
Nevertheless, it is important to be mindful of avoiding simple reproduction of the “official 
narratives” of social movements (Edelman 2009, Wolford 2010). Following Edelman’s balance 
of being “sympathetic to and yet critical of the movements with which we research” (Edelman 
2009: 246), the discussion offered in this dissertation will consider some of the divisive and 
debilitating internal dynamics of the movement (see chapter 6 in particular). 
 
There are three types of scholar-activists in this broad sense (see Figure 1.1): (1) scholar-activists 
who are primarily located in academic institutions who do activist work and are connected to a 
political project or movement(s); (2) scholar-activists who are principally based in social 
movements or a political project and do scholar-activism from within; and (3) scholar-activists 
who are mainly located in non-academic independent research institutions who do activist work 










Figure 1.1 Scholar-Activists 
 
Source: Borras (2016). 
 
Located within the first of these three models, this study hopes to respond to Borras’s (2009: 21) 
call for “academics and researchers to engage with development practitioners and activists for a 
transformative and mutually empowering co-production of knowledge and mutually reinforcing 
dissemination and use of such knowledge.” By working closely with people in struggle, this 
research will bring analytical and theoretical insights that would not be possible through attempts 





Theorising without grounding in political realities: political relevance, political 
urgency, existing balance of political forces, and so on, maybe important 
academically, but in the end will not matter much for those who are actually 
suffering on a daily basis and to those who are at the forefront of struggles to 
change their conditions. 
 
However, far from representing a novel and innovative approach to the field of rural sociology in 
Paraguay, this study draws inspiration from the country’s long tradition of the scholar-activism 
and committed social researcher—“sociologos comprometido” (Última Hora, 8 March 2012).17 
This approach goes back to at least the 1980s when “a new movement of scholar-activists, led by 
the Paraguayan sociologist Ramón Fogel, dedicated themselves to revealing the destructive 
nature of the [soy] industry and the abuse of their countrymen” (Blanc 2015: 147). I worked 
closely alongside Fogel throughout my fieldwork, during which time I was a visiting scholar at 
the Centro de Estudios Rurales Interdisciplinarios (Centre for Interdisciplinary Rural Studies, 
CERI) with which I continues to collaborate (e.g. Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel 2017, 2018).18 
CERI provided institutional and personal support throughout this research, and introduced me to 
key researchers on agrarian transformation such as Quintín Riquelme (CDE) and Luis Rojas 
(BASE IS).  
 
 
                                                             
17 https://www.ultimahora.com/el-paraguay-pierde-un-sociologo-comprometido-n509546.html 
18 Founded in 1986, the CERI is a national leader in agrarian research, having to its credit several institutional 





1.5.2 Data and data collection 
Historically, in Paraguay and elsewhere in Latin America (see, e.g., the introduction of 
Barraclough 1973: xiv–xix), one difficulty in examining agrarian structure and land tenure is the 
fact that most of the official statistics are, for various reasons, “polluted” or partial accounts of 
the more complex reality. There is also the issue of outdated data. The distribution of land, for 
instance, can only be determined from agrarian censuses, the last two of which were conducted 
in 1991 and 2008 (MAG 2009). The next agrarian census is reported to have started in June 
2019, with the support of a US$15 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, and 
is anticipated to incorporate the new operational guidelines of the FAO’s World Census of 
Agriculture 2020 (FAO 2015, 2018),19 which has been designed to facilitate the monitoring of 
progress toward the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (ABC Color, 24 
April 2019, 1 June 2019).20 Regrettably, however, the new census will likely not be available 
until 2021. Thus, this dissertation will necessarily have to rely on somewhat outdated figures for 
land tenure. My intentions moving forward with this project will be to incorporate the 2020 
Agrarian Census—once it is made available—into the historical and theoretical discussion laid 
out herein and mobilise the updated version of this document for future scholarly and activist 
purposes. 
 
                                                             
19The FAO Program for the World Census of Agriculture (WCA) provides a methodology to frame and organize 
agricultural census initiatives in each country. The program started in 1950 and ever since has supported countries to 
carry out their national agricultural census. Organized in decadal rounds, e.g., 1996–2005, 2006–15, each country is 






Secondary data used in this study include published and unpublished materials: books, journal 
articles, conference papers, government documents, newspaper accounts, and videos. The 
evolution of Paraguayan food and agriculture production during the period 2013–2019 is well 
documented in an excellent set of series of annual publications put out by the Asunción-based 
research centre BASE Investigaciones Sociales since 2015—Con la soja al cuello [Up to the 
Neck in Soy] (Palau 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). Much of the data presented in chapter 5 will 
be based on the statistics provided in these publications. For earlier agricultural data, I will draw 
on the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock’s 2008 agrarian census (MAG 2009). In addition, 
data from the annual reports of the national statistical office, Dirección General de Estadística, 
Encuestas y Censos (DGEEC), will be used for a variety of socio-economic indicators. 
 
The primary database used to inform the research for chapter 6, on land conflicts, will be the 
monthly Informativo Campesino, published by the Centro de Documentación y Estudios 
(CDE);21 the Land, Human Rights, and Agribusiness Observatory maintained by BASE IS),22the 
chronicle of protests kept by the Social Observatory of Latin America (Observatorio Social de 
America Latina, OSAL), a renowned research programme of the Latin American Council of 
Social Sciences (CLACSO);23the main Paraguayan dailies (ABC Color, La Nación, and Última 
                                                             
21 Many previous studies on Paraguayan land conflicts have also relied on the CDE archive (e.g. Petras 1997; Nagel 
1999; Fogel 2001; Riquelme 2003). 
22 Starting from the inauguration of Lugo’s government in 2008, BASE IS began monitoring land struggles, creating 
a database that feeds on journalistic information, whether business, community, and media organizations. 
23 Between 2000 and 2012, CDE was in charge of the elaboration of the chronologies of the social conflict in 
Paraguay carried out within the framework of the Social Observatory of Latin America (OSAL), which was one of 
the programs of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO). The creation of this regional program 
was extremely important, both in terms of collecting and systematising information about the social and political 




Hora); and the Brazilian observatory, De Olho nos Ruralistas. The archive entries from these 
various sources usually contain information on the date, location and type of conflict, number of 
households involved, responsible organisations, amount of land at stake, evictions, detentions, 
degree of violence, nationality of contestants, and resolution, if any (Nagel 1999).24 The database 
covers 519 land occupations initiated between 1990 and 2019. 
 
I supplement this dataset with a sociological strategic analysis that takes the form of interviewing 
the “actors” involved in collective action. Taken together, the various methodological 
approaches used in this chapter to analyze the development and resistance dynamics of agrarian 
extractivism in Paraguay constitute the principles “structural-strategic analysis” which assumes:  
 
(i) that identifiable and identified patterns in both development and resistance 
dynamics reflect the working of underlying ‘structures’ (identified by the existence 
of limited variations in identified patterns) that are ‘objective’ in their effects on 
individuals according to their location in the system; and  (ii) that the forces of 
change released in the development process reflect and must be understood in terms 
of the collective actions of these individuals in their strategic response to these 
conditions. This dictates a methodological requirement of interrogating the subject or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
on the subject. The development and publication of conflict chronologies in 19 countries was a valuable contribution 
for all those interested in knowing the struggle processes in our countries, both students and academics and members 
of trade union, social and political organizations. At the same time, it contributed to the formation and consolidation 
of teams in each of the countries dedicated to observing, recording, and analysing conflict in a systematic and 
sustained manner over several years. Unfortunately, in 2013 CLACSO discontinued the publication of OSAL 
timelines. 
24 It is worth stressing that the dataset derived from the compilation of these various sources is just an approximation 




‘actors’ involved in the development process. This means supplementing a structural 
analysis within a political economy theoretical framework with a sociological 
strategic analysis that takes the form of interviewing the ‘actors’ involved in 
collective actions. 
(Veltmeyer 2020: 3) 
 
From this perspective, the interviews conducted for the purpose of identifying the subjective 
dimension of the forces of resistance mobilised against the advance of agribusiness and agro-
extractive capital included: Marcial Gómez, Secretary General of the Federación Nacional 
Campesina (FNC); Magui Balbuena, founding member of the Coordinadora Nacional de 
Organizaciones de Mujeres Trabajadoras Rurales e Indígenas (CONAMURI), Lidia Ruiz, 
leader of the Organización de Lucha por la Tierra (OLT); and Ester Leiva, former leader of the 
OLT and founder of the Coordinadora de Trabajadores Campesinos y Urbanos (CTCU). In 
addition to personal interviews, I will also draw on secondary analysis of archived interviews. 
For example, “revisiting” (Crow 2014) the extensive in‐depth interviews conducted by the 
Asunción‐based social research centre, BASE Investigaciones Sociales, in the immediate 
aftermath of the parliamentary coup of June 2012 (Duré, Ortega, Palau, and Rojas 2012). 
 
As Javier Auyero demonstrates in his penetrating study of two Argentine women’s experiences 
during two protest episodes in that country, narrative and story-telling are indispensable, “not 
only in creating the possibilities for collective action… but also in constructing the experiential 
meanings of events during and after the fact and thus the self-understandings of those who, on 




the event not only speak about the ongoing political construction of the uprising (the ‘social 
construction of protest’) but also speak to the protesters’ hopes, expectations, emotions, and 
beliefs at the time” (Auyero 2003: 11). However, “rusty, bent, and unpredictable… they are,” 
these stories remain among the “few keys” we have that can “help us to understand the ways in 
which people make sense of collective struggle” (Auyero 2003: 12). In-depth stories told by 
activist of their experiences during and immediately after periods of struggle are also one of the 
best ways of getting a grip on the transformative imaginations of activists during these periods, 
their visions of the new society they are seeking to establish (Webber 2011: 47). 
 
An appropriate way of honouring these stories and memories of struggle is to leave them 
unaltered. I therefore quote extensively from these interviews throughout the latter half of this 
dissertation to allow for those engaged in the struggle for land, with decades of activism and 
militancy under their belts, to speak in their own voices. These extended quotations from 
activists are the “poetics of struggle and lived experience,” the “utterances of ordinary folk,” and 
the “cultural products of social movements” that provide us with “the many different cognitive 
maps of the future of the world not yet born” (Kelley 2002: 9–10, quoted in Webber 2011: 47). 
 
1.5 Outline of the chapters  
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including this introduction and a conclusion. This 
opening chapter has been an introduction to the study, including a discussion of the problem, the 
research question, the research design, and the significance of the study. Each chapter reviews 




literature on the agrarian question, and each can be read in their own right as a contribution to 
these particular debates. 
 
Chapter 2 (“Neoliberal Corporate Food Regime: Agrarian Change in Latin America”) lays out 
the relevant global and regional context for this study by outlining the major  productive and 
social transformations in global and Latin American agriculture brought about by neoliberalism 
in the era of globalization and agrarian extractivism. Regional and international comparative 
glances can help provide more critical questions about, and probably some answers to, the 
particularities of Paraguayan trajectories of agrarian change. 
 
In Chapter 3 (“Land for the Few”) the development of Paraguay’s agrarian structure and land-
based power relations are analyzed historically through several phases of transition—from 
independence in 1811, through the War of the Triple Alliance fought from 1864 to 1870 and the 
military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 to 1989, until the protracted transition to 
democracy in 2008. From this historical analysis, the chapter also provides an analysis of the 
historical evolution and modern reconstitution of the latifundio in Paraguay. I engage in 
theoretical discussions on the nature and role of the state in the historical development of 
capitalist agriculture, as well as the type of class alliances between national landed class, agrarian 
bourgeoisie, and foreign capital. 
 
Chapter 4 (“A ‘Coup’ Foretold) analyzes the politics of agrarian change during the Fernando 
Lugo, from his historic elections in 2008 which ended over 60 years of rule by the Colorado 




office via a parliamentary coup, instigated by the landlord class. The focus on the Lugo 
government is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, since democratization, it was the 
government that had raised the highest hopes for achieving substantial reforms in agrarian 
policies, including redistributive land reform and support policies for small‐scale producers. 
Second, the ousting of Lugo from office reveals the inordinate level of influence exerted by the 
landowning elite on Paraguayan politics, the increasingly solid alliance that has been forged 
among national political elite and the multinationals that dominate world trade in agricultural 
commodities, as well as the very feeble nature of Paraguay’s democracy.  
 
Chapter 5 (From ‘White Gold’ to ‘Green Deserts’) takes a step back to access the current model 
of agricultural development. The concept of agrarian extractivism is further developed and 
refined to take account for the specificities of the Paraguayan case. It is argued here that this type 
of agro-industrial development parallels that of an extractive enclave, disconnected from 
sufficient value-added processes and employment generation activity due to a lack of forward 
and backward linkages with the rest of the economy, with a high intensity of environmental 
degradation, and social exclusion of the rural majority. 
 
Chapter 6 (“Biting the Hand that Starves You”) turns to the most important social actor 
challenging the state and the political elite: the campesino movement, with a particular emphasis 
on three of the most important national peasant movements—the Federación Nacional 
Campesina (FNC), Organización de Lucha por la Tierra (OLT), and Coordinadora Nacional de 
Organizaciones de Mujeres trabajadora Rurales e Indígenas (CONAMURI). The chapter looks at 




dynamics of agrarian extractivism discussed in the preceding chapters. Their agendas, repertoire 
of collective actions, degree of organizational and political influence, and geographic spread over 
time are examined. In each of these aspects, the movement’s current situation is presented, 
positions clarified, dilemmas identified, and challenges put forward.    
 
The main objective of the concluding chapter will be to summarize the study and highlight its 
primary contributions to the Paraguayan rural sociology and critical agrarian studies. This final 
chapter will underscore the importance of challenging dominant discourses which characterize 
present-day forms of capitalist agriculture as industrial agricultural development and offer 
suggestions for additional ways in which scholars may take up notions of agro-extractivism to 

















The Neoliberal Corporate Food Regime: Agrarian Change in Latin America 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter lays out the relevant global and regional context for this study by outlining the 
major productive and social transformations in the world food economy, brought about by the 
neoliberal agrarian restructuring that ushered in the corporate food regime. Consequently, I begin 
by locating such transformations within the process of capitalist restructuring of global 
agriculture and the deepening of extractive imperialism on a world scale. A food regime 
perspective allows the current world food system to be situated within a broader historical 
understanding of geo-political and ecological conditions (McMichael 2009, 2013), and sets the 
scene for discussing the new dynamics and trajectories of agrarian change in Latin America 
brought about by neoliberalism in the era of globalization. In the second section, the extractive 
character of “industrial” agriculture is revealed, pointing to an emerging literature which refers to 
these dynamics of agrarian change as “agro- or agrarian extractivism”—a concept which offers 
both analytical and political utility in the debates regarding agricultural and rural development 
and agrarian change.  
 
2.2 The neoliberal corporate food regime in Latin America 
Food regime analysis emerged in the 1980s to explain the strategic role of agriculture and food in 
the construction of the world capitalist economy (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). Through 
this lens we can identify a “stable period of capital accumulation associated with particular 




consumption relations within and across national spaces” (McMichael 2009: 139). The current 
world food regime emerged from the collapse of the previous American-dominated and state-
regulate industrial food regime—labelled by Walden Bello as the “Bretton Woods agrifood 
regime” (Bello 2009: 24)—that lasted between 1945 and 1973.25Since the late 1970s, the 
neoliberal turn has led to a major concentration of capital and power in the agrarian sector, 
creating a new global food regime in which, some scholars have argued, the state is subordinate 
to corporate capital. 
 
Rather than engage in a semantic dispute over whether this third regime should be labelled as the 
“corporate food regime” (McMichael 2009) or the “neoliberal food regime” (Pechlaner and 
Otero 2010), I use the terms interchangeably here—as well as the combined term “neoliberal 
corporate food regime”—to emphasize both the increasing control of corporate capital over the 
rural economy, while at the same time still acknowledging that “states continue to be central to 
the deployment of neoliberalism” (Otero 2012: 285) through engaging in “neoregulation” 
involving the facilitation of policies for agribusiness transnational corporations (ATNCs), 
particularly in biotechnology, to advance their position in Latin American markets (Otero 2012). 
Next, I provide a general overview of the transformations of the current global food regime and 
highlight some major trends in the international relations of food production and consumptions 
since the neoliberal turn.  
 
                                                             
25The first food regime emerged out of the industrialization and urbanization processes in Europe of the late 
nineteenth century and was largely dominated by Great Britain. It started to erode with the outbreak of the First 




The most dynamic elements of the corporate neoliberal food regime, as discussed by, inter alia, 
McMichael (2009), Otero (2012), and Akram-Lodhi (2012, 2017), can, broadly speaking, be 
summarized as follows: 
 
(1) The formation of new profit frontiers associated with (i) the rise of  “flex crops and 
commodities”, that is, ‘‘crops with multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, fiber, industrial 
material, etc.) that can be flexibly interchanged” (Borras, Franco, Isakson, Levidow, and 
Vervest, 2016) such as soybeans (Oliveira and Schneider, 2016), sugarcane (McKay, 
Sauer, Richardson, and Herre 2016), oil palm (Alonso-Fradejas, Liu, Salerno, and Xu, 
2016); (ii) the new technical frontier of agricultural biotechnology  (genetically modified 
organisms or GMOs) which plays a strategic function in the way that corporate 
agribusiness is attempting to recondition human, animal and bacterial life in order to 
quicken the reproduction of capital—this new moment in the commercialisation of food 
systems has given rise to what Cambridge geographer David Nally terms “accumulation 
by molecularisation” (Nally 2011; explored further in chapter 5); (iii) the financialization 
of agriculture (Clapp and Isakson 2018). 
 
(2) At the point of production, the dominant producer model of the corporate food regime is 
the fossil-fuel-driven, large-scale, capital-intensive industrial agriculture megafarm, 
which in turn requires, through enclosures and market imperatives, deepening the simple 
reproduction squeeze facing small-scale peasant petty commodity producers around the 
developing world, as world market prices for farm products fail to cover the actual costs 





(3) At the point of consumption, the current food system has been constructed on a dramatic 
social and distributional contradiction leading to a world of the “stuffed and starved” 
(Patel 2007). That is, a global subsistence and health crisis, in which, on the one hand, 
record production co-exists with record hunger: 2 billion people experiencing protein-
calorie and micronutrient malnourishment; and, on the other hand, rising obesity and 
obesity-related illness associated with the nutritional deficiencies of diets composed of 
“junk foods”, fast foods and processed foods. A recent global comparative risk 
assessment study published in the authoritative medical journal, The Lancet, attributes 11 
million deaths (over 20% of all deaths among adults) in 2017 to suboptimal diet, making 
dietary risks responsible for more deaths than any other risks globally (Afshin et al. 
2019). 
 
While predominantly offering us a broad-brush picture of the global agro-food system, the food 
regime analysis “can be particularized at the regional level” (McMichael 2013: 96). Downscaling 
analysis to the meso-level, we see that Latin America’s insertion into the global food regime has 
had major impact on the composition and the degree of concentration of the region’s export 
basket. According to ECLAC, the weight of the agricultural sector in the region’s exports rose 
considerably, from 17% in 2000 to 26% in 2016 (ECLAC 2017: 127). Table 2.1 highlights the 
profound reconfiguration of the region’s export basket during this century and, in particular, the 
growing weight oil seeds and meats, which were the categories that saw the greatest increase in 





At the global level, the region continues to be a major supplier of agricultural products.26 The 
region’s share of world agricultural exports increased from 10% in 2000 to 13% in 2015—more 
than double the regional share of world exports of all merchandise, which stood at 5.6% in 2015 
(ECLAC 2017: 126). In terms of spefic commodity exports worldwide, in 2016, the region 
accounted for 84% of raw cane sugar, 67% of soybean meal, 55% of not roasted or decaffeinated 
coffee, 51% of chemical non-coniferous wood pulp, 49% of soybeans, 38% of frozen poultry 
meat, and 32% of maize and frozen meat of bovine animals (ECLAC 2017: 142). Another 
market niche that is becoming ever more attractive in the face of a rapidly ageing global 
population is that of “functional foods”, i.e. foods that, in natural or processed form, contain 
items which offer health benefits beyond nutrition (ECLAC 2017: 145). 
 
The weight of agricultural shipments in the region’s total exports has risen significantly, as has 
the region’s share in global agricultural exports (although to a lesser extent). The region has 
become increasingly self-sufficient in agriculture: it runs no significant trade deficit in any 
category of products. Yet when disaggregated, the analysis reveals great discrepancies among 
subregions and countries. Few countries can be regarded as agricultural export powers, and they 
are located essentially in South America: that subregion accounts for nearly 80% by value of the 
region’s agricultural shipments, and two countries alone (Brazil and Argentina) are responsible 
for more than half of those shipments (ECLAC 2017: 149). 
 
                                                             
26 For the purposes of this chapter, the ECLAC definition of agricultural products includes food (including fishery 
and aquaculture products), the forestry sector and other animal and plant products, such as hides, skins, wool, flax, 




Table 2.1 Latin America and the Caribbean: 10 main agricultural products exported to the world, 
2000 and 2016 (Billions of dollars and percentages of total agricultural exports) 
2000  2016 
Product Amount Percentage  Product Amount Percentage 
Coffee, not roasted, not deracinated 5.06 8.0  Soybeans 25.25 11.7 
Soybean meal 4.06 6.4  Soybean meal 16.03 7.5 
Soybeans 3.31 5.2  Raw cane sugar 9.48 4.4 
Bananas, including plantains 2.45 3.9  Coffee, not roasted, not deracinated 8.73 4.1 
Raw cane sugar 2.03 3.2  Maize (excluding seed corn) 8.55 4.0 
Chemical non-coniferous wood pulp 1.74 2.8  Chemical non-coniferous wood pulp 6.13 2.9 
Shrimp, frozen 1.54 2.4  Boneless meat of bovine animals, frozen 5.72 2.7 
Crude soybean oil 1.30 2.1  Bananas, including plantains 5.38 2.52 
Wheat 1.22 1.9  Crude soybean oil 5.23 2.4 
Orange juice, frozen 1.20 1.9  Poultry cuts and offal, frozen 4.37 2.0 
10 main products 23.91 37.9  10 main products 94.86 44.1 
Source: ECLAC (2017: 137). 
 
Oils seeds and meats were the categories that saw the greatest increase in their share of regional 
agricultural exports between 2000 and 2016. As displayed in Table 2.1, soybeans displaced 
coffee as the region’s leading agricultural export. In fact, the combined weight of soybean 
products—soybeans, soybean meal (and other solid residues from the extraction of soybean oil) 
and crude soybean oil—rose from 14% to 22% of the total value of exports. According to the 
latest data from Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2019 (ECLAC 2020: 
42), the combined weight of soybean products in the region’s total exports is 5.5 per cent—split 
as follows: Soybean (3.8%) and Oilcake other solid residues of oil from soya beans (1.7%)—
making the crop Latin America’s third most exported commodity, following petroleum oil and 
motor vehicles, respectively.27 
 
                                                             
27 Comparable figures for 2010, reveal a combined share in the total exports of 4 percent: Soybean (2.3%) and 




This rapid take-off in soybeans production was largely in response to soaring world prices 
resulting from high demand from China and the rest of Asia for the region’s agro-food products. 
As Table 2.2 shows, these global price rises were so steep that in some years the average value of 
this commodity was more than triple what it had been in 2000. 
 
Table 2.2 Indices of prices of soybeans and derivatives, 2001–2018 (Index 2000 = 100) 
Year Soybeans Soybean oil Soybean meal 
2001 92 104 100 
2002 100 137 96 
2003 125 165 114 
2004 145 183 128 
2005 130 164 116 
2006 127 177 112 
2007 181 262 158 
2008 246 373 217 
2009 200 252 208 
2010 211 296 196 
2011 254 384 201 
2012 281 362 261 
2013 260 312 267 
2014 229 268 257 
2015 185 233 191 
2016 191 241 184 
2017 186 252 172 
2018 186 233 199 






According to Turzi’s (2012) data, between 2001 and 2011, the area devoted to soy cultivation 
increased 53 per cent in Brazil, 63 per cent in Argentina and 94 per cent in Paraguay, making 
these three countries the first, second, and fourth largest exporter of soybeans in the world (see 
the last column of Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Soybean area, volume and share of global production and exports, 2015 




Share of global 
production (%) 
Share of global 
exports (%) 
USA 33.4 106.88 33.54 35.96 
Brazil 32.1 96.2 30.19 44.53 
Argentina 19.3 60.8 19.08 7.69 
China 6.80 12.35 3.87 –63.75 
India 10.9 9.00 2.82 0.20 
Paraguay 3.24 8.10 2.54 3.63 
Canada 2.23 6.05 1.90 2.77 
Ukraine 1.80 3.90 1.22 1.91 
Uruguay 1.33 3.11 0.96 2.24 
Bolivia 1.08 2.65 0.82 0.21 
Source: Oliveira and Hecht (2016: 258). 
 
This, then, is the background to the major agrarian transformations in the Latin American 
countryside brought about by neoliberalism in the era of globalization. The question, however, is 
not simply how Latin America has been reincorporated into the global food economy but how 
global extractive capital has reinserted itself into Latin America, putting increased pressure on 
land and other natural resources. While a meso-level food regime analysis of Latin America 




threat to food cultures and environments, and the political and social texture of local food 
sovereignty counter-movements” (McMichael 2013: 96), we are still in need of a more concrete 
analytical framework that can account for the social, economic and environmental implications 
of various forms and modes of agricultural activities taking place within the global food 
regime.28It is here that the concept of “agrarian extractivism” can offer valuable insights for 
understanding these new dynamics and trajectories of agrarian change.  
 
2.3 Agrarian extractivism: concept and characteristics29 
Agro- or agrarian extractivism brings the extractive character of so-called “industrial” capitalist 
agriculture to the fore. The concept directly challenges the notion that industrial agriculture is 
actually industrializing the countryside—developing industries which generate quality 
employment opportunities, develop forward and backward linkages and value-added processing 
in the places where production takes place. In fact, so-called industrial agriculture is 
characterized by industrialized external inputs controlled by market oligopolies upstream and 
processing, distribution and “flexing” downstream similarly controlled by a few multinational 
corporations. Industrial capitals therefore control both ends of the value chain, extracting natural 
and surplus value by circulating through the soil, contaminating the ecological material base, and 
exploiting or outright displacing labour. This type of agricultural model parallels the dynamics of 
extractive sectors (Teubal 2009) and should be conceptualized as such.  
                                                             
28The socioeconomic impact of the deployment of agricultural biotechnologies in Latin America has resulted in a 
new generation of familiar contradictions. This is argued with substantive evidence in the various national case 
studies presented in Food for the few (Otero 2008), La dieta neoliberal: globalización y biotecnología agrícola en 
las Américas (Otero 2014), as well as the research papers in a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Development 
Studies (Otero 2012), and a symposium in the Journal of Agrarian Change (Otero and Lapegna 2016). 
29This section draws from an introductory draft chapter for a forthcoming volume on the topic which I am currently 





More than just removing, or extracting, natural resources, extractivism refers to the broader 
social relations of production and reproduction in extractive economies and enclaves. Acosta 
(2013) describes extractivism as a mode of accumulation which entails “the deep structural logic 
of production, distribution, exchange, and accumulation” (Chase-Dunn and Hall 2000: 86). For 
Gudynas (2015) extractivism is a “mode of appropriation” which refers to the different forms of 
organizing the appropriation of distinct natural resources (physical materials, energy and 
ecological processes) for human purposes in specific social and environmental contexts. 
Gudynas rejects the notion of “mode of production” when referring to extractivism, since we do 
not “produce” natural resources, but rather appropriate or extract them from nature (Gudynas 
2015: 188). From this perspective, extractivism is not analogous to an industry since the 
industrial, value-added processes usually occur in faraway places from the extraction. This builds 
from Bunker’s argument that the “internal dynamics of extractive economies differ significantly 
from those of productive economies in their effects on the natural environment, on the 
distribution of human populations, on the construction of economic infrastructure, and therefore 
on the subsequent development potential of the affected regions” (Bunker 1984: 1019).  
 
Bunker goes on to say that “when natural resources are extracted from one regional ecosystem to 
be consumed or transformed in another, the socioeconomic and ecological linkages to the 
extracted commodity tend to a loss of value in the region of origin and to accretion of value in 
the region of consumption or transformation” (Bunker 1984: 1019). Extractivism not only leads 
to uneven economic and ecological exchange, but can also have devastating social consequences. 




elites become susceptible to forms of corruption. For Bunker, these processes represent “modes 
of extraction” which he introduced to characterize the systemic connections between changes in 
“the class structures; the organization of labour; systems of property and exchange; the activities 
of the state; the distribution of populations; the development of physical infrastructure; and the 
kinds of information, beliefs, and ideologies which shape social organization and behaviour” 
(Bunker 1984: 1020). In other words, extractivism is not simply “to pull out”, but encompasses 
particular exploitative social relations combined with unequal ecological and economic 
exchange. It is therefore important to consider the relations of production (or extraction), of 
property, of divisions of labour, of income distribution, and of consumption, reproduction and 
accumulation in extractive economies.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, new forms of agricultural productions—in particular, 
those orientated towards large-scale, intensive monocrop production for export—have 
increasingly been included under the umbrella of “neo-extractivism”, and are now commonly 
referred to as “agrarian extractivism” (see Gudynas 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Burchardt and Dietz 
2014; Giarracca and Teubal 2014; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). As a mode of extraction, agrarian 
extractivism involves particular exploitative social relations combined with unequal ecological 
and economic exchange, in which the surplus value is extracted and labour opportunities and 
conditions deteriorate via new forms of value-chain control and mechanization. It is therefore 
important to consider the relations of production (or extraction), of property, of divisions of 






As an emerging concept in the literature, agrarian extractivism has rarely been rigorously 
defined. Evidently, simply using the term synonymously with agro-industry is neither 
analytically or politically useful. An exception is the work of Alonso-Fradejas (2018) on the 
agro-extractive capitalist project in Guatemala. Using an approach grounded in agrarian political 
economy and ecology, Alonso-Fradejas defines the extractive character of the sugarcane and oil 
palm complex with three key features: (i) the extraction and appropriation of the surplus value, 
rents, and state revenues, including by means of financialization; (ii) the appropriation of 
productive and reproductive labour; and (iii) the contamination and exhaustion of external 
nature’s energy and materials as well as damaging workers’ health and vitality (2018).  
 
In other words, Alonso-Fradejas reveals the economic, social and environmental extractive 
dynamics of sugarcane and oil palm production in Guatemala. Building off an earlier 
conceptualization of agrarian extractivism by Alonso-Fradejas (2015), as well as the classic work 
of Bunker (1984) and Gudynas (2015), McKay (2017) characterizes the agro-industrial soy 
complex in Bolivia as a type of agrarian extractivism defined by the four interlinked features: (i) 
large volumes of materials extracted destined for export with little or no processing; (ii) value-
chain concentration and sectoral disarticulation (iii) high intensity of environmental degradation; 
and (iv) deterioration of labour opportunities and labour conditions in the area/sector. In this 
conceptualization, McKay attempts to add the issue of scale and how and by whom the economic 
activity is organized to the economic, social and environmental extractive dynamics. While the 
concept remains in its infant stages, more case studies and attempts to further refine this concept 
across various sectors, spaces, geographies, and political economies will undoubtedly contribute 





2.4 Conclusion  
The general trends of the neoliberal corporate food regime have played out differently in the 
countries of the region, through related but distinct trajectories of agrarian change. These 
differentiated paths are the result of distinctive histories of capitalist development, and of class 
and state formations. In order to better explain these variegated types of insertion into the global 
food system, we need to distinguish between factors that are the result of the current conjuncture 
related to the forces of global capital—as outline in this chapter—from those that stem from the 
historical changes that have taken place in the countryside of each individual country. Thus, the 
following chapters delve deeper into these dynamics in Paraguay, situating Paraguay’s agrarian 
structure in historical context by mapping out the historical patterns of landholding and property 
relations in the country, highlighting the emergence and consolidation of the latifundio system, 







Land for the Few: Paraguay’s Agrarian Structure 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Critical scholarship has been quick to scrutinize the lack of historical perspective within the early 
literature rush on land grabbing in Latin America, emphasising the need to decenter the rhetoric 
of “novelty” by historicising these processes within a deeper temporal frame (Edelman and León 
2013).30 From this perspective, “land grabbing is far from novel. It is, instead, a routine and old 
phenomenon” (Mollett 2016: 413). Reflecting on the recent furore over land grabbing in 
connection to his own on-the-ground studies of land appropriation in Costa Rica during the 
1980s and 1990s, Marc Edelman (2013) poses an interesting question which is worth considering 
for the case of Paraguay. Paraphrasing his question: how do the current wave of land acquisitions 
or land grabbing differ from what occurred in Paraguay in between the late nineteenth century, 
when two companies—La Industrial Paraguaya and Carlos Casado—consolidated control over 
properties estimated at over 5 million hectares (Pastore 1972)?  
 
By examining the historical antecedents to today’s land grabbing we are able to gain a fuller 
understanding of “[t]he historically-specific determinants of class, power, and the political 
organization of the contending social classes in the countryside” (Edelman 1985: 154). Such an 
understanding is analytically important for, according to Edelman and León (2013: 1697–1698), 
                                                             
30 While this critique is certainly not applicable to Galeano’s (2011) contribution on Paraguay—which places the 
current wave of land deals in Paraguay within deeply grounded historical context—it is at least curious to note that 
in the abbreviated and translated version of the FAO study, published as part of a special issue of the Canadian 




three reasons: (i) each new cycle of land grabbing is “profoundly shaped by pre-existing social 
formations and local and regional particularities”; (ii) information on previous land uses and 
livelihoods provides a baseline from which to assess the impact of today’s land deals, indeed 
many of the deleterious consequences attributed to current trends of land grabbing “might 
plausibly have predated today’s land deals, might have other causes or might have happened 
anyway”; and (iii) “viewing the present moment as an epiphenomenal result of earlier social and 
material processes” facilitates an understanding of the “conditions of possibility for current 
forms of both dispossession and resistance” (Edelman and León 2013: 1700). 
 
With these considerations in mind, this chapter maps out the evolution of Paraguay’s agrarian 
structure, which are linked to the longue durée and the nature of class and state formation in the 
country. I begin by tracing the historical patterns of landholding and property relations since 
independence in 1811, through the War of the Triple Alliance fought from 1864 to 1870 and the 
military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner from 1954 to 1989, until the protracted transition to 
democracy in 2008. This descriptive and empirically based analysis reveals the highly unequal 
distribution of land that has historically characterized the country, the intense penetration of 
foreign capital and associated dynamics of land foreignization, as well as the nature of capitalist 
agribusiness formation. From this historical analysis, the following section provides an analysis 
of the historical evolution and modern reconstitution of the latifundio in Paraguay. The chapter 
also engages in a theoretical discussion on the nature and role of the state in the historical 
development of capitalist agriculture, as well as the type of class alliances between national 
landed class, agrarian bourgeoisie, and foreign capital. It is contended that categories such as 




imperialism, and the oligarchic state, when put together, paint a clear picture to explain such 
relationships and the balance of class forces at the top of the rural. I bracket in this chapter the 
question on the nature and class alliances at the bottom—i.e. the various sectors of the 
peasantry—and the formation of agrarian social movements, which will be sketched out and 
developed in chapter 6. 
 
3.2 From “república campesina” to the “república de la soja”: cycles of land grabbing 
Paraguay gained independence from Spain in 1811 under the leadership of José Gaspar 
Rodríguez de Francia. Under Francia—also known as “El Supremo”—Paraguay initiated “Latin 
America’s first autonomous revolution” (White 1978) pursuing an independent and nationalist 
path to development, usually viewed as a “neosocialist regime” (established over half a century 
before Marx wrote Das Kapital), which was continued by Carlos Antonio López (1841–1862), 
and Francisco Solano López (1862–1870).   
 
The centralized development strategy pursued by Francia was accompanied by a profound social 
revolution which set the country apart from other nations in the region: the economy was shifted 
from colonial elite control to state control, placing the interests of the indigenous peasantry 
above those of the Creole elite, opening land for farming by renting state-owned land for 
nominal fees and for an unlimited period to peasant squatters (Turner and Turner 2009: 2608; 
Kleinpenning and Zoomers 1991: 282; Nickson 1987: xiii). These policies ensured Francia of 
support among the popular classes, giving raise to an era heralded by Brazilian historian Mário 




development continued under the López dynasty and toward the end of the “nationalist era” 
Paraguay had developed into one of the most prosperous countries in the region. 
 
Other strands of historical literature have cast serious doubt over the celebratory tone of these 
depictions of the early national period (e.g. Huner 2019), but I certainly do not wish to go into 
the whole debate about the accuracy of such revisionist readings of nineteenth century Paraguay, 
which will better be left to the experts (cf. Whigham 1995: 95; Nickson 2015; Huner 2019). My 
intention here is not to validate or refute the above depiction, but rather to present widely held 
understanding in Paraguay about the history of the country. Indeed, the above depiction of 
Francia—and the notion that he placed the interests of the poor peasantry above those of other 
groups in Paraguayan society—has an honoured place in the mythology of right-wing 
nationalists, dependency theorists, and leftist critics alike (Lambert and Medina 2007). 
 
Building on the work of Glauser (2009) and Galeano (2012a, 2012b), the chapter now turns to 
explore three of the main cycles of land grabbing, concentration and foreignisation in Paraguay 
in the post colonial period. The first begins with the end of the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–
1879), when the private property regime was introduced in the country and the sale of public 
lands approved. The second cycle takes place during the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner 
(1954–1989) and is marked by agrarian and land colonisation policies that facilitates the 
acquisition of land by military and business elite. The third cycle begins at the start of the new 






3.2.1 From post-war to dictatorship (1870 to 1954) 
The first cycle of land grabbing in Paraguay take place in the aftermath of the disastrous War of 
the Triple Alliance fought between 1864–1879, in which the combined forces of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Uruguay utterly defeated Paraguay, marking a turning point in the country’s history. 
The effects of the war on Paraguay were brutal, with emphasis on the reduction of the 
population, food deficit resulting from the complete disruption of agricultural production, and 
territorial loss to Brazil and Argentina, who, when winning the war, incorporated part of the 
disputed areas.  
 
The autarkic development strategy of the previous fifty years was overthrown and replaced by a 
long period of foreign domination. For many writers of the 1960s and 1970s, the Paraguayan 
War provided an excellent illustration of the validity of dependency theory. In his classic 
dependency text Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Andre Gunder Frank has 
even suggested that the war occurred because Paraguay would not yield peacefully to what he 
terms “satellization” to the “metropolis”, meaning Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Rio de 
Janeiro, in turn dominated by London (Frank 1969: 3–17). A similar reading is offered by 
Eduardo Galeano in the classic Open Veins of Latin America (see Galeano 1973: 188–197), and 
in Leon Pomer’s La Guerra Del Paraguay: ¡Gran Negocio! (1968). While the thesis of British 
imperialism has been subjected to scrutiny (Abente 1987), few would disagree about the war’s 
legacy in terms of the foreign control still exercised over Paraguay’s economy. In order to raise 
funds to pay off public debt and stimulate economic recovery, post-war leaders started to sell off 




the small national elite, ushering in an extremely unequal land tenure system that remains 
surprisingly little changed to the present day. 
 
It is worth noting that in 1870, when the war ended, fiscal lands still covered 98 per cent of the 
territory, comprising 30.6 million hectares, while only 489,000 hectares corresponded to private 
properties (Kleinpenning 1984). However, between 1871 and 1875, several laws were passed 
that facilitated the process of land privatisation (Rojas 2014), resulting in a major transformation 
of the ownership regime of one of the main factors of production in Paraguay. With average land 
prices as low as $0.42 per hectare, between 1885 and 1914, public land sales were carried out to 
the tune of 26 million hectares (equivalent to 64% of the surface of the total surface of 
Paraguay). Thus, over this period, the sale of public areas had a drastic effect on the 
concentration of land, consolidating the great large estate (latifundio).  
 
The formation of the latifundio system took two distinct forms: extensive cattle ranching owned 
in most part by members of the domestic elite; and economic enclaves used for tannin extraction 
or production of yerba mate, owned by foreign companies.  Enormous tracts of land in the Chaco 
and Alto Paraná initially changed hands between foreign companies, which were often engaged 
in speculation (Nickson 2015: 346). The most extensive properties were acquired by foreign 
capital. In 1886, the first two major investments by foreign companies took place: the 
Argentinian company, Carlos Casado, acquired more than 3 million hectares in the Chaco 
(almost 15% of the territory of the Paraguayan Chaco) for production of tannin, and the Anglo-
Argentine company, La Industrial Paraguaya, acquired over 2 million hectares of land in the 




the largest employer in Paraguay, with 5,000 workers engaged in the extraction of yerba, 
logging, and cattle-ranching (Nickson 1981). Over the proceeding years, an influx of other 
foreign companies installed in Paraguay, including the British company Liébig’s Extract of Meat 
Co. (LEMCO) and, of American origin, International Products Corporation (IPC), which settled 
in the country in 1917. Table 3.1 reveals the foreign companies that benefitted most from the 
Paraguayan land sales during this period, listing the largest land acquisitions and their ties to the 
rural economy.  
 
By 1917, the total land area “grabbed” by the 16 largest companies amounted to 8.6 million 
hectares—equivalent to over one-fifth of the total territory in the country. There was also a clear 
loss of the national control of the export sector. In addition to being in border areas, these 
companies held control over transport, finance, ports, and shipping lines, thus establishing farm 
enclaves which had little or no connection with the national economy and society, except for the 
use of peasant and indigenous labour in semi-servile conditions (Pastore 1972; Parquet 1987). 
 
The outward-oriented policies and foreign engagement in agrarian production and trade led to a 
gradual increase and diversification of export products, described by Baraibar (2020: 70–71) in 
the following terms:  
 
By the turn of the century, exports of tobacco, yerba maté (tea), hides, timber, 
lumber, and the bark of the quebracho (breakaxe) hardwood, from which tannin was 
extracted, and meat, had become important export products (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 




encouraged its renewed growth and in the 1920s it reemerged as export crop, mainly 
cultivated by small farmers (Seyler 1988, 116–118). However, a sizable proportion 
of cultivations was controlled by Argentine, British or Brazilian interests. Moreover, 
Argentina successfully restricted Paraguayan exports largely to “raw” products. For 
instance, the processing of yerba maté was in Argentine mills, and the processing of 
products from the forest sector was also made in Argentina, with for example 
Paraguayan quebracho extract shipped to Argentina to be reexported as Argentine 
tannin (Abente 1989, 67–69). Thus, Argentina succeeded in maintain [sic] Paraguay 
as commodity provider for processing in Argentina. Thus, not only was the actual 
production controlled by foreign actors, but Paraguay was hindered to develop into 
anything else than the rawest commodity provider. 
 
While many landowners were foreigners, there was also a domestic landed elite of 
ranchers, of which many belonged to the ruling Colorado Party. Many national 
landowners were also members of the powerful producer organization [Sociedad 
Ganadera del Paraguay, formed in 1885 and renamed the Rural Association of 
Paraguay (Asociación Rural del Paraguay, ARP) in 1938] …. [T]he ARP represented 
the ranchers’ interests with a lot of say in national policies. The ARP was also 
important in pushing for modernization of the livestock sector and export-orientation. 
It contributed to the rapid advancement of fencing, of the introduction of new 
European races, and developed systems for systematic breeding, and fencing. The 




and Brazil). By 1900, the stock of cattle was two million heads—which was still one 




Table 3.1 Foreign capital participation that settled in Paraguay, 1886–1917 
Year Company Origin of capital Principal activity Land (ha) 
1886  La industrial Paraguaya SA.  UK-Argentina Yerba mate/wood 2,137,500 
1886 Carlos Casado Ltda. Argentina Tannin 3,150,000 
1889 The Paraguay Central Railway Comp UK Railway – 
1893 Société la Foncière du Paraguay France-Belgium Salting and tannery 477,500 
1898 Liebig’s Extract of Meat Co. Britain Livestock* 322,225 
1902 Saladero Risso Uruguay Salting 56,250 
1903 Saladero Kemmerich (San Salvador) Germany Meat exports* – 
1905 Campos y Quebrayales Puerto Sastre Argentina Tannin 225,000 
1905 Estancia Cooper and Nephews UK Livestock 75,000 
1906 Quebrachales Fusionados SA Argentina Tannin and wood 227,500 
1907 Estancia La Rural Anglo Paraguaya SA UK Livestock 31,873 
1909 Compañía de Navegación Nicolas Mianovich Ltda. SA Argentina Fluvial transport – 
1910 Estancia La Rural Argentino Paraguaya SA Argentina Livestock 160,000 
1910 Estancia The Paraguay Land and Cattle Company  Livestock 444,082 
1910 The River Plate Quebracho Comp. UK Tannin and Wood 187,500 
1910 New York and Paraguay Comp. SA USA Tannin 375,000 
1910 La Forestal del Paraguay SA UK Tannin 131,250 
1910 The American Quebracho Company USA Tannin 412,500 
1911 Estancias y Quebrachales Puerto Galileo Argentina Tannin/Livestock 187,500 
1917 International Products Corporation USA Tannin/Livestock – 
     





The latifundistas emerged as a powerful social class. Famous names that would dominate the 
rural economy throughout the Liberal period and beyond soon appeared: Domingo Barthe, 
Carlos Casado del Alisal, José Fassardi, Foncière du Paraguay, Industrial Paraguaya, and Mate 
Larangeira. By 1946, landholding was still extremely concentrated. In the Chaco, 14 owners held 
7,567,457 hectares, equivalent to 31 per cent of the total land area, while in the eastern region, 11 
owners held 5,842,451 hectares, equivalent to 37 per cent of the total land area.  
 
On the other side of the rural spectrum, the first agricultural census in 1942–44, organized by 
Servicio Técnico Interámericano de Cooperación Agrícola (STICA), revealed the inadequacies 
of the minifundio (small subsistence-oriented farms) system. Out of a total of only 94,500 farm 
units: over 48 per cent were less than five hectares in size and there were even 25,600 holdings, 
each with less than one hectare of cultivated land, on which 153,600 people lived; 74 per cent of 
all cultivators were still squatters with no legal rights to land; 72 per cent still did not have iron 
ploughs, 55 per cent did not have any kind of plough, and 49 per cent did not have either a 
plough or an oxcart. The typical farm equipment consisted merely of an axe, a hoe, and a 
machete. The ox remained the only nonhuman power source (Nickson 2015). 
 
As consequence of all this, a defining feature Paraguayan countryside at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was the consolidation of a dualistic agrarian structure composed of latifundias 
and minifundias. By 1921, 47.8 per cent of the agricultural units (of less than 10 hectares) 
holding only 0.2 per cent of the land, against 1.7 per cent of the units with 76.1 per cent of the 
surface (in the stratum with more than 10,000 hectares) (Kleinpenning 1984). In short, the 




of land grabbing, concentration and foreignisation of a truly massive scale, establishing a highly 
unequal system of land tenure that remains virtually unchanged to the present day. 
 
3.2.2 El Stronato (1954–1989) 
The second cycle of land grabbing in the country begins with the military dictatorship of Alfredo 
Stroessner (1954–1989). If the first wave was driven by the territorialisation of Argentine and 
British capital for tannin, yerba mate and meat, the impetus for the second wave was a 
“conservative modernization”—to borrow from Barrington Moore’s (1966) classic work (see 
Soler [2014, 2018] for excellent analysis along these lines)—carried out by the authoritarian 
regime, which sought to develop “empty” lands and generate new sources of revenues from the 
exports of cotton and soybeans. In this new cycle, Brazilian actors and the production of grain 
takes centre stage. 
 
The Paraguayan political scientist Diego Abente-Brun (2005: 569) provides a description of the 
socioeconomic structure during the first fifteen years, or so, of the Stroessner era: 
 
Between 1954 and the early 1970s, the Paraguayan economy was characterized by 
very low rates of growth within the framework of a traditional social structure with 
widespread pre-capitalist forms of production in the countryside. Vast sectors of the 
peasantry were virtually excluded from the monetary economy and were devoted to 
subsistence crops on land they did not own. By the end of the 1950s, for example, 
1,549 landowners controlled some 85 per cent of the land, and only 0.9 per cent of 





In 1958, the first national seminar on land reform took place in Asunción, under the auspices of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and organised by the Paraguayan Rural 
Association (ARP). This significant event marked the genesis of a vast agricultural programme. 
In order to implement this shift in strategy, the Instituto de Reforma Agraria (IRA) was replaced 
in 1963 with the Instituto de Bienestar Rural (IBR),31 which was headed by the flamboyant Juan 
Manuel Frutos  throughout the remainder of the Stronato (Hetherington 2011: 28; Nickson 2015: 
33). The project, also called the “March to the East,” echoed the Brazilian “March to the West,” 
with all its military undertones.32 It was seen as a nation-building project which would 
simultaneously improve the lives of the campesino population and protect the territory from 
being annexed to Brazil’s much larger frontier drive (Hetherington 2011: 28).  
 
The project also epitomised the Stroessner’s particular brand of rural populism, known as 
agrarismo (Hetherington 2011). Adopting the language of Paraguayan nationalists such as Juan 
E. O’Leary and Natalicio González, Stroessner’s government embraced a populist discourse. 
Portraying the period from 1870 to 1947 as a time when foreigners dominated Paraguay and its 
peasantry, Stroessner announced that he would “liberate” Paraguay and establish social justice 
through a strong, authoritarian government (Chambers 2002: 135). In the words of Frutos, the 
government claimed that it sought to “transform the agrarian structure and establish a new 
Paraguayan society, with access for its poor, especially its peasants, to the nation’s wealth,” and 
would be “revolutionary, peaceful, nationalist, and anti-oligarchy” (Frutos 1982). Denunciations 
                                                             
31 Today the National Institute of Rural and Land Development (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Rural y de la 
Tierra; INDERT). 




against “oligarchs” were certainly not lacking in the legal code of the IBR. Consider, for 
example, this jewel written by Frutos:  
 
In 1940 the structure of land tenure was as follows: a. owners 5%, b. tenants or 
sharecroppers 4%, c. precarious occupants 91%. The only alternative: War on the 
latifundio, adopting political measures in both its aspects: as science and as art. To 
confront powerful sectors such as the large estate oligarchy, it is necessary to have 
powerful allies. In Paraguay the executives of the Agrarian Reform are allied with 
the people, the Armed Forces, and the youth. (Frutos 1977, quoted in Abente-Brun 
1989, own translation) 
 
IBR populist rhetoric notwithstanding, claims that the government had intended to destroy the 
landed oligarchy border on the farcical. According to the 1981 agricultural census, in the eastern 
region, 1,086 latifundistas still owned 58 per cent of the total area under cultivation, while in the 
Chaco, 951 latifundistas owned 94 per cent of the total area under cultivation. Meanwhile, 
104,629 farm units, each less than 5 hectares in size, equivalent to 43 per cent of the total, 
accounted for only 2.5 per cent of the total area in eastern Paraguay. In the Chaco, 340 farm units 
less than 50 hectares in size, equivalent to 36 per cent of the total, accounted for only 0.1 per 
cent of the total area. In Paraguay as a whole, 2,289 holdings of 1,000 hectares and over, which 
made up only 0.9 per cent of the total, monopolized no less than 78.5 per cent of the farmland.  
 
The reform emphasised colonization of “virgin land”, rather than expropriation, as the solution to 




hectares in the Chaco and larger than 10,000 hectares in the eastern region were classed as 
latifundios and thus subject to possible expropriation if not “rationally cultivated” (i.e., in which 
fixed assets such as roads, wells, fences, and buildings totalled less than 50 per cent of the fiscal 
land value). However, in practice, hardly any land was ever expropriated under this law (Nickson 
2015: 33). The strategy of agricultural colonization was, of course, a political one. As Tai (1974: 
234) explains: “public land settlement (or colonization) is an attractive idea. To settle people on 
new land and to develop it for agricultural use does not involve any basic alteration of the 
property rights of existing landowners; hence a public-land settlement program will generate no 
opposition from the landed class.” Emphasizing this same point, Kleinpenning and Zoomers 
write, “[w]hen opting for a policy of agricultural colonization… the Stroessner regime was well 
aware of the advantages of this strategy in comparison with… radical land reform measures… 
which would be in conflict with the interests of the ruling elite and particularly with those of the 
large land-owners” (Kleinpenning and Zoomers 1991: 290). 
 
In total, the IBR is reported to have opened more than 7.5 million hectares of land to some 
20,000 families and 1,210 titles between 1963 and 1985. Several critical studies have examined 
the impact of the colonization programme, highlighting the very low take-up of the IBR land-
titling facility by minifundistas, not least because the legal procedure itself was extremely 
expensive and time-consuming and the titles could not in any case be transferred to the next 
generation by inheritance (Zoomers 1988: 112). The failure of the colonization program to 
substantially alter the structure of landholding was revealed by the 1981 agricultural census, 
which showed that only 52 per cent of all farmers in eastern Paraguay held legal title to their 




landowners with holdings of more than 100 hectares, who accounted for only 4 per cent of all 
farmers, still controlled 88 per cent of all cultivated land (Nickson 2015). 
 
In practice, while the reform was nominally committed to proving land title and support to 
landless and land poor peasants, actual land allocation practices primarily benefited Stroessner 
associates (e.g. armed forces, rural elites and government officials), who in turn resold part of 
this land at favourable market prices to Brazilian companies and colonists. The IBR also sold 
land directly to foreign estate agencies and companies (Kleinpenning 1984: 173). Thus, far 
from resolving the country’s skewed distribution of land ownership, the “horizontal 
expansion” of agricultural land gave rise to Paraguay’s distinctive rentier class, a ruling class 
of landowners whose capacity to extract surplus relied on extra-economic means of 
enforcement and extraction. The following description of Brazil’s land-based power relations 
captures just as accurately the historic and Paraguayan reality tierras malhabidas: 
 
The oligarchic and patronage-based features of these policies are rooted in the 
agrarian past. Land in Brazil [and Paraguay] has traditionally been not merely a 
factor of production but a reward for service and proximity to power, as well as a 
foundation for the accumulation and maintenance of more power and privilege. 
This power includes the ability of large landowners to direct the legal and 
coercive apparatus of the state in their region. 





According to a recent report by the Paraguayan Truth and Justice Commission on illegal land 
ownership, between 1954 and 2003, a total of 7,851,295 hectares of land (64 per cent of the total 
land distributed and 19 per cent of Paraguay’s total surface area) were allocated to both nationals 
and foreigners in an irregular and clientelist manner (CVJ 2008). The study examined 200,705 
awards of land and concluded that many beneficiaries were relatives of Stroessner himself, or 
politicians and army officers directly associated with his government. Table 3.2 lists some of the 
main beneficiaries, including former Paraguayan Presidents, Alfredo Stroessner and Andrés 
Rodriguez, Former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza—who, after being overthrown by the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) in 1979, 
fled in exile to Paraguay where he bought a ranch and gated house33—and ex-Colorado Senator, 
Blas N. Riquelme. Indeed, it was on land to which Riquelme claimed ownership (some 4,000 
hectares in Curuguaty in the department of Canindeyú) in which 17 people were massacred on 
15 June 2012, triggering the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo (2008–2012) a week 
later, as we shall discuss in chapter 4. 
 
Table 3.2 Individual beneficiarias of tierras malhabidas (ill-gotten lands) 
Beneficiary Hectares Department 
Alfredo Stroessner 1,305 Alto Paraná 
Andrés Rodríguez 8,055 Alto Paraná and Cordillera 
Blas N. Riquelme 4,078 Canindeyú 
Humberto Domínguez Dibb  7,990 Ñacunday and Villa Hayes 
Conradro Pappalardo 4,000 Chaco 
Alcibiades Brítez Borges 10,000 Canindeyú 
Pastor Coronel 4,476 – 
Fahd Yamil 524 Amambay 
Roberto Knopfelmacher 8,244 Concepcion and Chaco 
Galo Escobar 1,630 Alto Paraná 
Source: CVJ (2008). Informe Final: Tierras Mal Habidas. Tomo IV.  
                                                             
33 Somoza was eventually assassinated outside his exile home (Avenida de España no. 433) by a seven-person 





As well as these corrupt forms of “domestic land grabs”, the colonization program also brought 
about a process of land “foreignization” (extranjerización). The awkward concept of land 
foreignisation has distinct roots in Latin America (Zoomers 2010; Borras et al. 2012) and was 
widely used in the region before the recent land grab “literature rush” (Oya 2013). This is 
certainly the case in Paraguay, where there is a sizeable extranjerización literature stretching 
back to the 1970s (Laíno 1977; Nickson 1981; Neupert 1991; Glauser 2009; Galeano 2012a, 
2012b). A strand of this literature focuses on the controversial issue of Brazilian immigration 
into Paraguay starting at the end of the 1960s, resulting in another awkward concept: 
“brasiguayos” a pejorative label (amalgamated from the Spanish words for Brazilian and 
Paraguayan) used to refer to Brazilian migrants in Paraguay and their descendants. The use of the 
term “brasiguayos” has been subject to particular critique for its implied dichotomy between 
wealthy Brazilian agriculturalists devoted to soybean production on the one hand, and 
impoverished and marginalized Paraguayan small-scale farmers on the other (Blanc 2015). In 
reality, “the majority of Brazilian immigrants in Paraguay are small-scale farmers who, like 
many of their impoverished Paraguayan neighbours, have faced constant marginalization” (Blanc 
2015, 145). In assessing the Paraguayan literature on this topic, Blanc (2015) offers a broad-
brush interpretation of various land-related studies in Paraguay. By lumping Nickson (1981), 
Nagel (1991), and Fogel (1989) together, however, he ignores the great variety in these studies, 
particularly in terms of methodological and conceptual framing. In fact, Nagel’s detailed study of 
peasant differentiation amongst Paraguayan and Brazilian producers goes a long way in 
supporting Blanc’s argument as she concludes that “Brazilian immigrants often suffer the same 





Perhaps the most nuanced study on this topic was conducted by Wesz (2020) who looked at the 
differential paths and contemporary dynamics of rural producers and landowners of Brazilian 
origin in Paraguay. Based on semi-structured interviews with 56 Brazilian farmers/landowners, 
Wesz identifies five different movements and dynamics of this social group in relation to land in 
Paraguay: (i) producers who arrived in the second half of the 20th century and who remain in the 
same region in Paraguay; (ii) producers and/or descendants who arrived in the country in the 
same period and in the last few years they have moved inland; (iii) actors who arrived in the 
country more recently, investing in agricultural production and/or land acquisition; (iv) 
producers who chose to hold land in both Paraguay and Brazil; (v) rural producers who, for 
different reasons, return to Brazil.34 
 
3.2.3 A transition in search of democracy (1989– ) 
The third and current cycle of land grabbing in Paraguay begins in the 1990s with the country’s 
(protracted and arguably ongoing) transition to democracy35 following the fall of the Stroessner 
                                                             
34 It is important to note that foreign land grabbing continues in Paraguay despite the implementation of laws and 
regulations to restrict these processes. In 2005, a border security law was passed providing for a 50 km strip of land 
along the terrestrial and fluvial borders, within which the law prohibited ownership or usufruct of land by foreigners 
from neighbouring countries as well as legal entities mainly composed of foreign capital. In 2008, the clause of the 
Agrarian Statutes of 2004 was implemented, which prevents foreigners from having access to land administered by 
the Institute of Rural Development and Land (INDERT). Despite the legal ban, many transactions have had the tacit 
approval of INDERT officials (Galeano 2012). Fieldwork research by Wesz (2020) also revealed the strategies used 
by Brazilians to circumvent these legislative hurdles. Given that most of them have been in the country for more 
than 30 years and have descendants who were born in Paraguay, they end up putting the land title in the name of 
family members who have Paraguayan citizenship. 
35There is a sizeable literature on the detective nature of Paraguayan democracy which cannot be covered here, but 




regime in 1989 through a putsch carried out by General Andrés Rodríguez, Stroessner’s former 
confidant and co-cuñado (see Nickson 1989).36 This cycle is marked by the penetration of trans-
Latin capital, rise of flex crop production (soybean), and consolidation of an agro-extractivist 
development model. 
 
As a reflection of the continued strength of the rural elite in the post-Stroessner era, the 1992 
Constitution accepted proposals by the ARP which effectively blocked significant land reform 
and expropriation of unproductive lands. The new constitution excluded the traditional usufruct 
right to land and established guidelines to agrarian reform in favour of large landholders, 
whereby expropriation of unproductive lands must be accompanied by full compensation, paid in 
advance to the landholder at the price agreed (Nagel 1999: 167-168; Lambert 2000: 388).37  With 
continued campesino unrest and renewed calls for agrarian legislation, a new Agrarian Statute 
was finally approved in 2002 (after lying dormant in Congress for more than a decade), and in 
July 2004 the IBR was replaced by the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Rural y de la Tierra 
(National Institute for Rural and Land Development – INDERT). The new legislation was 
nonetheless technical rather than redistributive in character, and the stated aim of rural 
development and poverty alleviation was to be achieved through increased productivity, the 
stimulation of agro-industry, and overall reduction of market interventions (Henderson et al. 
2015: 748). Furthermore, “a combination of continued resistance from the ARP and rampant 
corruption meant that, like its predecessors, INDERT failed to make any significant progress on 
agrarian reform” (Nickson 2015: 34). 
 
                                                             
36 Stroessner’s son was married to the daughter of Rodríguez. 




At the same time, the process of land foreignization (extranjerización) that had started in the 
1960s with the release of state lands for private purchase (Nickson 1981; Laíno1977) continued 
to accelerate, as Paraguayan lands were increasingly being integrated into the expanding 
agricultural frontiers of Brazil and, to a far lesser extent, Argentina (Galeano 2012; Glauser 
2009). The current correlation between land concentration and foreign ownership is indeed most 
striking, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 64% of the land cultivated with soy in the country’s four 
most important sojero departments—Alto Paraná, Canindeyú, Caaguazú and Itapúa– belong to 
Brazilian capitalists (Galeano 2012: 461). 
 
Figure 3.1 Percentage of hectares cultivated with soy, by nationality of producers and farm size, 
2008 
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Figure 3.2 Foreign direct investment inflows (millions of dollars), 1990-2018
 
Source: Own elaboration based on ECLAC (1998, 2009, 2019).   
 
The commodity boom of the 2000s and the sudden increase in FDI in agriculture (see Figure 3.2) 
has triggered a significant increase in the price of land across the country. There has been a 
proliferation of agencies online offering to purchase thousands of hectares of natural forests for 
conversion into cattle ranches. Capital Campo, a company specialising in direct investment in 
farmland and asset management, claims that a 5,000 hectare property purchased in 2004 in 
Boquerón Department for $125,000 ($25 per hectare) was sold nine years later for $1,500,000 
($300 per hectare). The Q&A section of the website for Agroindustrial Acaray S.A., a company 
specialising in direct investment in farmland and asset management, lays this phenomenon out in 
surprising candor: 
 
Rara vez compramos fincas de un ganadero existente. Generalmente estamos 

































































































































tienen interés en la agricultura, de los sucesores, de personas que se han adjudicado 
durante la dictadura Stronista del ex Instituto de Bienestar Rural (I.B.R) hoy 
Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (I.N.D.E.R.T). que hasta hoy están ociosa e 
improductiva, que han adquirido por precios irrisorios, y hoy están ofertando a 
precio de mercado, que con nuestro asesoramiento sensato el inversor puede 
comprar a precio infravalorado.  Se trata de un cambio generacional que se está 
produciendo y que con el tiempo se agota la propiedad de tierras agrícolas, que está 
comenzando a concentrar en las grandes empresas. 
 
A particularly prevalent feature in this latest wave of land grabbing as therefore is the “porosity” 
of the expansion of land tenure among countries of the region (Gómez 2014)—in other words, 
intra-regional land grabbing driven by “(trans)Latina” companies, often resulting in cross-border 
foreignisation (Borras et al. 2012a, 2012b; Driven 2014). According to Gómez (2014, 10), this 
process of intraregional expansion has taken three different tracks: (i) via (trans)Latina 
companies (TLCs) to mobilise resources; (ii) through a mix of landownership and leasing (such 
as agricultural “pools” in Argentina); and (iii) through migration (the case of Brazilians in 
Bolivia and Paraguay). All three of these pathways have taken place in Paraguay, although the 
“sowing pool” phenomenon is not as prevalent as it is in Argentina. Having already discussed the 
issue of Brazilian migration above, let us briefly consider the first of role of (Trans)Latina 
companies in Paraguay. 
 
Brazilian (Trans)Latin companies (JBS and Frigorífico Concepción) have taken a dominant role 




corporations, ADM (Archer Daniels Midland), Bunge, Cargill and Dreyfus (know as the ABCD 
firms), control the lion’s share of agricultural exports (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 The top seven agribusiness companies and their export sale (US$ million), 2010-2019 
Company (HQ) Principle exports Export sales 
Cargill Agropecuaria Saci (USA) Soy and derivatives 8,317 
ADM Paraguay S.A. (USA) Soy and derivatives 6,701 
Frigorífico Concepción S.A. (Brazil) Livestock 3,102 
Bunge Paraguay S.A. (USA) Soy and derivatives 2,364 
JBS Paraguay S.A. (Brazil) Livestock 1,652 
Louis Dreyfus Paraguay (France) Soy and derivatives 1,057 
Noble Paraguay S.A. (Hong Kong) Soy and derivatives 864 
Total  24,057 
Source: Own elaboration based on statistics from the National Customs Directorate (DNA). 
 
This intra-regional character has aroused a healthy renewal of interest in Ruy Mauro Marini’s 
(1972) concept of Brazilian sub-imperialism, redirecting our attention to the geopolitical alliance 
between the Brazilian state and private agribusiness interests (see Vuyk 2014; Zibechi 2014; 
Oliveira 2016; Sotelo Valencia 2017). As Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras (2014: 28) 
helpfully distinguish, extractive capital can largely be seen as “the multinational corporations, 
bearers of capital in the form of foreign direct investment”, while extractive imperialism, on the 
other hand, refers to the dynamic workings of “the state in the exercise and projection of its 
various powers in support of this capital.”38 While not yet a direct investor in land, the Brazilian 
government provides significant support to Brazilian investors, first by monitoring investment 
                                                             
38 For a fuller discussion on the intimate relationship between (extractive) imperialism and capitalism, see 




deals acquiring or leasing land (via the Brazilian embassy), and second by providing technical 
assistance (via Brazilian state agencies) in agricultural and cattle ranching ventures (Galeano 
2012: 646). Furthermore, in the face of increasingly militant agitation by landless peasants in 
Paraguay for redistribution of Brazilian-owned soybean farms, the Brazilian government issued 
strong warnings and threatened sanctions against such actions. In early October 2008, for 
example, Brazilian president Lula signed Decree 6.592, which regulates the National 
Mobilization System dedicated to confronting “foreign aggression.” The first article of the 
decree defines foreign aggression as “threats or injurious acts that harm national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, the Brazilian people, or national institutions, even when they do not constitute 
an invasion of national territory”(quoted in Ultima Hora 2008, emphasis added). In other words, 
any expropriation of Brazilian-owned land in Paraguay could be used as a pretext for Brazilian 
military action against Paraguay. The intervention of the Brazilian state in support of its 
nationals in land conflict has also proven to be a perennial obstacle to land redistribution, as was 
clearly seen in the case of Ñacunday (Fogel 2013), which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
 
3.3 Reconstituted landlordism 
Based on agricultural census data for the years 1956, 1981, 1991, and 2008, Table 3.4 provides 
information on the distribution of farms and landholdings by farm size categories. The structure 
of unequal landholdings has exhibited a remarkable persistence over time, remaining relatively 
immune to fluctuations in the rate of growth and resistant to diverse—albeit halting—efforts of 
class struggle for land over the past three decades to change this distribution in the direction of 





Table 3.4 Distribution of farms and land by farm size, 1956–2008 
 1956 1981 1991 2008 
Distribution of farms     
0–5 ha 45.9 36.0 40.0 40.5 
5–10 ha 23.4 19.9 21.7 22.9 
10–100 ha 27.4 40.0 34.3 30.2 
100–500 ha 1.9 2.8 2.7 3.6 
500–1,000 ha 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 
1,000–10,000 ha 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 
>10,000 ha 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Number of farms 149,614 248,930 307,221 289,649 
     
Distribution of Land     
0–5 ha 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 
5–10 ha 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.3 
10–100 ha 5.0 9.5 9.1 5.7 
100–500 ha  6.3 6.8 7.4 
500–1,000 ha 92.6 3.2 4.2 5.8 
1,000–10,000 ha  27.0 36.2 38.3 
>10,000 ha  51.6 40.8 40.7 
Land cultivated  16,816,618 21,940,531 23,817,737 31,0856,894 
Source: Henderson et al. (2015). 
 
Looking at the data for 1956, it is evident that the Stroessner regime inherited considerable 
inequality, as nearly 70 per cent of producers operated farms less than 10 hectares but accounted 
for just over 2 per cent of the total land cultivated. Conversely, in that same year, just over 3 per 




of the total land cultivated. The 1956 census also gave a livestock of 4,500,000 head and, by 
1966, some 14,300,000 hectares, equivalent to 35 per cent of the total land area, was used for 
cattle ranching. Over two-thirds of the national herd was owned by only 1.5 per cent of all 
producers, each with 1,000 or more head of cattle.  
 
Largely due to the regime’s land colonisation programme, it is apparent that the number of farms 
and area cultivated expanded greatly by 1991. Compared to the 1956, the number of farms more 
than double from 149,614 to 307,221, while the farmland jumped from 16.8 million hectares to 
23.8 million hectares. The inegalitarian distribution of landholdings, however, remained intact, 
as in that year the largest 4 per cent of producers operated 88 per cent of total land cultivated. 
The 1991 agricultural census revealed that 351 owners, each with more than 10,000 hectares, 
held a total of 9,730,950 hectares. Of these, 237 were in the Chaco with 7,297,440 hectares (75 
per cent of the total) and 114 were in eastern Paraguay with 2,433,510 hectares (25 per cent of 
the total). Meanwhile, 255,578 farmers, with less than 20 hectares each, equivalent to 83 per cent 
of all farms, held a total of 1,450,764 hectares, equivalent to only 6.2 per cent of all agricultural 
land. 
 
Finally, the democratization process that began after 1991 appears to have been accompanied by 
a further concentration of landholdings, as the 2008 agricultural census revealed the impact of 
the expansion of commercial agriculture on the land tenure system. The total number of farms 
fell by 5 per cent from 307,221 in 1991 to 289,666 in 2008, of which only 8,190 were located in 
the Chaco. Although the number of holdings above 1,000 hectares in eastern Paraguay fell, the 




500 hectares increased by 59 per cent. By contrast, the number of farms of between five and 10 
hectares in eastern Paraguay, at 66,118, showed hardly any change from 1991, while the number 
between 10 and 20 hectares fell by 13 per cent, those between 20 and 50 hectares fell by 28 per 
cent, and those between 50 and 100 hectares fell by 11 per cent. A World Bank report in 2009 
concluded that Paraguay had one of the most unequal distributions of land tenure in the world.  
 
Overall, the legacy of historical patterns of land distribution described in this chapter so far 
reveals a clear “landlord bias”, driven by the interests of the ARP, as the institutional basis of the 
allocation of land and tenure systems clearly favours the interests of the dominant rural class 
above those of smallholders. The category of “landlord bias” was first developed by Cristobal 
Kay in his comment of Michael Lipton’s famous “urban bias” thesis (Kay 1977) and further 
refined in his historical analysis of class alliances and agrarian change in Chile (Kay 1981: 498): 
 
Different social classes exist within each economically or geographically defined 
sector, and the main contradiction in society is not between sectors but between 
social classes. It is this essential contradiction which the state constantly tries to 
mediate through measures ranging from coercion to consent and which aim to ensure 
the domination of those classes in control of the state apparatus. The introduction of 
a class analysis reveals that whilst the State may have discriminated against the 
agricultural sector, it also acted to protect landlords’ interests. Peasants were the 





For Kay (2009, 112–113), a more useful analysis would therefore consider the “landlord bias” 
who exercise power “from the blocking of land reform, the absence or non-enforcement of 
minimum wage and social security legislation, the outlawing of rural trade unions, the failure to 
curb exploitative practices of traders (including sometimes landlords) who pay low prices for the 
peasants’ marketed surplus and sell at a high price the inputs purchased by peasants, and lenders 
(including sometimes landlords) who charge usury interest rates for credit.” In the case of 
Paraguay, large landowners—many of them foreign—have amassed vast estates, exerting a huge 
amount of influence on the state. Peasant leaders also grumble about the dense overlap between 
the landowner ownership and political power. The oligarchic control of the state by landed elites 
is widely recognized by the country’s most important peasant movements:  
 
Por un lado, la oligarquía, los latifundistas, los ganaderos, los sojeros, ellos los que 
tienen el control del aparato del estado y ellos marcan la política que se viene 
desarrollando en nuestro país. Se va profundizando inclusivo con el actual gobierno 
[Cartes], se está profundizando… se había aprobado una creación de impuestos por 
el 10% a la exportación de la soja y el presidente Cartes veto esa ley. Incluso, con la 
modificación de la ley fiscal, anteriormente el impuesto a la utilidad de las empresas 
estaba entre el 30%, bajaron al 10%. Se dieron más a las empresas… y toda la 
oligarquía están dirigiendo toda la política de los gobiernos de turno en nuestro país 
y son los que, hasta esto momento, no quieren ni pagar impuestos porque son, 
comparando con los países vecinos, los más atrasados digamos hasta en ese sentido.  





The rapid emergence of commercial soybean and meat production for export from the 1970s has 
had a contradictory impact on the phenomenon of the latifundio. On the one hand, most of the 
immense landholdings of the past were broken up and sold to agribusiness companies and 
brasiguayos in eastern Paraguay and to modern cattle-ranching companies in the Chaco. On the 
other hand, a consolidation of large landholdings in fewer hands took place, especially in eastern 
Paraguay, as commercial agricultural companies and brasiguayos such as Tranquilo Favero 
expanded their operations by buying up holdings of small farmers, who often lacked definitive 
land titles (Nickson 2015: 347–348). Although these new holdings continued to be referred to as 
latifundios, in reality their far superior level of mechanization and productivity means that they 
are extremely different economic entities to their counterparts of the pre-1970s. The next section 
briefly explores the complex web of intraclass relations of the various segments of the dominant 
rural class. 
 
3.3.1 Coalesced bourgeoisie 
In 1974, Maurice Zeitlin published a seminal article in The American Journal of Sociology, 
criticizing the prevailing managerial theory and evidence approaches that dominated the analysis 
of large corporation’s ownership and control. He called for research on the capitalist class that 
would reveal its inner structure—particularly the interaction of family ties, property, and 
business leadership in the large corporations (Zeitlin 1974). Developing this line of research on 
intercorporate and class power further in Landlords and Capitalists, Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988) 
set out to explore the full panoply of interclass relations—interorganizational, kinship, economic, 
and political—through a sustained, empirical, class analysis of the composition of Chile’s 




studies lies both in their exhaustive use of empirical data and insights gained from questionnaires 
and interviews with significant members of Chiles dominant class, and the methodological 
model used for the class analysis of the internal structures of dominant classes, which may well 
be fruitfully applied elsewhere.39 For example, Vergara-Camus and Kay (2017b) invoke Zeitlin 
and Ratcliff’s study to explain the difficulties faced by left-wing governments in Latin America 
to move beyond the inherited neoliberal model of agricultural development during early twenty-
first century. They concluded that the rise of agribusiness has accentuated the fusion of the 
landed classes with financial and industrial capital, leading to the formation of a “coalesced 
bourgeoisie”—i.e. a “single” and “indissoluble” class of landlords and capitalists. Under these 
conditions, the ties that bind the different fractions of the bourgeoisie and landed property 
reaches a level at which the distinction between capitalists and landowners is abolished.  
 
Drawing on the concept “coalesced bourgeoisie”, I  offer a class analysis of intersectoral 
alliances between the old national political and economic elite in Paraguay, and also show how 
new dominant actors have emerged from the reconfiguration of the global food system. It is 
argued that land-based power relations have resulted in a form of “reconstituted landlordism.” 
This analysis requires careful consideration of the role of mutual (although asymmetrical) 
benefits, cooperation, and alliances between specific sections of the landed classes, foreign 
agribusiness capital, imperialist forces, and the Paraguayan state: 
 
The growing dominance of trans-Latin corporations, international financial actors 
and agricultural multinationals has social, economic and political consequences that 
                                                             




have not been sufficiently studied, largely due to the opaque manner in which they 
act. They often operate through subsidiaries or partnerships with local companies, so 
their involvement is not always obvious. (Guereña 2016: 43) 
 
The section begins by identifying some of the major landowners in the country today and their 
role within the wider political economy of the country. Information on the social and economic 
backgrounds of Paraguayan landowning elite as well as, where relevant, brief sketches of their 
political careers are drawn from the extremely reliable bibliographic entries in the latest edition 
of the Historical Dictionary of Paraguay, hence the frequent citations of Nickson (2015) 
throughout this chapter. The following section examines the internal structure of the Paraguayan 
dominant class, exploring issues such as the particular ways in which the contradictory interests 
between landlords and agribusiness are resolved, and the type and degree of influence the 
different segments of dominant class exert in shaping state polices for rural development. 
 
3.3.2 The top landowners 
Who are the top landowners of Paraguay today? The Carlos Casado or Industria Paraguaya of the 
twenty-first century? Answering this question is not easy; it is difficult to obtain data that can 
give us a clear idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon. As Scoones et al. (2013), Edelman 
(2013), and Oya (2013) point out, there are several methodological hurdles to overcome when 
carrying out research on land issues. Understandably, landowners are reluctant to tell researchers 
about their land holdings, since many may wish to hide their land holdings, fearing taxation or 
expropriation. Adding further complexity to this task is the lack of transparency in transactions, 




(Nagel 1999: 160n17; Rojas 2016: 101–102). While measuring and defining ownership and 
tenure often requires rigorous analysis of cadastral surveys and land registries, neither the 
Paraguayan Public Registry of Property (DGRP) nor the National Cadastre Service (SNC) offer a 
searchable database of major landowners. Locating such information, therefore, entails 
painstaking cross-checking and drawing connections across variety of sources, to unearth hidden 
truths behind the official land records, and enumerating the cases in which the owner could be 
adequately identified. 
 
One of the few studies to have done this work of the sleuth and the economist is an Oxfam report 
conducted by Arantxa Guereña and Luis Rojas (2016), Yvy Jára: Los dueños de la tierra en 
Paraguay. Trolling through and examining various records, such as the Secretariat of the 
Environment’s (SEAM) environmental impact assessment reports, the register of livestock 
export-approved livestock establishments, cadastral records of recently acquired properties, 
newspaper articles, and trade publications, they have produced a database of more than 700 
property records throughout the country, which paints a fairly illustrative, although far from 
complete, picture of the main landowners. In total, these major landowners hold 3,900,100 
hectares, equivalent to almost 10 per cent of the total national territory.  
 
Table 3.5 displays the 15 largest landowners in Paraguay, unearthed in the study. Although 
incomplete, the list makes it possible to identify the main large landowners and reflects the 
diversity of actors competing for control of land in the region.40  In the top positions are a South 
                                                             
40 It is important to note that the figures are likely an underrepresentation of the extent of land concentration, many 




Korean church (Moon Sect), an investment fund associated with a European bank (Grupo 
Espíritu Santo/DEG), large soybean producers of Brazilian origin (Grupo Favero), and powerful 
oligarchs, including a former president (Grupo Cartes) and the owner of one of Paraguay’s main 
national newspapers (Pedro Zucolillo). One of the historic latifundios—Carlos Casado—still 
appears. Many of these large landowners own adjoining plots of land in the same district, as in 
the case of Favero in Ñacunday, where it has accumulated an area of 52,942 hectares distributed 
in 18 adjacent farms; the same is true of the Moon Sect in the Chaco or the Riquelme Group in 
Curuguaty. In part, this is because the owners are progressively acquiring new farms to increase 
their territories, but it can also be a strategy to minimize the risks of a possible expropriation or 
declaration of the property as a latifundia (Guereña and Rojas 2016). 
 
Table 3.5 The 15 Largest landowners in Paraguay 
Landowner Land holding (ha) 
Moon Sect 590,000 
Grupo Cartes 200,000 
Grupo Espíritu Santo (Portugal) and DEG (Germany) 136,000 
Grupo Favero 130,000 
Grupo Riquelme – Reguera 114,000 
Grupo Rieder 94,000 
Marcelo Bastos Ferraz (Brazil) 78,000 
Fundación Moisés Bertoni 70,000 
Grupo Domínguez Dibb 52,000 
Carlos Casado SA and Cresud SA 50,000 
Pedro Zucolillo 44,000 
Joici Companhoni (Brazil) 40,000 
Familia Zavala Serrati 37,000 
Grupo Vierci 33,000 
Heribert Roedel 32,000 
Source: Rojas (2016). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
neither the Chortitzer cooperative (98,636 ha) nor the Neuland cooperative (76,472 ha) have been included in this 




By far the largest owner is the private estate of the Universal Peace Federation of Korea, a 
religious sect formed by multimillionaire Reverend Sun Myung Moon (1920–2012), which own 
some 600,000 ha in the Paraguayan Chaco—more than twice the size of Luxembourg. Although 
it is not wholly clear what goes on there, this private estate appears to function as a hideaway: it 
is a definite no-go area for outsiders. According to a report in The Irish Times (14 October 2004), 
Moon’s acquisitions of land in Paraguay are connected to two strategy interests: control over the 
Guaraní aquifer, one of the largest resource of fresh drinking water in the world, and the 
narcotics trade.41 
 
In 2000, the Moon sect paid a reported US$13.65 million for 390,000 hectares of land in the 
Department of Alto Paraguay (Chaco) from Carlos Casado, Paraguay’s largest landowner and 
former tannin producer. The sale led to much controversy, as it made “Moon” the owner of the 
small town of Puerto Casado (population 6,000), which was once an important centre for the 
exploitation of quebracho extract by a private Argentinian enterprise. The confiscation of 
farmland surrounding the town that local people had tilled for generations led to hostility toward 
Victoria S.A., an agro-industrial firm established by the sect. On 30 October 2003, a mob 
destroyed the company offices in Puerto Casado. The conflict erupted after the company sacked 
activists who were trying to establish a trade union among its 400 workers. In 2005, a law was 
passed to expropriate 52,000 hectares of land belonging to Victoria S.A. However, in a 
counterproposal, which was accepted, Victoria S.A. donated 31,200 hectares to the community 
of Puerto Maldonado. The former tannin factory was returned to the company in June 2014 after 
being occupied by protestors in 2006 (Zoomers 2010: 437; Nickson 2015: 114). 






Grupo Cartes, owned by president Horacio Cartes (2013–2018), is the second largest landowner 
in the country, as they have bought large amount of properties in several departments of the 
country since Cartes took office in 2013, mainly in the departments of Boquerón, Alto Paraguay 
and Misiones, which are added to other previous properties. The group’s land would be around 
200,000 hectares. Most of them are in the name of companies such as Ganadera Chajá, Ganadera 
Sofía, Ganadera Las Palmas, Campos e Invernada SA, Ka’aguy Pora SA, Compañía 
Agrotabacalera del Paraguay SA, among others. Box 3.1 provides some background information 
on what is known about Cartes before he assumed the presidency in 2013, including widely 
reported links to drug trafficking and money laundering which, despite efforts by the Partido 
Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) and sections of the media, did not deter voters, who were 
more impressed by his projected image as a successful businessman who could increase 
employment opportunities. 
 
Box 3.1 Who is Cartes?42 
From 1985 to 1989, Cartes was a fugitive from justice after being arraigned on fraud charges 
related to a scam that took place during the first half of 1985 associated with abuse of the 
multiple exchange rate system then in force, through which he embezzled $35 million from 
Paraguay’s Central Bank.43 He returned to Paraguay following the overthrow of Stroessner 
                                                             
42 This section box draws almost exclusively and verbatim from Nickson’s (2015) bibliographic entry on Horacio 
Cartes in the latest edition of the Historical Dictionary of Paraguay (for the full entry see, “Cartes Jara, Horacio 
Manuel [1956– ]”; Nickson 2015: 114–117). 
43 “At the time, Cartes worked for an Asunción money exchange company, Cambios Humaitá, and was a 
shareholder in a front company, Humaitá Turismo, involved in the scam. Under the calesita (“roundabout”) swindle, 




and handed himself in to the authorities having believed that he had made arrangements for the 
pending charges to be dropped, but it seems that he was double-crossed by associates in the 
Paraguayan judiciary. In his 11 May 1989 declaration to the court, he stated that his four years 
on the run were “in order to obtain evidence to prove my innocence.” In his first interview 
after winning the presidency in April 2013, Cartes stated that he had been imprisoned for 60 
days “during the Stroessner dictatorship,” implying that he had been a victim of the violation 
of human rights prevalent during this time. However, there is strong evidence that his 
imprisonment actually took place from 24 April to 8 October 1989 (i.e., after the overthrow of 
Stroessner). The documentation surrounding this whole episode was subsequently removed 
from the state prosecutor’s office and, despite repeated efforts by lawyers acting for the 
Central Bank, charges against him were eventually overturned in 2008 (almost twenty-three 
years later), shortly before he announced his candidacy for president. 
 
After his release in 1989, he opened a money exchange company, Cambios Amambay, which 
was converted into a bank, Banco Amambay, in 1992. The business empire of Cartes grew 
rapidly during the 1990s through the creation of Tabacalera del Este (TABESA), a cigarette 
factory established in 1994 close to the Brazilian border, and Tabacos del Paraguay S.A., a 
cigarette sales company. He also purchased five large cattle ranches and the Pulp soft drink 
company. In March 1995, at the height of a major banking crisis that saw the collapse of two 
large banks—Banco Alemán and Multibanco—and a massive capital flight, Grupo Cartes set 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the preferential exchange rate. These funds were then turned over at the market rate and the profits deposited in U.S. 
bank accounts under front names, including that of the cleaning lady at Cambios Humaitá. After the scam was 
discovered in 1985, Cartes went on the run for four years. Virtually nothing is known about his activities at this 




up an offshore bank, Amambay Trust Bank, in Rarotonga, Cook Islands. The bank operated 
until 2000. Although a wholly owned subsidiary of the Banco Amambay, Amambay Trust 
Bank was never registered with the Paraguayan banking authorities. At the time, the Cook 
Islands were on the blacklist of tax havens produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development and generally regarded as a prime location for illegal money 
laundering activities. In 2001, Cartes gained control of Libertad football club. By 2014, his 
family-owned conglomerate, Grupo Cartes, consisted of 22 companies and employed 3,500 
people in Paraguay (Nickson 2015: 115, 116). 
 
In 2004, a Brazilian parliamentary committee investigated the alleged involvement of Cartes’s 
associates in the Banco Amambay in narcotics-related money laundering, using as its basis an 
earlier study by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In October 2012, 
WikiLeaks published documents of a cable from the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires (dated 5 
January 2010) showing that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) was still watching Cartes for alleged connections to money laundering 
and drug trafficking to the United States. The cable referred to “Operation Stone Heart,” an 
international investigation of narcotics smuggling, and money laundering based in the tri-
border area (along Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil) (Nickson 2015: 115; Hetherington 2020: 
242n5). For an even-handed assessment of these various crimes and allegations, see “¿Quien 
es Cartes?” (ABC Color, 17 April 2013).44 
                                                             
44 Cartes responded by welcoming an investigation, saying that he has nothing to hide, that his company, TABESA, 
legally exported cigarettes to all parts of the United States, and that he had regularly been granted a U.S. travel visa 
over the previous decade. He later published a rebuttal of four specific accusations concerning his alleged 





At the time of writing, a welcome additional source of data became available: on 24 June 2020 
the national audit office (Contraloría General de la República, CGR) began publishing asset 
declarations of leading officials on its website,45 starting with the first 3,000 of some 150,000 
declarations from 1998 to 2017, including those by past presidents, members of congress, 
supreme court judges, and the public prosecution service. The decision to put asset declarations 
in the public domain, which had been bitterly opposed by many politicians, represents a major 
victory for campaigners in favour of open government. Although the law requires asset 
declarations to include assets held by immediate nuclear family members (spouses and children), 
opportunities remain for concealing assets through third parties and hidden overseas bank 
accounts. Nevertheless, public disclosure will shed light on the ability of many senior officials to 
use their time in office to dramatically increase their private wealth through corrupt activities and 
this is likely to lead to criminal prosecutions. They have already exposed cases of tax evasion, 
money laundering, illicit enrichment (Andrew Nickson, pers. comm. 2020). Among the first to 
be made public were that of Horacio Cartes, who declared assets of US$200 million when he 
assumed the presidency in 2013 (see Figure 3.3), and current president Abdo Benitez, who 
declared a monthly expenditure on clothes of G30 million (US$5,200) in 2016; that is 17 times 
the then minimum salary and equal to the total amount that he paid in personal income tax for the 









Figure 3.3 Asset declaration for Horacio Cartes, August 2013  
 
Source: CGR website, accessed 1 August 2020, (see note 45). 
 
Grupo Favero is a family-owned business conglomerate set up by Tranquilo Favero, the largest 
soybean businessman in Paraguay and a controversial member of the elite, known as the “Rey de 
la Soja” (“king of soy”). He will be a recurring character in this dissertation, reappearing in 
chapters 5 and 6, so a brief profile is in order here. 
 
Born in Videira, Santa Catarina, Brazil, Favero is a leading member of the brasiguayo 
community and founding member of the Asociación de Productores de Soja, Oleaginosas y 
Cereales del Paraguay (APS – Paraguayan Association of Producers of Soy, Grains and Oilseed). 
In February 2012, APS distanced itself from him after he was widely criticized for an interview 




were so lazy that they should “be treated like a bad woman, with a stick” (ABC Color, 13 
February 2012; Nickosn 2015: 225).46 
 
Favero moved to Paraguay in 1969, when he reportedly bought tierras malhabidas at $1 per 
hectare. The connection between Stroessner’s colonization program, tierras malhabidas, and the 
current concentration and foreignization of land, is an issue that was frequently brought up 
during interviews with peasant leaders: 
 
En la era de Stroessner, él lo que hizo fue una ley de colonización, qué es 
principalmente para abrir, digamos, la frontera con Brasil que entonces es la 
colonización de Alto Paraná, Canindeyú, Caaguazú. Y resultado un poco de eso 
también es que hoy tenemos la mayor cantidad de brasiguayos, entre comillas, en 
esos departamentos verdad. Y no solo brasiguayos sino tenemos latifundista que 
tienen… como Favero, que casi agarra todo un departamento del Alto Paraná 
verdad. También tiene en Canindeyú. Es un empresario brasileño que fue 
apropiándose de todas las tierras que en muchos casos son apropiaciones ilegales, 
hasta hoy no hay titularidad, fueron tierras del Estado que están siendo usurpadas 
digamos por empresarios. (Lidia Ruiz, leader of the OLT, personal interview, 2015) 
 
Grupo Favero comprises eight companies involved in grain production, trading, and processing. 
As detailed by Nickson (2015: 225):  
 






Agro Silo Santa Catalina S.A., the core company of the GF, was founded in the 
1980s. It is supported by more than 1,500 producers and provides crop advances in 
the form of fertilizers, agrochemicals, and other supplies. Strategically located in the 
main production zones, its scope encompasses the entire soybean cycle from 
processing and storage to export and final delivery to overseas markets. In 1995, 
Favero founded Agrotoro S.A. after acquiring a 32,000-hectare cattle farm, which 
was gradually converted into a grain farm. It now boasts a static storage capacity of 
42,000 tons and a seeds plant with a production capacity of almost 3,000 tons of seed 
per year. In 2000, Favero diversified into cattle ranching, with a 25,000 herd spread 
over 200,000 hectares of land in the Chaco. Cattle operations are overseen by the GF 
subsidiary, Ganadera Campo Bello S.A. In 2001, Favero entered the agrochemical 
industry through Tatu Agrosciences S.A. Its 12,000-square-meter agrochemical plant 
in Villeta imports insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides, which are presold to local 
companies and farmers. The Totemsa port, acquired by the group in 1995, is located 
on the Paraná River with a 300- ton-per-hour loading capacity and a static storage 
capacity of up to 25,000 tons. 
 
In 2014, Grupo Favero is reported to have owned 168,000 hectares, 18 silos, 40,000 head of 
cattle, employed 1,500 staff, and operated in 13 of the 17 departments of the country. Favero 
(Nickson 2015: 224). In addition to producing 8 per cent of national soybean output, as reported 
in the Spanish newspaper El País (24 May 2018), the company produces corn, wheat, rapeseed, 
sunflower, sorghum, and meat (Nickson 2015: 225–226).47 






The oligarchic rural elite are composed of narco-traffickers, landowners, military and 
paramilitary officers, agribusiness, and cattle ranchers. Drug lords are becoming powerful actors 
in the countryside since marijuana production is on the rise in Paraguay’s northeast (the 
departments of Canindeyú and Amambay being two of main areas cultivation), including both 
small farmer and large plantations with near-slavery conditions. According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Paraguay is the largest producer of marijuana in South 
America, accounting for 15 per cent of the world’s harvest (Muñoz Acebes 2015: 76). Anti-drug 
officials roughly estimate Paraguay’s annual production at between 30,000 and 45,000 tonnes, 
with 80 per cent of this production ending up in Brazil, where its value increases almost fivefold 
(Muñoz Acebes 2015: 78). Paraguay is also turning from a transit country for cocaine trafficking 
to a producer country, according to its anti-drug agency, the Secretaría Nacional Antidrogas 
(SENAD), with the installation of laboratories in its territory financed by Brazilian gangs 
(Muñoz Acebes 2015: 76).48 
 
As Hetherington (2020: 238n1) notes: 
 
In some places there are clear overlaps between the oligarchs running the soy 
industry and those involved in the production and smuggling of marijuana, but in 
other places they are at odds, as production favours keeping some forest intact (to 
hide the production). 
 
                                                             




This topic of contradictory also emerged in other discussions with peasant leaders:  
 
Tienes una zona donde no hay legalidad cómo es la zona narcotráfico y esa zona 
está creciendo. Eso es lo preocupante verdad, o incluso eso está involucrando al 
propio EPP [Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo] o al propio ACA [Agrupación 
Campesina Armada], porque en esa zona donde ellos interactúan. Son zona de 
negocios y son cuestiones así de conceptos que es muy difícil que se entienda, pero 
qué es preocupante, porque eso también agarré toda una zona. O sea, no es 
solamente el agronegocio de soja o ganadería… El narcotráfico en Paraguay no 
sabemos a dónde vamos a desembocar de aquí a 5–10 años...a un México, qué es lo 
más probable... la mexicanización. Y incluso muchas de esas disputas eran con los 
narcos y los ganaderos o los sojeros... principal de los ganaderos mantienen... por 
los narcos quieren monte, quieren espacio donde refugiarse y esconderse porque hay 
ilegalidad y los otros van abriendo camino verdad, entonces allí entre ellos también 
hay mucha disputa, entre los sojeros que si destruyen todo—no deja ni un arbol. 
(Lidia Ruiz, leader of the OLT, personal interview, 2015) 
 
The most prominent representative of this rural elite-narco-connection is probably Horacio 
Cartes (see Box 3.1), and he is widely seen as what José Mujica, the former Uruguayan 
president, described as “narcocoloradismo” (ABC Color, 5 July 2012).49 Indeed, it is telling that 
the two largest landowners in the country—Moon Sect and Cartes—have been widely accused of 
involvement in the drug trafficking. 






At the same time, the conversion of extensive livestock farms into intensive soybean plantations 
or the transformation of thousands of hectares of forest into pastureland in the Chaco would not 
be possible without the injection of significant financial resources. Banks provide agricultural 
companies with the necessary credit to develop productive projects, and these in turn receive 
financing from the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank. In 2015 
alone, IFIs approved a total of $225 million in loans to Banco Itaú, Banco Regional and Banco 
Continental. In 2014, a loan of 7 million was approved to BANCOP and in 2013 another 15 
million to Vision Banco. In total, between 2013 and 2015, projects were signed for almost $250 
million (Guereña and Rojas 2016). All these projects have the objective of facilitating loans for 
the development of business activities, with an emphasis on soy production in the eastern region 
and cattle ranching in the western region. Some illustrative examples of the investment made by 
international financial development institutions to boost the agro-industrial sector in Paraguay 
include:  
 
 The German Investment and Development Corporation (DEG) invested $32 million in 
2013 to acquire the majority of the shares in the Paraguay Agricultural Corporation 
(PAYCO), a company that was wholly owned by the Rioforte Investments group—the 
investment arm of the Portuguese financial group based in Luxembourg, Espírito Santo 
(Guereña ad Rojas 2016). 
 
 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) together with the OPEC Fund for 




Villeta to launch the Complejo Agroindustrial Angostura SA (CAIASA), which operates 
the largest soybean meal and oil production plant in the country (IPS News, 23 March 
2016). 
 
 The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has also provided support to 
the Ganadera Vista Alegre (VASA), a cattle farming and forestry company operating 
some 95,000 hectares in the Department of San Pedro, owned by the descendants of 
British cattle rancher Federico Robinson (Andrew Nickson, pers. comm. 2020).50 
 
The historical-political analysis just presented highlights the powerful confluence of interests 
between the Paraguayan state, the landed elite, foreign agribusiness capital, and the Brazilian 
government. At this point, it is necessary to turn to the thornier task of developing a theoretical 
analysis of the Paraguayan state with respect to agriculture.  
 
3.3.3 The predatory and oligarchic state in Paraguay 
Rural scholars have long focused on the central role that states play in process of agrarian change 
but theorizing about the nature of the state in the countryside remains the “neglected step-sister” 
of critical agrarian studies. 
 
                                                             
50 Federico Robinson was a British cattle rancher who emigrated to Paraguay in 1933. He worked for the Société La 
Foncière du Paraguay and Liebig’s Extract of Meat Company, where he became head of ranches. In 1954, he 
established the company Robinson y Pereira, buying 230,000 hectares of Chaco land from Paraguayan Cattle Farms 




[V]ery few of these studies have attempted to re-examine the ways in which we 
understand the state or have scrutinized the underlying assumptions about the 
nature of the state that agrarian scholars reproduce. Even fewer studies are 
dedicated to theorising the current nature of the state within the countryside or in 
respect to agriculture. The recent contributions on the agrarian question […] from 
Byres to Bernstein, from Akram-Lodhi and Kay to McMichael, have not theorised 
the state, even though their analysis point to the state in many ways. [Indeed], very 
few scholars work explicitly with a particular conception of the state or refer to the 
theoretical discussions around state theory. Only a few scholars (Wolford et al. 
2013) have attempted to theorise what is specific or peculiar about the form that 
the state takes in the countryside or the role that it plays in social conflict over 
resources. Because of this centrality of the state, there seems to be a need to bring 
the state back in (once again), not only thematically but also through a theoretical 
discussions [sic] on the nature and role of the state in the ongoing process of 
neoliberal globalisation of the countryside (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a: 242)  
 
Kay and Vergara-Camus (2017a) identify five schools of thoughts that focus on the state within 
the literature of agrarian studies natural resources: a Neo-Weberian, a Schumpeterian, a Marxist, 
a Foucauldian, and an Eclectic approach. Among all the constellation of theoretical tendencies 
running through these schools of thought, I believe that two deserve special attention given their 
frequent appearance in the Paraguayan literature on the characteristics of the Stroessner regime 





The first is the Weberian approach, which characterises the state as having relative autonomy 
and as being either developmental or predatory. Several attempts have been made to characterize 
the Stroessner regime, ranging from “traditional caudillo”, and “traditional authoritarian” to 
“transitional from a caudillo-type to a modern bureaucratic-authoritarian regime.” In fact, most 
of the initial literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism were quick to point out the sui generis 
nature of the regime. It is worth remembering tha the Stronato pre-dates the emergence of 
Southern Cone bureaucratic-authoritarian dictatorships by a decade, and it deviates significantly 
from this genre of militarism (see Sondrol 1990). In his seminal text, Modernization and 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, O’Donnell writes, “in Paraguay is the only survival of traditional 
authoritarianism in South America. A small and quite homogeneous elite rules over a largely 
politically inert and scarcely differentiated population. The foreign export-oriented sector is 
dominant, and there have been no serious attempts to subordinate it to domestic industrial and 
market expansion” (O’Donnell 1973: 112). More than a decade later, when reflecting on the 
various types of authoritarian rule in Latin America, O’Donnell outlines the characteristics of 
“traditional authoritarianism” as featuring “strong patrimonialist (in the Weberian sense), and in 
some cases even sultanistic components”, before signalling out “Stroessner’s Paraguay [as] the 
last remnant of what used to be a quite common form of rule in the region” (O’Donnell 1986: 4). 
In the same edited volume, the Brazilian dependency theorist Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
depicts Stroessner as belonging to a “caudillismo of the old Latin American Militarism” 
(Cardoso 1979: 35). But the most appealing characterization to date is that offered by the 
Paraguayan sociologist Marcial Riquelme (1994), who argued that the nature of the regime was 
similar to what Max Webercalled “sultanism”, a variant of patrimonialism, in which power is 




is consistent with Riquelme characterization of “neosultanism”, given its lack of institutional 
mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power (see Nickson 2020).  
 
Setting many complexities aside, not least the fact that “[t]he state itself is a socially and 
politically contested terrain, and as such is a highly heterogeneous institution comprised of 
various actors” (Borras 2007: 75), the essence of the Paraguayan state under Stroessner, and 
during the 19 years of transition to democracy, is accurately captured in Peter Evans’s (1989: 
562) conceptualisation of the “predatory state,” wherein the state acts in the interest of an elite 
rather than pursue a coherent strategy for economic development: 
 
Some states may extract such large amounts of otherwise investable surplus and 
provide so little in the way of ‘collective goods’ in return that they do indeed impede 
economic transformation. It seems reasonable to call these states “predatory” … 
Those who control the state apparatus seem to plunder without any more regard for 
the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its prey. 
 
Following this description, several scholars have argued that Paraguay should be seen as a 
predatory state (the terms patrimonial state or privatized state have also been used), whereby 
connected individuals treat public agencies as private property (Nickson and Lambert 2002; 
Richards 2008; Fogel 2009; Levy 2013). For example, Levy (2013: 41) writes, “Paraguay is the 
epitome of state corruption and confusion between state and Colorado Party interests where the 
patrimonial state blurs distinctions between public and private property… and acts as a vital 




Stroessner’s rule (1954-1989) Paraguay’s predatory state extracted rents from four primary 
sources: (1) the disbursement of public lands; (2) the construction of large infrastructure projects, 
especially dams; (3) state-owned enterprises; and (4) trade in contraband (Richards 2008: 102). 
For our interests in this dissertation, we focus the corrupt sale of state land (tierras 
malhabidas)—a practice initiated during the Stroessner dictatorship and continued under 
successive Colorado governments. 
 
From a Marxists perspective, Paraguayan sociologist Ignacio González Bozzolasco (2009, 2012) 
characterizes the Paraguayan state as oligarchic. The standard usage of the “oligarchic” state by 
Latin American scholars has generally referred to political systems that are characterized by 
extremely limited scope of political competition, where the elite of the primary-product export 
sector (based on minerals and agricultural products) dominates the state and orients public policy 
around its needs (Collier 1979: 23–24). Along these lines, and in reference to the works of 
Agustín Cueva51 and Waldo Ansaldi, González Bozzolasco argues that this state model is still in 
force in Paraguay, at least in its general characteristics. In making this argument, González 
Bozzolasco points to the fact that the economy is rooted in the latifundio agrarian model and the 
penetration of transnational capital in strategic areas (agriculture, electricity). The development 
of agriculture, cattle raising, and extractive enclaves contributed to the formation of a small 
economic elite and a relatively new rural oligarchy, whose origins were established in the last 
century and crystallized during the Stroessner era when 12 million hectares of land were 
                                                             
51 In El desarrollo del capitalismo en América Latina (1977), Agustín Cueva argues that in the transition to a 
capitalist social formation in Latin American, an “oligarchic state” emerged as the “superstructural expression” of 
the process which implanted capitalism as the dominant mode of production. This oligarchic state constituted an 




distributed to both nationals and foreigners in an irregular and clientelist manner. Throughout the 
last decades, the Paraguayan state has not only favoured the internal accumulation of capital, 
attraction of external resources and the maintenance of legal privileges for the large agro-export 
sector, but also successfully set up a legal structure that supports and protects it, which is 
particularly clear in the current tax structure of the country (with one of the lowest tax takes and 
most regressive form of taxation in the region) (González Bozzolasco 2009, 2012).  
 
What both these perspectives emphasize is that, as discussed earlier, far from resolving the 
country’s skewed distribution of land ownership, the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
through the regime’s land colonization programme gave raise to a distinctive rentier class, a 
ruling class of landowners whose capacity to extract surplus relied on extra-economic means of 
enforcement and extraction. In other words, access to land in Paraguay took the form of 
“politically constituted property” (see Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017 in reference to the work of 
Ellen Wood) because it was political power and control of the state which gave access to 
property. As a result, “almost all members of Congress are also members of Paraguay’s tiny 
landowning elite, with titles held either directly or in the names of friends and family” (Nickson 
2015: 18). Thus revealing “the nature of Congress as the political embodiment of the tiny elite 
that runs the country” (Lambert 2012). 
 
While both Weberian and Marxists approaches serve to highlight the overarching characteristics 
of the Paraguayan state throughout the military dictatorship and protracted transition to 
democracy, it is important to view the state not as a static object, but as a series of relationships 




and effects of state power must always be understood in contextually specific terms. Portrayals 
of the state as predatory or oligarchic, while largely accurate and helpful for illuminating the 
broader structural forces at play, do not adequately capture the micro-level process of state 
power. The challenge here is grappling with a noted tension between, on the one hand, 
developing a theory of the state within the rural settings of capitalist development, while on the 
other hand developing “a methodology or a framework that is adaptable to the diversity of cases, 
processes, and the balance of classes forces” (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a: 243). This latter 
objective rests on the need to “recognize a stronger agency on the part of different actors within 
the structure of the state and leaves room for contingent results” (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017: 
243). In order to meet this objective, chapter 4 adopts a somewhat more eclectic approach to the 
state, as recommended by Wolford (et al. 2013), wherein the state is seen as a “contradictory 
space of conflicts of interests where actors, deploy strategies at multiple levels” (Vergara-Camus 
and Kay 2017: 243). More specifically, I draw on different conceptualisations and understands of 
the state to illustrate different moments or aspects of Paraguayan politics. For example, my 
discussion of the agrarian reform impasse under Fernando Lugo (2008–2012) draws on the 
Gramscian concept of “Caesarism” to account for inherent weaknesses and ambiguities that 
characterised Lugo’s administration—weakness and ambiguities which played out within the 
broad structural framework of the oligarchic and predatory state as discussed outline above. This 
fluid conceptualization of the state is then combined with an “interactive approach” to state-
relations, as used Jun Borras and Jonathan Fox in their studies on agrarian reform (see Borras 
2007). This eclectic approach, therefore, privileges a relational understanding or power which 




disaggregated levels and functions of the state” (Wolford et al. 2013: 206). This will again be 
illustrated in chapter 4 via two land conflict cases studies in Ñacunday and Marina Kue. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The origins of Paraguay’s latifundio system rose from the ashes of the War of the Triple 
Alliance, when Paraguay repudiated the self-reliant developmental strategy of the previous half-
century via foreign occupation, political domination, and economic dependence—factors which 
continue to cast a long shadow on the trajectories of agrarian change. The Stroessner regime’s 
colonization programme drove the country’s agro-frontier expansion, offering land to many of 
the country’s land poor peasants, but also facilitating the rent-seeking behavior, revealing the 
sultanistic nature of the regime and the rentier nature of the state. During this period, Brazilian 
migration increased via a form of “colonization by invitation” (Petras 2014), increasing the 
levels of land concentration and foreignization, and installing “brasiguayos” as a key social actor 
within the Paraguayan agrarian structure. The transition to democracy from the 1990s coincided 
with the country’s continuing insertion into the global food regime, opening up the country to 
new forms of agro-extractive capital penetration, primarily in the form of agricultural 
biotechnologies and increasing agribusiness control of the commodity value chain (developed 
further in chapter 5). 
 
By examining the prior distribution of power in society and within the state, we can begin to 
identify the nature of the political problem facing any attempt of major redistributive land reform 
in this country: (i) the legacy and ongoing perversion of a predatory state; (ii) the oligarchic 




extractive capitalism, particularly in relation to the sub-imperial interests of Brazilian trans-Latin 
capital. It is against this backdrop that we need to situate the analysis of the political economy 
and dynamics of social change during the almost four years (August 2008–June 2012) of the 







A “Coup” Foretold: The Politics of Agrarian Change under Fernando Lugo 
 
4.1 Introduction52 
Of all the so-called “pink tide” governments that reached power in Latin America over the past 
two decades, the election of defrocked Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo as President of Paraguay 
in April 2008—while admittedly “something of a red herring” (Hetherington 2011: 227)—was 
perhaps the most surprising. For one thing, Lugo’s victory ended the seemingly eternal 
hegemony of the Colorado Party, which had been in power for 61 years—the world’s longest 
ruling party at the time (Gott 2008; Nickson 2008).53 His electoral platform centredon far-
reaching socioeconomic reforms to address Paraguay’s long-standing issues of poverty, 
inequality, and corruption. In an interview before the elections that made him president of 
Paraguay, Lugo stated that the first axis of his principle political would be program substantial 
reforms in agrarian policies, including redistributive land reform and support policies for 
small‐scale producers: 
 
El primer eje es la Reforma Agraria integral, que no es solamente una cuestión de 
tierras. Acá se han repartido más de 11 millones de hectáreas en los últimos 20 
                                                             
52Parts of this chapter have been published in Ezquerro-Cañete and Fogel (2017). 
53 The Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR), more commonly known as the Partido Colorado, had controlled 
the Paraguayan state continuously from January 1947 until Lugo’s election in 2008. This period of rule spanned the 
military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989) and a dismal democratisation process thereafter which saw 
three bouts of military instability (1996, 1999, 2000), the assassination of a Vice-President, Luís Argaña (1999), and 
the indictment of two former Presidents, Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) and Raúl González Macchi (1999-




años, pero eso no ha solucionado el problema. La Reforma Agraria tiene que 
abarcar otros aspectos, no solamente el de la tierra, sino también la formación, la 
asistencia técnica, el acompañamiento, ir creando un modelo productivo 
diferente... Nosotros proponemos una Reforma Agraria integral no como una 
simple repartida de tierras sino como un proceso en que los sujetos de la Reforma 
Agraria sean los campesinos, los indígenas, la gente que la trabaja hoy 
ineficientemente. (Fernando Lugo, quoted by Carracedo 2008, in Gascón and 
Montagut 2010) 
 
Critically, land reform was placed squarely back on the political agenda, an issue of 
particular importance in a country with the highest inequality of land in all of Latin 
America and where over 40 per cent of the population live in the countryside (Fogel 
2009).  However, despite these explicit commitments to agrarian reform and peasant 
farming, Lugo’s government proved too weak to implement such reforms and key 
campaign promises faced deadlock. Moreover, fast-forward to June 2012, Lugo was 
removed from office by the Paraguayan Congress following a highly dubious 
impeachment procedure. The impeachment had been triggered by a violent clash a week 
before in the Curuguaty district of Canindeyú which left 11 landless peasants and six 
police officers dead. How should we interpret the rise and fall of Fernando Lugo, and 
what is its significance for agrarian change in the poorest and most agrarian society in 
South America, where the struggle for land and land reform remain at the very epicentre 





Despite its many insights, recent scholarship on the Latin American “left turn” has been uneven 
in its coverage. In particular, the academic debate on the pink tide has paid little attention to the 
case of Fernando Lugo’s election in Paraguay (Levy 2013: 31-32). In a review of seven books 
dealing with South America’s left turn, for instance, Marc Becker (2013: 253) observes how the 
case of “Paraguay’s Fernando Lugo, unfortunately, receives not even minimal treatment in any 
of these volumes, even though this case contains a series of key themes facing the left, including 
the role of agro-export economies… and the limited nature of presidential power as evidenced in 
the June 2012 institutional coup.” In an attempt to fill this lacuna—albeit partially—this chapter 
focuses on the politics of agrarian change in Paraguay and, in particular, on the land reform 
impasse under the short-lived Lugo government (2008–2012). 
 
In concert with an earlier special issue on this subject in the Journal of Agrarian Change, edited 
by T.J. Byres (2004), I argue argue that a placing of class and power at the centre of analysis is 
essential for understanding the dynamics and constraints facing redistributive land reforms—
particularly in a country like Paraguay, where, as we saw in the previous chapter, access to 
power and wealth is synonymous with access to land (Nickson 2015: 18). From this class-
theoretical perspective, it is argued that Lugo’s stalled agrarian reform can be explained by the 
oligarchic control of the state by landed elites which, despite the election of Lugo, continued to 
dominate Congress and succeeded in thwarting any significant reform. That being said, Lugo’s 
weak position vis-à-vis the legislature and the seemingly insurmountable opposition to his 
reform programme within Congress provides only one side of the story. Indeed, as Saturnino 
Borras (2007) reminds us in his examination of the land reform process in the Philippines, 




passive societal actors by politicians. Rather, in pursuing distributive land reform policies, “the 
state has to interact with a range of societal actors with varying, often competing and conflicting, 
interests. Thus, a rigorous analysis of land reform requires the full understanding of state-
society relations dynamics” (Borras 2007: 64; emphasis added). For this reason, in this chapter, 
an “interactive approach” to state-society relations is applied, wherein the “prospects for 
distributive reform depend less on the insulation and coherence of a strong state than on… the 
nature of the political interaction between the pro-reform forces in the state and society” (Fox 
1993: 39-40, cited in Borras 2007: 69; emphasis added by Borras).  
 
Drawing upon recent fieldwork research, as well as insights gained from extensive in-depth 
interviews conducted and published by the Asunción-based social research centre, BASE 
Investigaciones Sociales, in the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary coup of June 2012 
(Duré et al. 2012), this chapter begins by analysing the nature of the political interaction between 
pro- and anti-reform forces in the Paraguayan state and society during the Lugo government. To 
address ambiguities surrounding the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio (Patriotic Alliance for 
Change –APC) coalition that brought Lugo to power, a Gramscian approach is offered here 
drawing upon work that has fruitfully located Lugo’s government within the realm of 
“progressive Caesarism” (González Bozzolasco 2009; Bourscheid 2016). The following section 
then shifts to a narrative of the key events leading to the impeachment and removal of Lugo from 
office. The final section seeks to draw wider conclusions regarding the parliamentary coup and 






4.2 The land reform impasse and agrarian stalemate under Lugo  
With the election of Fernando Lugo in April 2008, agrarian reform was placed squarely back on 
the political agenda. Influenced by liberation theology, Lugo had earned a well-deserved 
reputation as the “bishop of the poor” following the almost 11 years he spent working with poor 
but combative peasants in the department of San Pedro, which had been the epicentre of protest 
by landless peasant groups (Gott 2008). In their edited volume on the agrarian policies of left-
wing government in Latin America, Gascón and Montagut (2010) include a chapter wherein they 
interview Peter Rosset—a researcher at the Centro de Estudios para el Cambio en el Campo 
Mexicano (Center of Studies for Rural Change in Mexico), and co-coordinator of the Land 
Research Action Network—on the prospects of these, at the time, new governments carrying out 
clear policies in favour of the peasantry and within the paradigm of sovereignty food. Reflecting 
on the early administration of Lugo in Paraguay, Rosset responded:  
 
The Paraguayan case is also complex. Lugo has arrived to power without deputies 
in the National Congress and with a very adverse balance of power. He does not 
control the institutions of the State. He does not control Parliament. It is true that 
he came to power thanks, in part, to peasant organizations members of La Via 
Campesina who are among the most combative on the continent. Perhaps only the 
MST of Brazil beats them in combativeness. But the scandals in his personal life 
that have weakened him even more politically, have paralyzed possible proposals 
of agrarian reform, and have forced him to accept that institutional forces have 




Beyond the resisting in power and getting re-elected with a more favorable 
correlation of forces, you cannot expect much.  
 
In addition, the Brazilian government is exerting strong pressure on Lugo, even 
while carrying out military manoeuvres on the border, because of the land issue. 
And it is that as in the Bolivian case, the great Latifundio in Paraguay is of 
Brazilian capital, of the so-called “brasiguayos.” An agrarian reform in Paraguay 
would require expropriating land of Brazilian capital. And the government of 
Brazil has left very clear that it has the determination to defend, in the way that is 
necessary, their economic interests in Paraguay. In short, Lugo is an extremely 
weak president of a country that is extremely weak in comparison with its 
Brazilian neighbour, a real superpower. Perhaps it can be built for a future, but 
there are few short-term expectations.  
 
This precise summation touches on many of the key themes discussed and expanded on in this 
section. Following González Bozzolasco (2009) and Bourscheid (2016), I draw on Gramsci’s 
concepts of Caesarism in order to highlight the ambiguities that characterised Lugo’s 
administration. This political form emerges when no one class has the power to decisively 
impose its mark on the social order. Hence a mediating force such as Caesarism must emerge.  
 
In the Prison Notes Gramsci writes: Caesarism “always expresses the particular solution in 
which a great personality is entrusted with the task of ‘arbitration’ over a historico-political 




219). The “great personality” (or as Gramsci writes elsewhere, the “charismatic leader”), is 
“entrusted” with the power to arbitrate between contending groups (Fontana 2004: 179). In 
Paraguay this process took the shape of a “marriage of convenience” (Lambert 2011: 180), 
resulting in an “unlikely coalition of the pro-market Liberal Party and leftist activists, including 
environmentalists and peasant groups that had coalesced around the charismatic leadership of 
Fernando Lugo” (Hetherington 2014: 57). Caesarism is therefore either progressive or 
reactionary: “Caesarism is progressive when its intervention helps the progressive force to 
triumph, albeit with its victory tempered by certain compromises and limitations” (Gramsci 
1971: 219). This was certainly the case with Lugo’s electoral victory, which was tempered by 
various compromises and limitations that deserve mention from the outset. First, Lugo had come 
to power as the leader of the APC, a fragmented, ideologically divided electoral coalition. 
Crucial to the APC’s electoral success (but also to its eventual downfall) was a strategic alliance 
with the centre-right Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA), the traditional opposition to the 
Colorado Party,54 who agreed to support Lugo’s candidacy in exchange for the vice-presidency 
ticket, which went to Federico Franco. Not only did the APC hold a minority in Congress, but 
also Lugo’s own position within the governing APC coalition was weak. Indeed, only five 
members of Congress represented his own supporters, primarily the small, centre-left Tekojojá 
Popular (which in March 2010 merged into the Frente Guasú). Thus, however ambitious Lugo’s 
reform plans might have been, he was highly dependent on the support of the PLRA which 
dominated his coalition.  
 
                                                             
54Ideologically there is little difference between the PLRA and the PC, both are state-based clientelist parties marked 
by ample factionalism. The PLRA is noticeable for its lack of a clear political program, which is a reflection of its 




A second wrench thrown in Lugo’s electoral victory was that, despite losing the presidency for 
the first time in over 60 years, the Colorado Party retained a majority in both the Chamber of 
Deputies (30 out of 80 seats) and the Senate (15 out 45 seats), as can be seen in Table 4.1—
particularly salient fact in a country with the weakest presidentialist system in Latin America 
with Congress retaining extensive powers, a design of the 1992 Constitution in reaction to the 
excesses of Stroessner’s dictatorship (Nickson 2008). In addition, the Colorado Party’s influence 
within Paraguay’s patronage-based political culture remained largely intact.  
 
Table 4.1Distribution of seats in Congress, April 2008 
 Chamber of Deputies Senate 
Partido Colorado 30 15 
Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico 27 14 
Partido Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos 15 9 
Partido Patria Querida 3 4 
Left-wing partiesa 2 3 
Other partiesb 3 0 
Total 80 45 
Source: Tribunal Superior de Justicia Electoral (TSJE). 
a Movimiento Popular Tekojoa, Partido Democrático Popular (1 Chamber seat, 1 Senate seat 
each); Partido País Solidario (1 Senate seat). 
b Alianza Patriótica de Ñeembucú, Alianza de Presidente Hayes, Alianza Democrática Boquerón 
(1 Chamber seat each). 
 
From a Gramscian perspective, we can understand Lugo’s government as the product of the 
ongoing evolution of the bourgeois state as it confronts crises within the economy and within its 
legitimating institutions (González Bozzolasco 2009; Bourscheid 2016). That is, the Lugo 




another, but only ‘evolution’ of the same type along unbroken lines” (Gramsci 1971: 222). In 
this sense, “the most important change following the election of Lugo was that the state became 
a disputed space between progressive and conservative socio-political forces leading to an 
ideological polarization in the political debate around issues such as agrarian reform” (Levy 
2013: 46). As a clear indication of these contradictory struggles and tension within the state, 
Lugo placed two personalities with vastly different ideological profiles as his ministers for the 
most important institutions for agricultural policy. On the one hand, as Minister of Agriculture 
and Livestock (MAG), he chose Cándido Vera Bejarano, a person closely linked to the interests 
of the landowner business union. On the other hand, he placed the lawyer Alberto Alderete 
historic defender of peasant rights, at the head of the National Institute of Rural Development 
and Land (INDERT). Following Borras (2007), we focus on four related themes to guide our 
discussion of state-society interaction for agrarian reform in the context of Lugo’s (“Caesarist”) 
government: (i) autonomous rural social mobilisation “from below” (ii) pro-reform initiatives 
“from above” (iii) positive interaction between pro-reform forces within the state and in society, 
and (iv) ability to overcome landlord’s resistance to land reform. Let us move, then, through each 
of these four domains in turn, in search for answers to why Lugo failed to implement the 
redistributive land reform he had promised. 
 
4.2.1 Autonomous rural social mobilisation “from below” 
The peasant mobilisations promoted by the more militant peasant organisations continued to 
keep the pressure up on the government. In August 2009, the Espacio Unitario Popular (United 
Popular Space – EUP) promoted a mass mobilisation for the implementation of agrarian reform 




departments with the greatest soybean expansion. The reaction from the State was to intensify 
criminalization so that, between August 2008 and June 2010, 12,650 peasants were displaced, 
1,148 were arrested and 334 were criminally charged (Palau et al. 2010: 23-24). In 2010, in the 
face of government inertia in advancing its promised land reform, a new militant peasant 
organisation, the Liga Nacional de Carperos (LNC), was formed and began rapidly attracting 
members (Fogel 2012). In the months prior to the “parliamentary coup” tensions sharpened in 
the countryside as Carperos began a campaign of large-scale land invasions in the in eastern 
border areas of Itapúa and Alto Paraná that targeted highly visible tracts of tierras malhabidas. 
The LNC, advocating more radical action to settle idle and ill-acquired land than that pursued by 
the existing peasant organisations, argued that many brasiguayos were in breach of the 
legislation that bars foreigners from owning land along Paraguay’s borders. In the midst of this 
intense struggle, two episodes in particular—the cases of Ñacunday and Marina Kue—lay the 
foundation for the unravelling of the Lugo government. These are examined further below. 
  
4.2.2 Reformist initiatives by pro-reform state actors “from above” 
In response to an escalation of land invasions and mounting social tensions in the countryside in 
the first few months of his administration, Lugo announced the creation of a new state body for 
land reform, the Coordinadora Ejecutiva para la Reforma Agraria (Executive Coordinating 
Committee for Agrarian Reform, CEPRA), as well as the development of a social assistance 
programme for rural communities. At the same time, INDERT also announced that it would 
repossess plots of land it had awarded to people who were not qualified as beneficiaries of the 
land reform law (i.e. the politically constituted tierras malhabidas), and to recover state lands 





The crucial first step of Lugo’s initiative required an urgently needed cadastral survey to 
establish land value and ownership, estimated at cost of $300 million. This was to be financed by 
tax reform and a renegotiation of the 1973 Treaty with Brazil relating to the Itaipú hydroelectric 
dam. However, attempts by pro-reform factions within the Lugo government to raise these funds 
were immediately undermined by perennial foot-dragging within Congress, which strongly 
resented Lugo’s decision to create a new land reform without any participation by Congress. On 
4 June 2009, Congress voted to further postpone a personal income tax bill, thus cutting a key 
revenue stream (around $160 million). On the same day, it refused to approve an agreement 
between the hydroelectric plant Itaipú Binacional and CEPRA to finance new settlements for 
landless families. In the same session, and against the wishes of finance minister Dionisio Borda, 
it also voted to increase state pensions and double the salaries of departmental governors and 
members of the National Electoral Commission, at a combined cost of $118 million (EIU 2009). 
In other words, Congress voted to block vital funding streams, while simultaneously voting to 
increase spending, generating the possibility of an unsustainable deficit. As a result, INDERT’s 
ability to settle landless peasants continued to be severely restrained by its limited budget and its 
requirement to compensate owners of expropriated land at market price.  
 
Further illustrating the lack of state capacity to mobilise and allocate fiscal resources for the 
implementation of an agrarian reform is the fact that the “left turn” in Paraguay did not coincide 
with the regional shift towards neo-developmentalism (or “progressive neo-extractivism”). 
Contrary to the neo-developmentalist policies implemented in, for example, Argentina under the 




2017), Lugo’s attempts to pass a bill to introduce a 6 per cent tax on unprocessed cereal exports 
(soybean, maize and rapeseed) were squashed by Congress. As a result, Lugo’s administration 
was unable to move Paraguay beyond fundamentalist free-market policies, wherein taxes on 
commercial agriculture are kept at derisory levels (the amount netted in 2011 was only $13 
million, equivalent to 0.5 per cent of total tax revenue). 
 
Despite growing demands from peasant organisations, the continuing capacity of the state to 
govern in the interest of the elite meant that the politically constituted tierras malhabidas 
remained intact. Worst still is the fact that Lugo was incapable of halting illegal transfer of land, 
which continued throughout his presidency. In September 2011, Alberto Antebi Duarte, son of 
Paraguay’s second richest landowner, Roberto Antebi, was awarded 4,000 hectares by this 
means thanks to high-level corruption in INDERT (Nickson 2012). 
 
4.2.3 Pro-reform state-society alliances and interactions 
Although Lugo’s election would not have been possible without the mounting politicisation and 
support of both rural and urban social movements (see Levy 2013), the degree of support varied 
greatly depending on the particular organization. The peasant movement was strongly divided 
about the extent to which they should support the APC in the 2008 elections (Palau and Ortega 
2008). While various national and regional organisations offered their support, the National 
Peasant Federation (FNC), which remains the best organised of all national peasant organisation 
and has demonstrated a greater capacity for mobilisation, retained its anti-establishment 
militancy and rejection of electoral politics, calling on supporters to express their contempt for 




interview 2015). Peasant organisations were also divided regarding the level of pressure that 
should be exerted upon the government. On the one hand, there was a partial process of 
demobilisation from those organisations, which viewed the Lugo government as a government of 
the people and those who felt mobilisation to pressure the government would facilitate the 
possibility of the fall of Lugo (Duré et al. 2012: 26).55 
 
Los movimientos sociales nos mantuvimos muy quietos, porque también estaba 
ese miedo que, si nosotros estábamos muy movilizados, que a él le iban a echar y 
bueno, no sirvió de nada quedarnos quietos. Igual lo echaron, y son los 
aprendizajes que hoy tenemos verdad. (Lidia Ruiz, leader of the OLT, personal 
interview 2015) 
 
On the other hand, engaging in self-critique, leaders lamented the peasant organisations’ failure 
to agglutinate into a movement that could support Lugo’s agrarian policies (Duarte in Duré et al. 
2012: 54). Marcial Gómez, leader of the FNC, goes further, pointing out that, while the FNC 
maintained its yearly marches to Asunción demanding that Lugo follow through on promises to 
enact agrarian reform and create health and educational programmes for rural communities,  
 
we have to question those organisations that said: “just let Lugo’s government do its job 
without pressure, so it can be possible to achieve something.” Others said, “we must 
                                                             
55 The interviews cited here were conducted by BASE Investigaciones Socialeswith representatives of organisations 
from different positions within the peasant movement: ASAGRAPA (Tomás Zayas), CNOCIP (Nicolasa Trinidad), 
CPA-SPN (Ernesto Benítez), FNC (Marcial Gómez), MCNOC (Luis Aguayo), MAP (Jorge Galeano), OCN 




declare a truce in this process”, while others simply entered the sphere of the State to get 
political appointments… For all that, we need to confront several social organisations 
including peasant organisations, because for [the FNC] there will be no 
change based only on good will, or the good desires of some people. Here there must be 
permanent social pressure for real change that will benefit the sectors, and that 
means good organisation and struggle. Unfortunately, there are organisations which have 
another reading of the situation, another vision, and above all, there are those who entered 
into the State apparatus and put aside the social struggle that they were carrying out 
(Gómez; quoted in Duré et al. 2012: 43; authors’ translation). 
 
4.2.4 Confrontation with Anti-Reform Coalitions 
Landowners’ groups comprise some of the wealthiest and most influential elites in the country, 
and exert a strong lobbying presence inside Congress, with representation in all major political 
parties. The two most important groups are the ARP, which represents mainly large cattle 
ranchers, and the Asociación de Productores de Soja, Oleaginosas y Cereales del Paraguay 
(Paraguayan Association of Producers of Soybeans, Cereals, and Oilseeds – APS), which 
represents 50,000 brasiguayo commercial farmers who control most of Paraguay’s huge soybean 
production. Both the ARP and APS are members of the Unión de Gremios de la Producción 
(Union of Producer Association – UGP), a powerful umbrella association established in 2005 to 
defend the interests of producers and exporters of agricultural goods. Traditionally these groups 
have been able to block tax and land reform not only through lobbying, but also through the 
threat of direct action in the form of tractorazos (large disruptive demonstrations that mobilise 




in December 2008 sent a clear signal to Lugo that land reform efforts would be met with 
significant opposition. The slow pace of reform under Lugo led to a rise in land occupations, an 
increasingly militant discourse among peasant organisations and clashes with armed, often 
Brazilian, security guards. The deterioration in the situation led Claudia Ruser, the controversial 
hard-line leader of the APS, to accuse Lugo of alleged links to the Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo 
(Paraguayan People’s Army – EPP), which she went on to classify as a proto-guerrilla 
organisation, supported by President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (Nickson 2015: 17–18). As 
Lugo’s land reform project stagnated, social conflict became increasingly likely. Two land 
disputes in particular would mark the beginning of the end of Lugo’s government.  
 
4.3 Ñacunday, Marina Kue, and the Curuguaty massacre 
 
Ñacunday 
The Lugo government faced intense criticism over its poor handling of a land conflict in 
Ñacunday (department of Alto Paraná) on an estate controlled by Grupo Favero, owned by 
Tranquilino Favero who we met in the previous chapter. On 19 September 2011, at request of 
a neighbourhood commission of landless peasants (Comisión Vecinal Santa Lucía), the INDERT 
announced that it would begin a judicial review to determine whether land titles in the area were 
legal or not. The processing of official records revealed that Favero had illegally appropriated 
55,406 hectares in 1999 (Fogel 2013: 81). INDERT duly arranged for army engineers from the 
Military Geographical Department (Instituto Geográfico Militar, IGM) to conduct an on-site 
survey of the estates to identify any surplus state-owned land. This all coincided with a wave of 




had been camping in the Colonia Paranambú area of Ñacunday since July 2011, when they were 
evicted from the Espigón farm, another Favero property (LASSR February 2012; Fogel 2013). 
Some of Lugo’s closest advisors, such as José “Pakova” Ledesma, the governor of San Pedro, 
and Senator Sixto Pereira, saw the conflict as an opportunity to mobilise political support ahead 
of the April 2013 elections by tapping into widespread, chronic hostility in rural areas against 
brasiguayo soybean farmers (EIU 2012). 
 
At this point, the anti-reform alliance between landlords and state actors was principally 
responsible for holding back progress in the course of the survey. Landlords retaliated by 
evicting the intruders, dismantling the GPS receivers installed by the soldiers and removing a 
landmark they had planted. Favero filed an appeal which was backed up by a local public 
prosecutor, María del Carmen Meza, who issued a warning to the military high command that 
the presence of the carperos in the survey party was unwarranted. The Supreme Court 
intervened, ruling that future surveying would be overseen by a local judge—a step short of 
saying that Lugo had erred in entrusting that task to the military. The Brazilian consulate 
had an active involvement in the crisis too. Eduardo dos Santos, Brazilian ambassador to 
Paraguay, told the media that his embassy was providing Brazilian landowners with “technical, 
legal and consular assistance” (LASSR 2012). At the same time, the carpero movement 
was brutally suppressed and criminalized; Victoriano López, leader of the LNC, was arrested for 
alleged sexual abuse of a minor (Fogel 2013).  
 
Throughout the entire episode, Lugo made contradictory and indecisive statements about the 




under pressure to uphold the rule of law (EIU 2012). On 26 February 2012, after months of 
dithering the Lugo government relocated the roughly 350 families of carperos inside Ñacunday 
to the nearby National Park, leading to the sharp criticism from Paraguay’s environmental NGOs 
(LAWR 2012). The fiasco over measurement of Favero’s farm exposed the inability of the Lugo 
administration, confronted with a hostile and conservative Congress, to enact the land reform it 
had promised. As Lidia Ruiz of the OLT recounts, the episode lay bare where the real power lay 
in the country:  
 
[Lugo] intentó hacer la mensura de las tierras de Ñacunday en Alto Paraná y tuvo 
que llevar militares y todo, y ni aun así no lo hizo. Ahí fue claro quién era el poder, 
poder fáctico, el poder económico, son los intereses económicos lo que manejaban el 
poder, porque él teniendo una estructura del estado como el ejecutivo, teniendo 
incluso allí los militares, no le dejaron hacer una mensura, qué es un procedimiento 
administrativo normal. Porque la mensura lo que hace es para saber bueno cuántas 
hectáreas de tierra hay, quien lo está ocupando y cuántas hectáreas... y es básico. Y 
más aún en un territorio que es en el marco de los 50 km fronterizos, que es del 
Estado pero que hoy día está usurpado. Están en manos brasileñas. Y a él no le 
dejaron hacer eso. Ahí hubo Claridad de cómo el poder fáctico trabaja en el país. 
(Ruiz, personal interview, 2015) 
 
Marina Kue 
On June 15 2012, 11 squatters and six police officers were killed in a shootout during a botched 




la Recuperación Campesina de Canindeyú (MRCC), who had occupied land near Curuguaty. 
The tragedy was the worst incident of political violence for decades, igniting criticism from 
peasant movements and opposition leaders, albeit for very different reasons. It took place on a 
2,000-hectare section of property in Marina Kue (department of Canindeyú), that had been 
spuriously obtained during the Stroessner era by a corrupt businessman and former Colorado 
senator Blas Riquelme under the guise of agrarian reform (as signalled earlier in chapter 3).  
 
On July 11 2016, the Paraguayan Supreme Court sentenced eleven peasants (eight men and three 
women) for the killings of the six police officers during the Curuguaty massacre. Rubén Villaba, 
who was identified as the squatters’ ringleader, was given a 30-year prison sentence. Luis 
Olmedo was sentenced to 20 years as the main co-author of the crime, and two other men, 
Arnaldo Quintana and Néstor Castro, were given 18 years each for the same charge. Seven other 
peasants received sentences of between four and six years for criminal association and invasion 
of private property (LAWR 2016). Concerns over the lack of impartiality and independence in 
the investigations into the events in Curuguaty, are captured in a press release from the United 
Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein:  
  
The conviction of 11 peasants in the Curuguaty case following a trial that allegedly 
did not respect judicial guarantees is deeply troubling… [also concerning is] the fact 
that, up to now, the deaths of 11 peasants, killed in the same incident, have not been 




summarily executed after being subjected to torture and other human rights 
violations.56 
 
The official version of what happened stated that squatters had fired at police first but this view 
was strongly contested by human rights and activist organisations (e.g. CODEHUPY 2012; 
PEICC 2012). Investigations have been cast in a shadow of doubt due to ‘allegations of serious 
irregularities in the actions of the Public Prosecution Service, the judiciary and the security 
forces in relation to the police raid in Curuguaty in June 2012’ (Human Rights Committee 
findings on Paraguay 2013). Accusations have also been made regarding the involvement of 
hidden marksmen, planted to spark a political crisis in order to oust Lugo from office. In such a 
climate of suspicion, conspiracy theories abound.57 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Curuguaty massacre, a medley of conservative social forces 
saw their opportunity and converged around the impeachment and removal of Lugo. Accusations 
of negligence, ineptitude, and incapacity to act decisively, spearheaded by highly placed 
spokespeople for the soy producers (such as Hector Cristaldo, head of the UGP, as well as 
spokespeople for Cargill and Monsanto), blamed Lugo for the deaths and called for his 
immediate impeachment (Ultima Hora 2012). Given that Lugo’s position vis-à-vis the legislature 
                                                             
56 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20289&LangID=E 
57 According to an independent examination of audio footage by Spanish ballistics experts stated that the police were 
killed by automatic fire, incompatible with the rudimentary old hunting rifles captured from the squatters. The 
presence of women and children suggested that they were not expecting violence. Many believed that the shootout 
was orchestrated by hidden marksmen, a view detailed by the Plataforma de Estudio e Investigación de Conflictos 
Campesinos (PEICC 2012), which argued that the police, who were wearing bulletproof vests, were all killed by 




was never strong, it is no surprise that the opposition struck when the opportunity arose and that 
Lugo was not able to withstand the attack. 
 
4.4 The ousting of Fernando Lugo 
On June 21 2012, the Chamber of Deputies voted 76-1 (with 3 abstentions) to initiate the 
impeachment of Lugo on the grounds of “poor performance of functions” (mal desempeño en sus 
funciones).58 The following day, after the briefest of debates, the Senate voted 39-4 (with 2 
abstentions) to confirm the decision and remove Lugo from office. Lugo reluctantly signed, and 
his vice-president, Federico Franco, who had long disagreed with the president’s reformist 
policies, was sworn in for the remaining 14 months of the presidential term of office. The 
impeachment process was widely criticised. Despite official assurances that the process was 
constitutional, no evidence was presented at the impeachment trial. In fact, the formal accusation 
document even stated that this was not necessary because the facts were “common knowledge” 
(del conocimiento público). Lugo was given just 24 hours to prepare his defence and less than 
two hours to present it to the Senate (which he eschewed as preposterous). On all these counts, 
the process violated Article 17 of the 1992 Constitution, which protects the rights of the accused 
to see the charges, challenge the evidence and be given necessary time to prepare an adequate 
defence. Due process fell by the wayside as Congress rushed through the ‘express’ impeachment 
(Nickson 2015: 17). In this respect, Lugo’s ousting is an emblematic case of a “smart coup”, a 
                                                             
58 The Chamber of Deputies cited five counts to support its accusation of Lugo’s ‘poor performance’: (1) organising 
and financing/authorization of a politically partisan gathering within the engineering unit of the armed forces in 
2009; (2) instigating and supporting illegal land occupations/invasions in the Ñacunday area; (3) violating the 
democratic process by signing the Ushuaia II protocol (Mercosur’s 2011 democratic charter) without consulting 
Congress; (4) responsibility for the increasing insecurity in the country due to failure to combat the EPP; and (5) 




process that is increasingly being witnessed throughout the region “whereby Left governments 
are forced out of office and a new Right-orientated government put in place, with, preferably, 
relatively little bloodshed and an element of popular and institutional legitimacy” (Cannon 2016: 
119).   
 
In many ways, this was a (smart) “coup” waiting to happen. Lugo had already survived various 
attempts by the Colorado opposition to impeach him on spurious charges. What occurred in the 
end was a catastrophic balance of forces mirroring the “reciprocal destruction” (or “mutual 
bleeding”) of Caesarism. In the Gramscian vocabulary:  
 
Caesarism can be said to express a situation in which the forces in conflict balance 
each other in a catastrophic manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a 
way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal 
destruction. When the progressive force A struggles against the reactionary force B, 
not only may A defeat B or B defeat A, but it may happen that neither A nor B 
defeats the other – that they bleed each other mutually and then a third force C 
intervenes from outside, subjugating what is left of both A and B (Gramsci 1971: 
219). 
 
Following Gramsci we would say that that the cross-party unity to approve Lugo’s impeachment 
emerged as a particular expression of the catastrophic balance of forces whereby “the third force 
C [Colorado Party], intervenes not only because of the mutual exhaustion of A [Lugo] and B 




solution to the conflict. Thus, though the eventual outcome of the intervention might be the 
subjugation of both groups, the intervention itself is sparked by interest internal to the conflict” 
(Fontana 2004: 178; emphasis added). Certainly, the PLRA’s myopic behaviour reflected 
strategic concerns and an attempt to gain political advantage in the forthcoming 2013 electoral 
campaign. However, “in ousting Lugo, they ruptured the only political coalition capable of 
defeating the Colorados” (Setrini and Arce 2012). As Lambert (2012) pointed out, the  
 
Impeachment allowed the PLRA to distance itself from an unpopular government, 
which it had previously supported, and gain the presidency for the remaining 10 
months of the presidential period; this would crucially provide access to state resources 
to fund their patronage machine and their electoral campaign (a practice which is 
illegal but was standard practice under the Colorados). The Colorados took the risk of 
allowing the PLRA full access to government, to highlight how they were unable to 
govern even without Lugo – a policy that would depend on effectively undermining 
government policy through their majority in Congress for the remaining ten months of 
the administration. 
 
This is precisely what occurred in 2013. Colorado Party candidate Horacio Cartes, one of the 
most affluent businessmen in Paraguay (refer to Box 3.1), won the election with 45.8 per cent of 
the vote. The administration of Cartes (2013–2018) returned Paraguay to the orthodoxy 
neoliberal camp of Latin American politics, alongside Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and the 
majority of the countries of Central America (López and Vertiz 2015: 156), signalling a return to 





4.5 Conclusion  
Fernando Lugo promised substantial reforms in agrarian policies during his race to power. Once 
in power, however, his administration lacked the capacity to mobilise and allocate fiscal 
resources for the implementation of an agrarian reform. The unwillingness or incapacity of the 
Lugo administration to carry out its promise of, and mandate for, land reform ultimately resulted 
from weak interaction between pro-reform state and society actors, fierce political opposition 
from a coordinated, well-resourced and powerful landed elite, and the combative but insufficient 
mobilisation of an atomised campesino movement. 
 
The ousting of Lugo from office reveals the inordinate level of influence exerted by the 
landowning elite on Paraguayan politics, as well as the very feeble nature of the country’s 
democracy. “The vehemence of opposition to a centre-left president whose policies were more 
social democratic than revolutionary and who actually achieved very little” (Nickson 2015: 18) 
serve as a potent reminder that “it is hardly necessary for the Latin American governments to 
adopt social-revolutionary measures before the traditional elite… feel threatened and act 
violently in protection of their interests” (Gordon and Webber 2013: 36). In a country like 
Paraguay, where the oligarchic control of the state by landed elites is widely recognised, the 
prospects for redistributive land reform continue to be fragile without substantial, even if partial, 
structural and institutional change within the state and in society. At the same time, progress in 
the direction of redistributive land reform continues to be held back by the weakening of peasant 
organisations, due both to internal differentiation and mass peasant expulsion from the 




a long-term basis and if their organisations and movements manage to minimise their differences 
and agree on a united strategy that transcends short-term demands” (Fogel 1997: 104).  
 
In all, the Paraguayan experience demonstrates the resilience of the landed oligarchy and 
highlights how fragile the prospects for redistributive land reform continue to be in the post-
authoritarian period. Such a transformation is not at all likely without addressing the underlying 
policy paradoxes and power structures associated with not only the legacy of the predatory state 
in Paraguay, but also how these power structures are intertwined with new accumulation regimes 
in the wider global food regime. To be sure, if these concerns are left unaltered, the current agro-
extractive export model will continue to reproduce existing power structures that are founded on 
wealth polarisation as opposed to striving for redistributive policies to overturn Paraguay’s 







From “White Gold” to “Green Deserts”: Agrarian Extractivism and the Peasantry 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The term agro- or agrarian extractivism has a relatively recent history (Petras and Veltmeyer 
2014)59 and has become an increasingly recurrent term in the Latin American extractivist 
literature for understanding the new dynamics and trajectories of agrarian change and 
challenging dominant discourses which characterize present-day forms of capitalist agriculture as 
industrial agricultural development (Teubal 2009; Gudynas 2010, 2015; Teubal and Giarracca 
2014; Alonso-Fradejas 2015; McKay 2017). In this chapter I will engage with and refine this 
emerging concept within the specific dynamics of agrarian change taking place in Paraguay, 
arguing that the current model of rural development represents a form of agrarian extractivism 
that is leading to social, economic, and environmental impoverishment for the majority of the 
Paraguayan population. The chapter is organized in four sections: the next (second) section 
provides greater conceptual clarity of the meaning agrarian extractivism within the broader 
‘extractivist’ discourse, as well as its recent emergence within the Paraguayan agrarian literature 
on agroextractivismo. The third section offers a short presentation of the dramatic agrarian 
change that has occurred in the country over the past three decades, in terms of not only land use 
but also changes in forms of production and social relations. The fourth section harnesses the 
concept of agrarian extractivism to reveal the extractive character of the contemporary agro-
                                                             
59 The actual term agro- or agrarian extractivism, as far as I know, was first introduced in the book Extractive 
Imperialism in the Americas, written by James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer (2014), and developed further in 
Veltmeyer and Delgado Wise (2018), as well as in two keynote address delivered by Veltmeyer at the China 
Agricultural University and the BICAS conference in Brasilia in 2018. As we shall see in this chapter, the actual 




export development model. The final section concludes the chapter with some remarks on the 
analytical and political utility of this new concept and its applications to other Latin American 
contexts. 
 
5.2 Agrarian extractivism: an emerging concept  
As a result of the neoliberal restructuring of the global food system and the increasing 
dominance of agribusiness transnational corporations, some sectors of agriculture in Latin 
America have been transformed, according to Teubal (2009) and Gudynas (2010), into extractive 
systems. This argument is often made with particular reference to soybean plantations: “The no-
tillage system, Roundup Ready seeds and glyphosate tolerance reconfigured agriculture into an 
essentially extractive system not very different from mining, as resources are extracted from soil 
without recompense” (Teubal 2009: 158; emphasis added). Hence the term “agrominería” (agro-
mining) is now also entering the lexicon of activist research—see for instance the excellent Atlas 
del agronegocio transgénico en el Cono Sur (2020) prepared by Acción por la Biodiversidad.60 
In that publication, the collective defines this particular model of agriculture “as another form of 
extractivism, because it extracts millions of litres of water and thousands of tonnes of nutrients 
from the soil every year without replenishing them, thus condemning them to desertification” (p. 
162). In their comparative study of open-pit mining and soybean production in Argentina, 
Giarracca and Teubal (2014: 48) again point to the commonalities between both sectors, 
emphasizing how the latter represents “a certain type of agriculture in which essential resources 
such as water and fertile land, and biodiversity, are degraded by extractivism” (Giarracca and 
Teubal 2014: 48). The Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa (2013) is another scholar who 
                                                             
60 The Biodiversity Alliance is a collective Latin American platform that brings together 13 key organizations and 




has included agribusiness and biofuels production in her understanding of the new extractivism 
in Latin America, ‘‘due to the fact that they consolidate a model that tends to follow a 
monoculture, the destruction of biodiversity, a concentration of land ownership and a destructive 
re-configuration of vast territories” (Svampa 2013: 118–119).  
 
For Gudynas (2010, 2013, 2015), the term is important because it challenges dominant 
discourses of governments and corporations that adopt the term “agro-industry” or “industrial 
agriculture” as a legitimating strategy for these models. Rather than a form of industrialization 
characterized by social and sectoral articulation which generates employment through value-
added, forward and backward economic linkages and a home market in agriculture, Gudynas 
points out that this model is largely characterized bycrop production which is more akin to 
“extractive industries” which extract raw materials in large quantities, destined for export with 
little or no processing.  
 
For Petras and Veltmeyer (2014), the defining feature of agricultural extractivism in Latin 
America today has taken form around the “political economy of biofuels capitalism: the 
conversion of farmland and agriculture for food production into the production of biofuels.” In 
reality, the driving forces behind this transformation in land use relates not just to the increasing 
pull of biofuel markets—undoubtedly an import important factor (see Palau et al. 2008)—but 
also to the borders uses of this so-called “flex crop” (Borras et al. 2016). Figure 5.1 shows the 
relative share of soybean usage in the world bio-fuel economy, vis-à-vis other food crops, 
highlighting that the production of biofuels is a much more prevalent feature for crops such as 




al. 2016). In the specific case of soybeans, global demand is driven by the “four f’s”: food, feed, 
fuel, and finance (Turzi 2017), but its primary insertion into the global economy takes the form 
of livestock feed. 
 
Figure 5.1 Share of food crop usage in world bio-based economy (2009) 
 
Source: FAO (2013: 217). Statistical Yearbook. 
 
The most systematic applications of the term agrarian extractivism to date is a study carried out 
by Ben McKay (2017) on the expansion of the agricultural frontier in Bolivia’s lowlands. 
Building on the works of Gudynas (2013) and Bunker (1984), McKay demonstrates how the 
Bolivian soy complex is  extractive in nature, extractive in a quadruple sense: (1) large volumes 
of materials extracted destined for export with little or no processing; (2) value-chain 
concentration and sectoral disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental degradation; and 
(4) deterioration of labour opportunities and/or labour conditions. The strength of this framework 




economic and socio-ecological spheres with a particular emphasis on scale (scale of extracted 
materials and/or scale of capital involved), control (over value chains and control grabbing), and 
sectoral linkages (or lack thereof). Essentially, it brings Gudynas’ dimensions of extractivism 
into direct dialogue with concerns from critical agrarian studies around the terms of land control 
and use, labour relations, surplus distribution, and capital accumulation (Bernstein 2010). 
Combining the vivid Latin American debates on neo-extractivism with an agrarian political 
economy approach in this manner allows for a more precise inquiry into extent to which 
particular agricultural sector may represent an extractive enclave (see discussion below on Fogel 
and Riquelme 2005). 
 
For these reasons, in this chapter, I explicitly engage with this analytical framework, arguing that 
all four characterizations of agrarian extractivism highlighted by McKay for the Bolivian context 
can be usefully retained for analyzing the case of Paraguay. Of course, these features are not 
meant to represent a one-size-fits-all definition for agrarian extractivism. The degree and form of 
extractivism in agrarian sectors will undoubtedly vary in different contexts and crop complexes, 
as demonstrated in the various national cases study contributions to a forthcoming edited 
volume, Agrarian Extractivism in Latin America (McKay, Alberto-Fradejas, Ezquerro-Cañete 
Forthcoming), which will be the first systematic collection on agrarian industrial capitalism seen 
through the prism of extractivism. With this in mind, I not only trace over the four 
aforementioned dimensions of agrarian extractivism, but also elongate the concept to include 
additional dimensions that, I argue, are required to fully capture the extractive dynamics of 
agrarian capitalism in Paraguay today. In particular, I propose that the Paraguayan case exhibits, 




required to sustain this mode of rural development; the negative impact on food security and 
sovereignty; the politics of agrarian extractivism and its constricting impact on democracy (this 
last point was developed in the previous chapter and therefore will not be covered in here). It is 
particularly surprisingly that the food dynamics has not been front and centre of the emerging 
literature on agrarian extractivism. This might partly be a reaction to debates and critiques 
arising from the related literature on “land grabbing” in Latin America. The initial FAO study 
(2012) was quickly critiqued in numerous follow up studies (e.g. Borras et al. 2012a, 2012b) for 
framing the dynamics of land grabs too narrowly within a food-centered/food crisis-centred 
analysis. This led to an expanded understanding of the motives behind contemporary large-scale 
acquisitions of land which has greatly benefited the literature. Be that as it may, let us not throw 
the baby out with the bathwater: the negative impact of agrarian extractivism on the national 
dynamics of food production deserve close monitoring if we are to unveil to true extent of the 
extractive nature of the current agribusiness-led model of agrarian capitalism. Adding more 
analytical strings to the bow of agrarian extractivism will capture, in a fuller sense, the extractive 
nature and dynamics inherent in the capitalist development of agriculture in Paraguay today, 
highlighting the growing contradictions of this model. I develop each of these points further 
below. Before getting there, let us briefly review how this discussion on the extractive 
characteristics of agriculture has developed within the Paraguayan agrarian literature. 
 
One of the most systematic applications of the term agrarian extractivism was a study carried out 
by McKay on the expansion of agricultural frontier in Bolivia’s lowlands. Building on the works 
of Gudynas (2013) and Bunker (1984), he demonstrates how the Bolivian soy complex is 




destined for export with little or no processing; (2) value-chain concentration and sectoral 
disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental degradation; and (4) deterioration of labour 
opportunities and/or labour conditions. All four of McKay’s (2017) characterizations of agrarian 
extractivism in Bolivia can be usefully retained here. In addition, I propose that the Paraguayan 
case exhibits, at least, three additional extractive dimensions that merit close analysis: the 
repressive model required to sustain this mode of rural development; the negative impact on food 
security and sovereignty; the politics of agrarian extractivism and its constricting impact on 
democracy (this last point was developed in the previous chapter and therefore will not be 
covered here). All the other points are developed further below. Before getting there, let us 
briefly review how this discussion on the extractive characteristics of agriculture has developed 
within Paraguay. 
 
The economic, social, and environmental extractivist dynamics of soy production in Paraguay 
have long been highlighted by national and foreign scholar activists, in a number of publications. 
Two of the first studies to emerge, following the legalization and expansion of GM seed in 2004, 
were a short study by Tomás Palau (2004), The Advance of GM Soy Monoculture in Paraguay: 
Agrarian Capitalism and Peasant Expulsion, and an edited volume by Ramón Fogel and Marcial 
Riquelme (2005), Soy Enclave: Poverty and Weakening Sovereignty. This latter text is 
particularly noteworthy as it predates aforementioned conceptual discussions around agrarian 
extractivism in Latin America by several years, but was already characterizing the expansion of 
soy production as an “enclave” economic activity, implying that foreign agribusiness companies 
created very little forward or backward linkages into the local or national economy that would 




to “raise concerns about the correlation between the soy boom, the expulsion of campesino 
farmers, environmental degradation, and the cultural shift in border areas” (Hetherington 2020: 
45). Indeed, the two authors make very strong nationalist statement in their introduction and 
respective chapters, although the other contributing authors represent an interesting diversity of 
views, including a piece about anti-brasiguaio racism inherent in Paraguayan nationalist rhetoric 
(i.e. Albuquerque 2005; also see Blanc 2015; Hetherington 2020: 230n3), and a Spanish 
translation of an earlier article on Brazilian colonization of the eastern border region that had 
been previously published in the Journal of Latin American Studies (Nickson 1981; 2005). While 
the book failed to spark the sort of public debate the authors had hoped for—it was often 
dismissed in the country “for being too nationalist and too Marxist” (Hetherington 2011: 62)—it 
did spawn a long list of publications making similar claims (Palau et al. 2007; Rulli 2007; 
Glauser 2009; Guereña 2013; Riquelme and Vera 2013; Rojas 2014, 2016; Elgert 2016; 
Ezquerro-Cañete 2016, 2017), including increasing characterizations of the soy model as an 
extractive system. 
 
In her historical review of the Paraguayan agro-export model, Duarte Recalde (2014) situates the 
emergence and consolidation of what she refers to as “agroextractivismo extranjero” within the 
wider extractive imperative throughout the region: the “Commodity Consensus”, a new 
economic and political order according to which the production of primary or low-processed 
goods is privileged from a tacit agreement about the irrevocable character of the extractivist 
dynamics (Svampa 2013: 31). Likewise, several researchers at BASE Investigaciones Sociales 
have included the large-scale monocrop production of agriculture for export as a form of 




Exclusion and Resistance (Rojas 2014) and Mapping Extractivsim (Ortega 2016). In a special 
report prepared for this same research center, Eduardo Gudynas, one Latin America’s leading 
environmental thinkers, adds his voice to the Paraguayan extractivist literature. For Gudynas, 
Paraguay’s extractive matrix is composed of three main pillars: soybeans, meat, and 
hydroelectric energy (Gudynas 2017).  Paraguay is thus the only country where an extractivism 
of electrical energy occurs, that is, where a river is modified for the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam, and the energy obtained is exported directly. In other countries, hydroelectric 
power plants are part of the so-called support basins of extractivism, which include works or 
spaces that provide resources to sustain extractive activities. In those cases, hydroelectric dams 
generate electricity that extractivism needs. A well-known example is found in the Amazon of 
Brazil, where the Tucuruí dam feeds energy to the mining and aluminum processing of Carajás. 
For Gudyans, these dams are not extractive in themselves, since they do not export electricity, 
but are built to meet the needs of extractive enterprises that are located elsewhere. In the 
Paraguayan case, however, the energy of the dams on the Paraná River is largely exported, 
making it a unique case of hydro-electric energy extractivism (Gudynas 2017: 2).  
 
Having outlined the main contours of the Paraguayan and Latin American debate on agro-
extractivism, and before developing into the specific extractivist dimensions of the contemporary 
forms of agribusiness-led agro-export, the following section provides a brief history of the 
capitalist development of agriculture in Paraguay. This is necessary context because, as Peter 
Newell signals in his review of Food for the Few: Neoliberal Globalism and Biotechnology in 





there is a need to separate out analytically and historically… those transformations in 
agrarian structures that can be related to the introduction of transgenics, or even of 
neoliberal forms of capitalism, from those driven by other forces and factors. Many 
of the forms of social exclusion and environmental devastation [currently taking 
place across the Latin America] pre-date the period in which neoliberal forms or 
biotechnologies were introduced into the region and relate, for example, to systemic 
patterns of institutional weakness or forms of historical discrimination against 
campesino or indigenous groups. While some applications of biotechnology may 
exacerbate existing social inequalities or environmental problems, they cannot be 
held wholly responsible for their causation. (Newell 2009: 590–591) 
 
With this important caveat in mind, the rest of this chapter will aim to reveal the specificities of 
agrarian extractivism in the current context, arguing that it has brought about large and 
unprecedented economic, social, and environmental transformations that have been profoundly 
damaging for the majority of Paraguay’s rural population.  
 
5.3 Agriculture in Paraguay: a brief background 
Whether through the nineteenth century yerba mate plantations (yerbales), forest exploitation for 
quebracho logging (tannin production) in the Gran Chaco during the early twentieth, or the more 
than one hundred thousand “white gold” producers during the cotton boom of the 1970s and 
1980s, Paraguay has always depended heavily on agricultural exports to sustain its economic 




(1989: 63) recounts the slow and gradual diversification of Paraguay’s export products post-1870 
in the following manner:  
 
Yerba mate continued to represent an important export item, and together with 
tobacco and hides accounted for the bulk of Paraguayan exports for the remainder of 
the century. Soon, however, new products were added. Timber came first, quebracho 
extract followed with the dawn of the twentieth century, the exportation of meat 
product took a quantum leap with the installation of meat processing plants in the 
1910s and 1920s, and finally cotton became a major export item in the aftermath of 
the revolution of 1922–3. Hence, although the agro-export model of development 
remained firmly in place, the structure of the Paraguayan export sector changed 
significantly. 
 
As a result of Stroessner’s colonization and agrarian policies that where outlined in chapter 3, 
Paraguay experienced a massive expansion of the area under crop production, which increased 
six-fold between 1956 and 1988 (Weisskoff 1992: 1532). Describing the role that small farmers 
played in this transformation, Weisskoff (1992: 1534) notes the following:  
 
It may be a remarkable characteristic of Paraguayan agriculture that the expansion of 
the major food crops—cassava and corn—has been based on the production of 
hundreds of thousands of microfarms, each of less than a hectare. More surprising 
perhaps is that cotton, the leading export earner, is also a minifundia crop and was 





Thus, a unique feature of Paraguay’s pattern of agricultural development during this period was 
its heavy reliance on small-farm production: “almost 70 per cent of the area dedicated to cotton 
in 1981 was on farms of less than 20 hectares. Cotton alone accounted for more than a third of all 
Paraguayan exports in 1990” (Carter et al. 1996: 54n18). The extensive and intensive production 
of cotton in the 1970s and 80s was largely due to extensive government support, in the form of 
seeds, credit, infrastructure and technical assistance (Hetherington 2011; 2020). With the 
creations of cotton colonies, peasant producers were inserted into the national circuit of capital 
through produce commercialisation but continued to be organised under non-capitalist forms 
(Nagel 1991). This persistence of non-capitalist forms of production can be usefully understood 
through Marx’s distinction between the formal and real subsumption of labour to capital. In the 
Marxist tradition, a social setting in which non-capitalist relations of production persist but the 
producers are inserted within (and subordinated to) the capitalist market as provider of a 
commodity is understood as one of “formal subsumption of labour to capital”—i.e. capital 
appropriate surplus value, but is does not determine the forms in which commodities are 
produced (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a). 
 
Since the 1990s, however, waning government engagement and plummeting cotton prices took a 
toll. The cotton sector spiralled into a prolonged and ongoing crisis as production declined 
precipitously, plunging smallholders into deepening poverty and exclusion (Hetherington 2014). 
Cotton production fell from 246,594 tonnes in 2000 to 64,282 in 2008, while the surface area 
planted with cotton fell from 194,760 to 65,000 hectares (Itriago 2012b: 9). Over the same 




2.91 to 5.97 million tonnes, while the land dedicated to soy increased correspondingly from 1.2 
to 2.64 million hectares (Ezquerro-Cañete 2016: 704). As a result, soy replaced cotton as the 
primary commercial and export crop, as expressed in the following Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MAG) numbers cited by Hetherington (2011: 243–244n62):  
 
In 1980, smallholder cotton production accounted for 33.6 per cent of primary exports, 
while soybeans accounted for only 13.5 per cent. By 2005, this had more than 
reversed, with soybean accounting for 33.5 per cent, and cotton having fallen to 2.4 
per cent. The other big winner was beef… which rose from 0.3 per cent to 15 per cent 
over the same span. 
 
The ever-increasing penetration of agribusiness capital and agricultural biotechnology has led to 
the current model of agrarian extractivism, which correlates with the country’s insertion into the 
neoliberal corporate food regime (Otero 2012; Ezquerro-Cañete 2016, Fogel 2019). The novelty 
of this new form of agrarian expansion relates to its scale and scope, its impact in the 
restructuring of society, and its damaging consequences.  
 
5.4 Agrarian Extractivism in Paraguay 
This section analyses Paraguay’s soy complex through the lens of agrarian extractivism. In doing 
so, it traces over the four interlinked dimensions of agrarian extractivism as laid out by McKay 
(2017), but also elongates the concept to include three additional dimensions required to fully 
capture the extractive dynamics of agrarian capitalism in Paraguay today. It is particularly 




emerging literature on agrarian extractivism. This might partly be a reaction to debates and 
critiques arising from the related literature on “land grabbing” in Latin America. The initial FAO 
study (2012) was quickly critiqued in numerous follow-up studies (e.g. Borras et al. 2012a, 
2012b) for framing the dynamics of land grabs too narrowly within a food-centered/food crisis-
centred analysis. This led to an expanded understanding of the motives behind contemporary 
large-scale acquisitions of land which has greatly benefited the literature. Be that as it may, let us 
not throw the baby out with the bathwater: the negative impact of agrarian extractivism on the 
national dynamics of food production deserve close monitoring if we are to unveil to a true 
extent of the extractive nature of the current agribusiness-led model of agrarian capitalism. 
Adding more analytical strings to the bow of agrarian extractivism will capture, in a fuller sense, 
the extractive nature and dynamics inherent in the capitalist development of agriculture in 
Paraguay today, highlighting the growing contradictions of this model. 
 
5.4.1 Large volumes of materials extracted destined for export with little or no processing 
Looking at Paraguay’s agro-export profile, we see that the country’s insertion into the global 
food regime is aligned, almost in its entirety, with what Tony Weis (2007) has called the 
industrial grain-livestock-complex: together soy-based products (including whole soybeans, 
soybean cakes, meal, and oil) and beef (including frozen, fresh, or chilled beef and livestock 
cattle) account for 83 per cent of Paraguay’s agrarian export basket in 2018 (CAS 2019: 51). 
Between 2002 and 2017, the export value of the soybean complex increased six-fold, but the 
relative share of the soybean complex (soybeans, soybean oil and soybean oil cake) was rather 
stable, increasing slightly from 44 per cent in 2002 ($500 million), to more than 46 per cent in 




triple. The absolute value of bovine exports was almost fifteen times higher, from $70 million in 
2002, to $1,030 million in 2017 (Baraibar 2020: 385). 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, soybean production area under cultivation has dramatically increased 
over the past twenty years, with the volume extracted going from 2,771,000 metric tonnes (MT) 
in 1996–97 to 10,336,144 MT in 2016–17, while land area more than tripled from 1,050,000 ha 
to 3,388,709 ha during the same period.61During the latest 2018–19 season, 7,653,310 MT of 
soybeans and derivatives were destined for export, representing 90 per cent of total production.  
 
Figure 5.2 Total area and production of soybeans, 1996–2019. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CAPECO data.62 
 
                                                             
61Over this period, yields have fluctuated between 1,367 and 3,050 kg/ha. 





































































































During the 1990s, soybean farmers exported most of their product to Argentina and Brazil, and 
international shipping went through the Brazilian port of Paranaguá. In large part this was due to 
the lack of national regulatory infrastructure to comply with phytosanitary regulations, thus 
producers often replied on Brazilian inspectors. With the creation of SENAVE (Servicio 
Nacional de Calidad y Sanidad Vegetal y de Semillas) in 2004 (Law 2549), ports on the 
Paraguay and Paraná rivers were brought into compliance with export standards which could 
now be verified locally, making it far easier to negotiate contracts with overseas buyers. As a 
result, the bulk of the soy that had been traversing the Brazilian border on the way to the Atlantic 
started going down the Paraná River into Argentina (see Table 5.1), leading to a boost in 
shipping volume so immense that Paraguay has now developed the third-largest fleet of tug boats 
in the world (only behind the US and China) (Hetherington 2020: 64–65). 
 
Table 5.1 Evolution of soybean export infrastructure in MT (% of total export), 1992–2018 
 Terrestrial Fluvial Rail freight Total 
1992 693,995 (49.9) 604,604 (43.5) 91,660 (6.6) 1,390,259 
1993 635,649 (54.1) 428,192 (36.4) 110,920 (9.4) 1,174,761 
1994 869,089 (56.5) 517,534 (33.7) 150,980 (9.8) 1,537,603 
1995 721,129 (45.4) 713,045 (44.9) 153,254 (9.7) 1,587,428 
1996 722,236 (33.6) 1,248,364 (58.1) 179,400 (8.3) 2,150,000 
1997 430,746 (18.8) 1,743,446 (76.0) 119,409 (5.2) 2,293,601 
1998 657,543 (28.7) 1,536,215 (66.8) 105,000 (4.6) 2,298,758 
1999 784,482 (38.7) 1,113,850 (55.0) 111,220 (5.5) 2,025,552 
2000 984,738 (39.2) 1,460,110 (58.2) 65,100 (2.6) 2,509,948 
2001 1,155,776 (48.4) 1,216,615 (51.0) 5,000 (0.2) 2,385,979 
2002 1,210,874 (38.2) 1,828,559 (57.7) 120,960 (3.8) 3,167,193 
2003 351,906 (13.2) 2,152,152 (80.8) 149,309 (5.6) 2,664,415 
2004 334,746 (11.6) 2,526,762 (87.7) 20,674 (0.7) 2,882,182 
2005 31,986 (1.3) 2,227,727 (93.6) 120,631 (5.1) 2,380,344 
2006 118,268 (2.9) 3,844,201 (92.9) 173,648 (4.2) 4,136,117 
2007 97,560 (2.2) 4,242,351 (95.6) 98,174 (2.2) 4,438,085 
2008 87,140 (3.8) 2,134,065 (93.5) 61,500 (2.7) 2,282,705 
2009 107,605 (2.3) 4,492,824 (96.5) 54,000 (1.2) 4,654,429 




2011 199,116 (6.7) 2,771,923 (93.3) 0 2,971,039 
2012 278,684 (5.7) 4,653,764 (94.3) 0 4,932,448 
2013 581,349 (12.0) 4,274,772 (88.0) 0 4,856,121 
2014 339,700 (7.6) 4,107,814 (92.4) 0 4,447,514 
2015 387,073 (7.2) 4,984,059 (92.8) 0 5,371,132 
2016 239,858 (3.8) 6,076,491 (96.2) 0 6,316,349 
2017 178,846 (2.9) 6,058,344 (97.1) 0 6,237,190 
2018 116,994 (2.4) 4,771,657 (97.6) 0 4,888,651 
Source: Own compilation with data from CAPECO.63 
 
This evidently had important implications for widening the export destination of soybeans. In 
2019, soybeans were exported primarily to Argentina (69%), followed by Russia (17%), the 
European Union (8%), Brazil (2%), and Israel (2%); soy oil was exported to India (57%), 
Bangladesh (14%), and the European Union (13%); and soybean pellets was exported to the 
European Union (38%), followed by Chile (27%), Peru (13%), Thailand (6%) and Ecuador (5%). 
 
In terms of processing, Paraguay has gradually increased the degree of semi-processing of its 
soybeans. Whereas in 1988–1989, a mere 99,741 MT (9.3%) were retained for in-country 
processing, by 2018–2019, as much as 3,373356 MT (39.6%) were being semi-processed as oil 
(12.9%) and flour (26.7%). Up until the early 2010s, only Cargill had soy-crushing structure 
within the country (Wesz 2016). But in response to restrictions on exporting Paraguayan 
soybeans through the Rosario soybean oil complex imposed by Argentina in 2011, ADM and a 
joint venture between Bunge and Dreyfus invested $280 million in setting up large export-
oriented soybean oil plants. Bunge-Dreyfus venture built the processing plant Villeta (Central 
Department), with processing capacity of 3,000 tonnes per day. These plants have pushed the 
soybean processing capacity to 4,230,000 MT (CAPECO n.d.) and tripled the export capacity to 
                                                             




760,000 tonnes of oil. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reported 
that Paraguay was seeking to produce more soy oil than the European Union and take the place 
of the United States as the third largest producer of soybean oil, behind Argentina and Brazil 
(ECLAC 2013: 110). In 2016, however, a report by the Cámara Paraguaya de Oleaginosas y 
Cereales (CAPPRO) documented the lack of significant investments in recent years to expand 
the country’s crushing capacity. Domestic consumption over total production is just 7 per cent—
human consumption of refined soy oil is very low, and soy is used, domestically, for animal 
feeding (meal), although recently there has been an increase in the raw oil demand for biodiesel, 
since incentives for production and consumption of renewable energies have also increased 
(Rojas 2009; Wesz 2016). 
 
It is important to stress here that when soybeans are semi-processed into meal and oil for export, 
there are no sectoral articulation and little employment generation. For these reasons, Gudynas 
(2010a, 2010b, 2013) suggests that this type of agricultural activity is not an “industry” since 
using the term industry implies some kind of industrialization or value-added—not primary 
production for export. Elaborating this point further, McKay (2017: 203) writes: 
 
The importance of in-country processing is the value-added component of the 
production process which can trigger sectoral articulation as complementary sectors 
engage in industrial processing and manufacturing creating employment through 
inter-sectoral linkages. However, when soybeans are semi-processed into oilcake and 




The oilcake must be further processed to be converted into animal feed or consumer 
products. 
  
Somewhat surprisingly, this same line of argument was presented to me during an interview in 
Asunción with an analysts from the Instituto de Biotecnología Agrícola (INBIO), an agency that 
was funded from royalties paid to Monsanto by soybean farmers for the use of their patented 
seeds (discussed further below)—although as context for the following quote, it was part of a 
much longer argument to exonerate producers from paying taxes on soy exports. Indeed, the 
following depiction of this form of agriculture in Paraguay could easily feature as part of the 
agro-extractivist critiques discussed at the start of this chapter. 
 
No se termina—por otros problemas políticos—de consolidar la cadena de valor. 
¿Ves toda la materia prima que tenemos acá? No solo de alimentos o de agricultura, 
sino tenemos miles de materias primas... que no se consolida porque… La parte 
industrial, lo poco que se hace, se hace a medias. Es decir, lo que se hace es 
extracción, pero no producto terminado. Entonces una fábrica—"fabrica" le dicen—
de aceites no es tal cosa. Es una moledora de granos que extrae aceite, en sólido y 
líquido, y eso lo exporta. Y está todo automatizado. Para que toda la producción del 
país empleara cien personas. O sea, no solucionaste el problema. El problema es el 
producto terminado donde ahí viene la cadena: yo industrial produzco esto, encargo 
acá el envase, acá la tapa del envase, acá la etiqueta, el flete grueso, distribución, y 




aceite... va, va, va, va. Y eso no existe. (INBIO analyst, personal interview 2015; 
emphasis added) 
 
Thus, even the little “industrial processing” that takes place is not so, as it too constitutes a form 
of further “extraction” as oils are extracted from the soybean, and subsequently exported as 
primary commodities. The high volume of soybeans produced, semi-processed and destined for 
export represents the first features of agrarian extractivism in Paraguay—a point that was also 
raised by a completely different social actor: the leadership of the National Peasant Federation 
(FNC) laid out these extractive dimensions in the following clear terms: 
 
La producción de soja que está ligada absolutamente a la exportación de materia 
prima, porque la producción de soja no se consume en nuestro país, es 
absolutamente para el mercado internacional y, sobre todo, exportación sin ningún 
valor agregado. Son materia prima que se exporta hacia afuera. (Gómez, personal 
interview 2015) 
 
5.4.2 Agribusiness and market concentration: sectoral disarticulation 
An unmistakable trend in this new phase of global capitalism is the growing concentration of the 
commodity chain under the command of large agribusiness transnational corporations 
(McMichael 2009; Teubal 2009; Otero 2012). These firms control important segments at both 
ends of the value chain: agri-input corporations—those that invest in agricultural upstream64 
activities—dominate the seed industry and the provision of agrochemical, as well as other inputs 
                                                             
64 i.e. all those activities necessary to secure the conditions of farming before it can take place, such as access to 




that are sold to farmers; agro-food corporations—those that invest in agriculture downstream65 
activities—dominate global food processing and distribution, as well as the sale of food by 
supermarkets to consumers in the advanced capitalist countries. In this section, I analyse 
Paraguay’s agricultural value-chain and argue that a new phase of “control grabbing” is 
occurring via value-chain relations. New forms of capital are penetrating Paraguay’s countryside 
and drastically changing forms and relations of production, property, and power. According to 
national analyst Luis Rojas, “soy production in Paraguay is practically like an assembly plant: 
the inputs come from abroad, the land and water are provided here and often the same company 
that supplies the inputs is the exporter. They supply the inputs through credit to the producer and 
commit to purchase the production. The producer is just one more link in the process chain” 
(Rojas quoted in Guereña 2013: 19). Agribusinesses of different sizes are involved in all the 
stages of the commodity chain. These processes are analyzed by disaggregating the agro-
industrial value chain and revealing where the value being produced is appropriated and how the 
terms of control are changing.   
 
Market concentration in upstream activities can be sub-divided into three groups: seeds (GM and 
conventional), agro-chemicals, and machinery. These segments move considerable amounts of 
capital controlled by a select number of transnational agri-input corporations. Since the 
legalization of genetically modified (GM) soybean seeds in 2004, seed imports have increased 
rapidly. Although this has led to a proliferation of seed distributors, from 2009 to 2018, just ten 
companies controlled 92 per cent of Paraguay’s GM seed distribution market and 67 per cent of 
conventional seed distribution market. Monsanto controlled more than 30 per cent of GM seed 
                                                             
65i.e. all those activities concerning agricultural commodities when they leave the farm, such as marketing, 




market, and almost 20 per cent of conventional seed, along with Dow Agro, Syngenta, Nidera, 
Bayer and LDC. The biotechnology transnationals were responsible for 70 per cent of total seed 
imports (Arrúa 2019: 33). 
 
In addition to direct sales, transnational seed companies also receive revenues though the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Building on David Harvey (2003) notion of 
“accumulation by dispossession”—itself an updating of Marx’s theory of “primitive 
accumulation”—Cambridge economist David Nally (2011) characterise this new moment in the 
commercialisation of food system as “accumulation by molecularisation”, wherein corporate 
agribusiness—in partnership with the life science—are reconditioning human, animal and 
bacterial life in order to quicken the reproduction of capital. This model is most strongly 
associated with Monsanto’s intellectual private (IP) property right over Roundup Ready soybean 
seeds. As discussed in Filomeno’s (2014) comparative study of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, 
there has been a great variety in the success of this accumulation strategy, depending on the 
degree to which countries have been inserted in this IP regime, that is, the legal framework for 
protecting and enforcing IP rights—“accumulation by molecularization” thus depends to large 
extent on the access to state officials and influence over the policy-making process (see 
Filomeno 2014; Hetherington 2020: 50, 65). It has also been argued that such forms of 
revenue—received through the enforcement of intellectual property rights—should be 
considered a form of absolute ground rent, since such profits are acquired from a politically 
granted monopoly (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a: 247). In Paraguay, while soybean farmers 
have refused to pay export taxes, Monsanto was successful in charging them royalty for their use 




There is no data available on the exact amount of royalty payments during this period but, based 
on the initially reported fee of $4.40 per ton of soy produced (as reported in Guereña 2013, and 
newspaper reports), a rough estimate of $230 million for this 10-year period can be assumed.66 
 
The expansion of transgenic soybean production has been accompanied by a steep increase in 
agrochemical use in Paraguay. In 2002, 75 per cent of the agrochemicals used in the country 
were utilized for the production of GM soy, with a net worth $83.7 million (Fogel 2005). 
Between 2009 and 2015, annual agrochemical use increased from 9.2 million kilos and 15.6 
million litres to 30.8 million kilos and 20.5 million litres (Franceschelli 2015: 43). The average 
use of glyphosate, per hectare per year, increased from 2.5 litres/ha before the introduction of the 
RR soy, to between 4 and 6 litres in 2012 (Benítez Insfrán 2013). In many cases, it is “enhanced” 
with other more toxic herbicides such as paraquat and 2,4D. Thus, by 2015, 13.3 million litres of 
glyphosate, 9.1 million litres of paraquat and almost 2 million litres of 2,4D were imported into 
Paraguay (Franceschelli 2015: 44). From 2009 to 2016, the import of agricultural pesticides has 
increased fivefold and this trend has coincided with the massive liberalization of genetically 
modified seeds (Apipé 2017). In 2017, Paraguay officially imported 152,067 tonnes of 
agrochemicals (an average of 7.4 kilos of agrochemicals per inhabitant) for a value of $419 
million, representing 6.2 per cent of the world total commercial value, an extraordinary amount 
if we consider that it refers to a small country with a cultivated land of 5,839,000 hectares. The 
main chemical imported was glyphosate (46%) followed by Paraquat (30%), with these products 
coming from China (60%), Argentina (20%), India (7%), Brazil (7%), the United States (2%), 
                                                             
66 Own calculation based on CAPECO data for soybean cultivation. In reality the royalty payments were based on a 
4% of gross earnings and also subject to yearly negotiations, making more precise calculations almost impossible 




and France (1%). That same year, 1.5 million tonnes of fertilizers were imported at a value of 
$402 million (Apipé 2018: 32). Some 80 per cent of the total agrochemical imports is in the 
hands of 8 foreign capital companies, including Monsanto, Agrotec and Master Corporation. 
 
In 2017, 1,519,154 MT of fertilizers were imported at a value of $1,338 million where more than 
74 per cent was controlled by just 15 out of the 88 companies in charge of importing the 
fertilizers; amongst them, the 6 transnationals, Master Corp, Mosaic Company, LDC, BUNGE, 
Cargill and Fertimax represented 23 per cent of the imports (Arrúa 2019: 33). In the case of 
agrochemicals, in 2017, 39,277 MT were imported at a value of $316 million carried out by 88 
companies, of which10 companies imported 74 per cent. Amongst them the giants Monsanto, 
Nayer, Dow and Syngenta with 26% of the total.  In the first quarter of 2018, Bayer and 
Monsanto introduced into Paraguay products valued at $20.8 million. Bayer imported 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical products valued at US$11.13 million, while Monsanto 
imported seeds and agricultural products valued US$ 8.95 million.  
 
In 2018, the total imports of agricultural machinery reached $1,224 million, with the market 
being dominated by the multinational John Deere, New Holland y Massey Ferguson-AGCO (see 





                                                             




Figure 5.3 Main importers of harvesters, 2018 
 
Source: Arrúa (2019: 35). 
 
Figure 5.4. Main importers of tractors, 2018 
 





















Market concentration is equally acute in downstream activities, such as processing, 
commercialization, and export. In Paraguay in 2015, six companies controlled 70% of the 
soybean export and almost the same five companies controlled 95% of the export of soybean 
derivatives (Vázquez, 2016: 36). As Wesz (2016: 297) highlights, such levels of market 
concentration have rendered the Paraguayan government as a “trading hostage”: 
 
The effect of the companies on economic stability and surplus generation is an 
important triumph of the companies when negotiating public investments in 
agribusinesses’ strategic areas (plots for industrial plant building, infrastructure for 
production marketing, tax incentives, etc.). In this sense, these companies’ economic 
and productive importance ends up turning the Paraguayan government into a trading 
hostage, using the conjuncture to negotiate public resources which contribute to their 
profits and their expansion in the grain market. 
 
5.4.3 Re-concentration of land, exclusion of small-scale famers, and deteriorating rural 
labour opportunities 
As Carter et al. (1996) have argued, there are three main channels through which to gauge the 
impact of agro-export “booms” on peasants and rural labourers: (i) the “small-farm adoption 
effect”; (ii) the “land-access effect”; and (iii) the “labour-absorption effect.” This framework was 
used in a comparative study on the impact of the growth of non-traditional agricultural exports 
(NTAX) on the rural poor in Paraguay, based on soybeans and wheat, in Chile, based on fruit, 
and in Guatemala, based on vegetables. Evaluating the different possible scenarios, it is stressed 




thwarted by resource constraints and the labour intensity associated with larger farms drops 
below the levels of previous crop choices” (Carter et al. 1996: 38). Regrettably, as summarized 
in Figure 5.5, the soybean and wheat boom in Paraguay exemplified the worst-case scenario as 
described above. 
 
Figure 5.5 Impacts of growth in agriculture exports on the rural poor in Latin America 
 
Source: Carter et al. (1996: 45). 
 
The fieldwork for the Carter et al. (1996) study was carried out in 1991–1992 and therefore 
predates the introduction of agricultural biotechnology. This speaks to the point raised early by 
Newell (2009) about the need to separate out analytically and historically the transformations in 
agrarian structures that can be related to the introduction of transgenics from those driven by 
other forces and factors. Evidently, the rural poor in Paraguay were already suffering multifaced 
forms of social exclusion from the emerging boom in (conventional) soybeans well before the 




where formally legalized in 2004. What will become clear from the analysis below, is that while 
the introduction of biotechnology into the countryside did not cause the issues of social 
inequality, they did certainly exacerbate them—in the case of environmental degradation 
discussed further below, a much stronger argument can be developed in terms of direct causation 
of the problem. Taking the three factors—small-farm adoption, land-access, and labour-
absorption—in turn, we can begin by analyzing the extent to which small-scale units have 
participated directly in the expansion of soy production.  
 
Comparing 1991 with 2008, the years of the last two agrarian censuses, it can be seen in Table 
5.2 that the benefits of the transgenic soy boom have been reaped almost exclusively by the 
largest farmers. Soy in Paraguay is increasingly a large-scale crop: the number of farms in the 
three largest producer stratums grew at a much faster rate than the number of farms in the 
smaller categories. The number of producers in the 100–<1,000 hectare stratum, for example, 
grew by nearly 490 per cent. Conversely, the number of farms smaller than 20 hectares remained 
virtually stagnant, while the number of farms between 20 and 50 hectares contracted by 26 per 
cent (see Table 5.2). Thus, in 1991, soybean production provided a livelihood for 21,846 small-
scale farmers (i.e. those with less than 50 hectares) and their families; 17 years later, the number 
had contracted to 20,487 small farmers. In terms of the overall structure of landownership, the 
transgenic soyization of agriculture has stimulated a new process of land concentration as the 
farms over 100 hectares increased their share of the country’s soy cropland from 60.8 per cent to 
88.7 per cent. During this same period, the share for farmers in the smallest category has been 
reduced from 9.3 per cent to 2.6 per cent (MAG 2010). These data show a marked pattern of 




increasingly excluding peasant farmers from the rural landscape” (Elgert 2016: 538; emphasis in 
original). 
 
Table 5.2 Farms and land surface dedicated to soy production, 1991–2008. 
Farm size (ha) No. of farms  Total area (ha) 
1991 2008 % Change 1991 2008 % Change 
<20 14,624 15,140 3.5  51,163 64,908 26.9 
20–<50 7,222 5,347 -26.0  86,495 92,182 6.6 
50–<100 2,424 2,562 5.7  79,954 120,482 50.7 
100–<1,000 2,309 5,040 118.3  241,116 1,009,569 318.7 
1,000–<10,000 134 789 488.8  70,901 1,015,224 1,331.9 
>10,000 7 39 457.1  23,839 161,176 576.1 
Total 26,720 28,918 8.2  552,658 2,463,541 345.8 
Source: MAG (2009). 
 
According to internal documents of the UGP reported in the media, out of a total 3,637,000 
hectares of soy planted in during the 2019–2020 harvest, 832,849 hectares were planted by 
41,600 small-scale producers (pequeños productores) with under 20 hectares (ABC Color, 23 
April 2020).68 Comparing these claims with the data from the latest agrarian census (see first row 
in Table 5.2), we see that over the past decade a total of 26,460 small-scale farmers have been 
incorporated into the soy sector, the area of land being planted by these producers has increased 
over 12-fold, and the their share of the total surface area planted with soy has jumped from 3 per 
cent to 23 per cent. Unsurprisingly, various national and foreign commentators have raised 
doubts about the validity of these claims (Andrew Nickson, pers. comm. 2020; Ramón Fogel, 
pers. comm.), and it will be interesting to see how the figures presented by the UGP stack up 
against the newest agrarian census, when it is made available. It can be assumed that the UGP 





figures have been inflated by including smallholder farmers who are renting their land to sojeros 
(what could be considered petty bourgeois rentiers), a process for which there is no any reliable 
data but which has been widely corroborated by ethnographic research (e.g. Hetherington 2011, 
2020). 
 
At the same time, even if taken at face values, this reported increase in the incorporation of 
small-scall producers tells us nothing about the nature of this incorporation. Further analytical 
emphasis should be placed on the heterogenous social process in which different campesino 
social categories are embedded into the soy sector. What is the nature of debt relations, 
patronage and political clientelism, and competition for land?  Unfortunately, without further 
research we cannot begin to answer to these questions? Future studies may opt for case study 
analysis of Itapúa, which was signalled out as the department with the highest number of 
pequeños productores, with over half of all soy producers belonging to this category (ABC 
Color, 23 April 2020).69 
 
At the same time, there are also important political implications regarding the internal 
differentiation within rural communities, which are composed of both smallholding peasant 
farmers and rural landless workers, who earn their income predominantly from labour. This 
internal class division of the peasantry will undoubtedly impact their disposition towards 
resistance versus accommodation to the forces of capitalist development (see Hall et al. 2015). 
As explored in the following chapter, it is the rural landless workers of rural communities who 
are far more likely to engage in class struggle than smallholding peasant farmers (many of who 





may be planting soy or renting their land to sojeros). The fact that smallholders can be 
differentiated into categories which include being simultaneously semi-proletarian and petty 
rentiers means they are caught in a contradictory class position, as their interest as landowner 
means they are less likely to engage in organized forms of resistance against the expansion and 
intensification of soy cultivation.   
 
Before addressing the third factor in Carter et al.’s conceptual model—the “labour-absorption 
effect”—it is worthwhile considering the specific transactions and dynamics leading to the 
process of land concentration described above. Borras et al. (2012: 406) suggest that “land grabs 
[in Paraguay] seem to constitute everyday forms of dispossession by differentiation, most 
probably along a Leninist logic or overlapping Leninist and Chayanovian logics.” This refers to 
forms of dispossession wherein (medium- to) small-scale landowners sell part or all of their 
holding to richer rural capitalists, and in the case of Paraguay often Brazilian landowners 
(Galeano 2012). Under the neoliberal food regime, however, the mechanism of dispossession has 
also been refracted by the adoption of biotechnology. Specifically, I suggest that the transgenic 
soyization of the Paraguayan agriculture has engendered a new predatory practice whereby the 
rich wrest land from the poor: the forced displacement of small holder peasant through the 
contamination of food crops, water, and air due to the agrochemical drift of fumigations on 
nearby soybean fields. As the spread of GM soybean production literally engulfs small 
communities, it has also ushered in a myriad of agrochemical drifts in rural areas as winds easily 
spread the herbicides sprayed from airplanes and “mosquitos” (tractors with long “arms” with 




widespread health ailments (skin rashes, muscular pains, headaches, breathing problems, and 
unusual pimples), and even the deaths of small children in rural areas (discussed further below). 
 
At the same time, the combined effects of the collapse of the cotton sector and the expansion of 
soybean production have had a dramatic impact on the composition of rural labour, expressed in 
a sharp contraction of employment in the agricultural sector. In 1990, 38.9 per cent of Paraguay’s 
economically active population made its living in agriculture (ECLAC 2005). By 2004, this ratio 
had fallen to 33.3 per cent and on to 22.8 per cent by 2014 (DGEEC 2005, 2015). A recent study 
by Riquelme and Vera (2013) gives strong evidence of this contraction in labour. According to 
the study, the number of seasonal workers employed in the agricultural sector plummeted during 
the period 1991–2008 from 946,040 to 238,674—a decrease of 74.8 per cent—meaning that 
707,366 rural labourers have been rendered “absolutely extraneous” (Hetherington 2011: 64) to 
the needs of agribusiness capital (see Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3 Permanent and temporary rural wage labour, 1991–2008 
Category 1991 2008 % Change 
Number of farms with rural wage labour 107,739 96,804 -10.1 
    
Permanent rural labour     
Number of farms 26,640 27,915 4.8 
Total  81,748 81,754 0.01 
Male 66,730 68,191 2.2 
Female 15,018 13,565 -9.7 
    
Temporary rural labour    
Number of farms 96,292 79,235 -17.7 
Total  946,040 238,674 -74.8 
Male 794,750 231,060 -70.9 
Female 151,290 7,614 -95.0 
Source: Riquelme and Vera (2013: 44). 
 
The data clearly show the strong net negative impact on rural employment induced by the 




pattern of Paraguay’s growth has been “employment-displacing more than employment creating” 
(Berry 2010: 323). A major factor contributing to this outcome, no doubt, can be attributed to the 
ascendancy of biotechnology in agricultural production, which has dampened employment 
opportunities as “rural labour demand has been displaced by demand for machinery and 
chemicals” (Richards 2010: 573). Kregg Hetherington explains the simple mechanism through 
which this new technology has transformed the rural labour market in Paraguay: 
 
as late as 1999, most soy farmers still needed a steady supply of changueros, because 
while farmers could mechanize land clearing, planting, and harvesting, they still 
needed people to deal with weeds that sprang up after germination and before 
harvesting. A one hundred hectare field of soy could provide work of this sort for at 
least a dozen men on a regular basis… Roundup Ready soy transformed this labour 
relation completely. [This new soy] could resist the application of Roundup even 
once it was growing in the fields, thus replacing manual weeders with increased 
pesticide application. (Hetherington 2020: 211–212) 
 
The generation of jobs per hectare reveals some startling figures. On average, for every 1,000 
hectares of land, 2.6 permanent and 7.7 temporary jobs are created. This quantity is significantly 
higher if we consider family farms, where the rate of job creation rises to 15.2 permanent 
workers and 94.4 temporary workers, while medium and large farms, characterised by 
mechanization of agricultural production, create just 1.8 jobs for both permanent and temporary 
workers per 1,000 hectares. The employment generation is inversely proportional to the size of 




generate on average 518.7 permanent and temporary jobs per 1,000 hectares. At the other 
extreme, large-scale farms of over 10,000 generate just 1 direct employment per 1,000 hectares. 
It is also estimated that some 50,000 jobs are indirectly created along the soybean value chain 
(UNDP 2010: 80). 
 
As Correia (2019) points out, wage-labour opportunities also intersect with longstanding cultural 
politics rooted in the history of Brazilian migrations to Paraguay (see Nickson 1981; Nagel 1991; 
Blanc 2015). As a result of this, he suggests, that the number of employees in farms or 
agricultural enterprises of Brazilians located along the border region, is likely greater than that 
recorded in censuses, since farmers will often prefer to employ their own countrymen, many of 
who are often not registered as residents, as well as seasonal Brazilian rural workers (boias 
frias).  
 
Many Paraguayan campesinos are thus negated wage-labour opportunities. The obvious 
consequence has been a surge in rural-urban migration, as an expanding “marginal mass” (Nun 
1969; Quijano 1971)—or “refugees of the agro-export model” as described in the analysis of 
Palau et al. (2007)—is forced to migrate into informal labour markets to eke out a living (see 
Riquelme and Vera 2015). As Rulli (2007b: 215) emphasizes, this “migration should be 
understood as a forced expulsion process, an inevitable consequence of the slow degradation of 
the living conditions in the place of origin.” Clearly in the case of Paraguay, one of the least 
industrialized countries in Latin America, the decreased demand for unskilled labour in the 
agricultural sector has not been mitigated by a corresponding expansion in urban sector 




which rose from 50.9 per cent in 2004 to 58.7 per cent in 2014 (DGEEC 2005, 2015), the 
majority of this employment has expressed itself outside the formal economy. The ILO (2013) 
calculates that 70.7 per cent of the non-agricultural employment in Paraguay is constituted within 
the informal economy, the third highest rate in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
The fact that so many peasant farmers have become redundant to the requirements of 
agribusiness capital, combined with the lack of alternatives for gainful employment in other 
sectors of national economy, has rendered them as a “surplus population” (Li 2009) or an 
“outcast proletariat” (Davis 2006)—that is, a labour force without adequate livelihood 
alternatives. As McMichael (2008: 219) argues puts it, “in generating a ‘planet of slums’ [Davis 
2006] neoliberal capitalism reveals the social and ecological limits of the development narrative. 
The so-called ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ from the countryside metamorphose into a 
seemingly unlimited supply of unemployed slum-dwellers, exiting increasingly degraded 
habitats.” In Paraguay, the clearest manifestation of this process is found in los Bañados (Spanish 
for marshy wetlands), a peripheral settlement of makeshift homes on the outskirts of Asunción 
(see Rojas 2013). In interviews with peasant leaders, such “degraded habitats” were often 
described to me as “belts of poverty and misery” [cordones de miseria y cinturones de pobreza]: 
 
Tenés al sojero que viene y te dice tanto, en Alto Paraná están pagando $2000 la 
hectárea, algo así como casi 12 millones [guaraníes] la hectárea de tierra... 
Pareciera ser mucha plata, pero si en Paraguay no hay industria, si en Paraguay no 
hay otras posibilidades de trabajo, no te sirve de nada. Porque ahí te quedas sin tu 




y te quedas sin nada. [Eso] es un poco lo que profundizó los cordones o cinturones 
de pobreza de acá en los alrededores de Asunción verdad. O sea, el Departamento 
Central de tener 800,000 familias, paso a tener dos millones de habitantes. ¿Y de 
dónde vinieron esos? Vinieron del campo. ¿Y a qué se dedican eso dos millones? Y 
bueno, tenés unos cuantos en la calle pidiendo limosna, otro cuantos limpiando 
coches... y tenés ya con eso inseguridad, tenés montón... claro, la gente antes de 
morir va a querer robar para comer, no va a morir de hambre. Y el Estado ofrece 
nada. (Ruiz, personal Interview 2015) 
 
The transformation of Paraguayan agriculture in recent years has been accompanied by a 
concentration of landholdings, as well as increased mechanisation and sophistication of the 
production process in a way that has decreased employment opportunities for unskilled labour. 
The result has been an increase in rural-urban migration which is rendering vast masses of 
people without an adequate livelihood in agriculture, or alternatives for gainful employment in 
other sectors of the national economy. Such inherent features of this mechanised large-scale 
agriculture have led critical scholars to characterizes it as  “the antithesis of broad-based 
development—it eliminates work opportunities and ejects labour to urban sectors that are already 
overwhelmed with unemployment and underemployment” (North and Grinspun 2016: 1497). 
 
Increasingly, migration has become transnational, with more Paraguayans seeking employment 
opportunities abroad. One report from Paraguay notes that 280,000 Paraguayans have applied for 
permanent residence in Argentina since 2000, while Spain has seen a fourfold increase in the 




150,000 Paraguayans are living in Spain, of whom only 11,000 were legal immigrants (Nickson 
2009)—a fact that was distastefully broadcasted by then President Horacio Cartes in a speech in 
Madrid (June 2015) where he told an audience of elite investors that Paraguay “exports poverty 
to Spain” (Ultima Hora 2015). In addition to soybeans and beef then, population has become an 
important export for Paraguay. 
 
5.4.4 Environmental degradation 
The expansion of agribusiness over the countryside, particularly because of its enormous use of 
agrochemicals, is having significant negative environmental impacts across the region, such as 
increased deforestation, loss of biodiversity, decrease soil fertility, surface and underground 
water contamination, as well as negative health impacts on the population. 
 
As soybean expansion has out-competed pastures for beef and dairy production in fertile areas, 
cattle ranching is being displaced further into non-agricultural land, particularly in the Chaco 
region. Ranching and soy are thus the main causes of the current dramatic deforestation of the 
native forest throughout the country, not least the hotspot of the Chaco which is currently 
exhibiting one of the most rapid reforestation rates in the world, and the Atlantic forest area, 
where only an estimated 11.7 per cent of forest’s original area remains (Baraibar 2020: 15). 
Recent studies conducted on a global scale identified Paraguay as one of the countries in Latin 
America with the highest deforestation rates worldwide (Hansen et al. 2010, 2013). The rapid 
deforestation rate has resulted in the loss of 90 per cent of the forest cover in the eastern region 




Color, 30 March 2017).70 Between 1990 and 2015, annual net loss of 325,000 (ha) of forest area 
(FAO 2016; Zarate 2018). According to the National Forestry Institute (INFONA), the country’s 
forest area was reduced by 265,590 hectares between August 2017 and the same month in 2018, 
especially in the Chaco region.71 
 
There is also a heated debate about the social-ecological hazards caused by snowballing 
agrochemical use. This causes adverse effects on pollinators, soil nutrients, food safety (chemical 
residues in food exceeding safety limits), soil and water resources, and biological diversity 
(Angulo 2017; Domecq 2017; Neris 2017; Barreto 2018; Baraibar 2020: 19–20). There are also 
public health concerns over the agrochemical exposure among farmers and communities nearby 
the sprayed fields causing health problems, issues which are discussed below as a form of 
quotidian violence. 
 
5.4.5 “La soja mata”: a panorama of violence 
Throughout many parts of Latin American, extractive operations have unleashed increasingly 
violent dynamics on the local communities. In Blood of Extraction, a book about the seamy side 
of Canadian foreign policy, Todd Gordon and Jeffery Webber (2016) shed light on the ways in 
which the Canadian state exercises its (secondary) imperial power to facilitate the expansion of 
Canadian capital in Latin America. The book documents a wide range of environmental and 
human rights abuses, unveiling that “the wealth repatriated to Canadian companies is routinely 
covered in blood and dirt” (Gordon and Webber 2016: 181)—a direct allusion to Marx’s famous 
insistence that capitalism stalks about the world “dripping from head to toe, from every pore, 






with blood and dirt” (Marx, 1990 [1887]: 926). Not only do the authors go to great lengths to 
show that the foreign policies of Canada benefit primarily the interests of Canadian capital rather 
than those of the citizens, let alone the peoples of Latin America, but also they offer rather 
detailed coverage of the vicious methods of Canadian imperialism. In this context, the book’s 
catalogue of violent appropriation of natural resources includes “murder, death threats, assaults, 
and arbitrary detention against opponents of resource extraction” (Gordon and Webber 2016: 
28). In my review of this book (Ezquerro-Cañete 2019), I suggested that the authors might have 
drawn more on the Uruguayan political ecologist Eduardo Gudynas, whose concept of 
extrahección—a term coined by Gudynas to capture “the most acute cases of the appropriation of 
natural resources, where these are extracted using violence and where human rights and the 
rights of nature are violated” (Gudynas, 2013: 15)—is directly applicable. 
 
In dialogue with Gudynas’s concept of “extrahección”,72 this section examines the different 
forms of violence brought about by the sweeping expansion of agribusiness in Paraguay in recent 
years. To frame this discussion, we can consider one of the protest slogans of the organized 
peasant movement (See Figure 5.6): “Soy = Glyphosate + Paramilitary” [Soja = Glifosato + 
Paramilitares] was written on the banner at the forefront of a demonstration staged by peasant 
and indigenous organizations on August 31, 2006, to protest against the Second Roundtable on 
Sustainable Soy Conference held at the Hotel Yacht Golf Club in Asunción (Maeyens 2006). 
The banner encapsulates the twin forces of violence and dispossession faced by the peasant and 
indigenous communities who live near soybean fields. On the one hand, the quotidian violence 
caused by agrochemical drifts that contaminate the air and water and affect the health of 
                                                             




inhabitants of rural towns. One the other hand, the more open, direct, and deadly violence 
involving the assassination of peasant activists and local leaders along with the criminalization of 
social protests. 
 
Figure 5.6 Soy = Glyphosate + Paramilitary. 
 
Source: Última Hora archives. 
 
The following sections outline emblematic cases of quotidian violence caused by agrochemical 
drifts, violent land evictions for the cultivation of GM soy, and the assassination of peasant 







5.4.5.1 Quotidian violence: agrochemical drifts 
This dramatic increase in the use of agro-chemicals is associated with a myriad of socio-
environmental problems, including contaminated surface and ground water and has been linked 
health problems of the local population.73 Several clinical studies carried out at the Hospital of 
Encarnación (department of Itapúa) by the paediatrician Stela Benítez-Leite, Professor of 
Medical Science at the National University of Asunción and research at the Consejo Nacional de 
Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT), have documented the harmful effects of occupational 
exposure to agrochemicals on human health, including associated risk factors for congenital 
malformations (Benítez-Leite et al. 2007) and a significant increase in the frequency of 
karyorrhexis and pyknosis (Benítez-Leite et al. 2010). A recent study published in the British 
Journal of Medicine & Medical Research—titled “Violated Rights in Rural Populations Exposed 
to Transgenic Soybean Crop”—reports findings about genetic damage to children exposed to 
pesticides (Benítez-Leite et al. 2016; also see Benítez-Leite and Corvalán 2018). Not 
surprisingly, such studies have been subjected to frequent attacks and scrutiny by the soy 
industry. The UGP, which has a strong presence on the Paraguayan public funding program 
(CONACYT), attempted to publicly discredit Benítez-Leite’s work by publicizing how much of 
her research grant had been used on catering (Hetherington 2020: 164). 
 
Despite repeated requests from the peasant organisations to the authorities, the Ministry of 
Health has refused to investigate the matter. Since the early 2000s, one NGO in Asunción, BASE 
Investigaciones Sociales (BASE IS), started systematically recording reported incidents of 
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human, animal, and vegetable contamination associated with the agrochemical drift of 
fumigations. This matrix reveals that there was a total of ninety-six cases of pesticide related 
intoxications because of agrochemical drifts between 2003 and 2006 (Palau et al. 2007: 332–
346).The following quotes from leaders of two peasant organizations I interviewed provide a 
powerful description of this destructive impact: 
 
En Alto Paraná tenemos asentamientos que están rodeados de sojales y de verdad 
que es muy difícil porque... la expulsión, que no quiere reconocer el Estado, ni 
quieren reconocer mucha gente urbana, es difícil. Tienes a tus niños todos con 
problemas de piel, con problemas estomacales, dolor de cabeza. Pero además de 
eso, tenés que tú producción ya no sale más. La mandioca tiene problema. Tiene un 
bicho que le ataca en la raíz... tenés mandioca podrida, tenés tu poroto todo 
destruido... o sea también incluso en la comida, te estás quedando sin comida. 
(Ruiz, leader of OLT, personal interview 2015) 
 
En varios departamentos del país donde ya tienen más de 10 años las plantaciones 
de soja con fumigaciones aéreas van apareciendo enfermedades… se ha 
multiplicado la enfermedad cancerígena, sobre todo en criaturas… son datos 
estadísticos que están saltando actualmente. Hay comunidades que en época de 
fumigaciones masiva de sojales hay mortandad de animales domésticos, de gallina, 
de chancho, incluso de animales vacunos, que tienen los compañeros pequeños 




están rodeados por grandes extensiones de sojales. (Gómez, leader of FNC, personal 
interview 2015) 
 
Such grievances by campesino communities are routinely rejected and dismissed by the agro-
industry and soybean union. In an excerpt from an Al Jazeera documentary, Héctor Cristaldo, 
head spokesmen for the Unión de los Gremios de la Producción (Union of Production Trades, 
UGP), offers the following fanciful analogy: “It’s the same as when you put salt on your 
barbecue. If you put a little, it is delicious. Too much and you’ll have high blood pressure and 
it’ll kill you” (quoted in People & Power: Paraguay’s Forgotten Coup).74 When I questioned a 
senior member at the Agricultural Biotechnology Institute (Instituto de Biotecnología Agrícola, 
INBIO) about the impacts of fumigation, he replied with vitriolic humour: 
 
Como nosotros veníamos en la agricultura usando productos que, en la época 
cuando no había estos descubrimientos de ahora, [eran] altísimamente tóxicos… 
[antes de que] se adopta esta tecnología nueva, y no pasaba nada. Correcto. Yo 
tengo 40 años de agricultura. Estas es mi casa y mi chacra es esto [signalling two 
ítems on the table side by side]. Estoy vivo. Y a mis 63 años tengo mejor estado físico 
que cualquier jovencito. Muy bien. ¿Cuál es el daño? Ahora, toda la franja 
productiva sobre el Río Paraná, desde Pedro Juan Caballero a Encarnación, o sea 
todo lo bajo del país, tendremos que estar toditos deformes, cancerosos, y muertos. 
¿Por qué? Porque tenemos 60 años de fumigación. … Yo vengo de fumigar sesenta 
años allá, vengo acá, fumigo y se me entrega una comunidad entera. ¡Una 
                                                             




comunidad entera! Cuando que antes, que no existía la tecnología y la maquinaria y 
todo eso, nos poníamos en la espalda la mochila [agricultural backpack sprayer] y 
nos bañábamos con el veneno. Y estos dicen que el viento le trajo y se enfermó toda 
una comunidad. ¡Vaaa! 
(INBIO director, personal interview 2015) 
 
As Pablo Lapegna (2017) has argued in reference to these same dynamics in the Argentine 
province of Formosa, such adamant dismals of agribusiness elite to the peasants’ grievances 
represent a form of “symbolic violence”, defined by Pierre Bourdieu as those processes by which 
“different classes and class fractions are engaged in a symbolic struggle [. . .] aimed at imposing 
the definition of the social world that is most consistent with their interests,” which ultimately 
“help to ensure that one class dominates another” (Bourdieu 1991: 167). Through the contrasting 
quotes above, “the effects of symbolic violence can be read in the discourses mobilized by elites 
denying the negative environmental effects of agrochemicals and in the vilification of peasants 
when they demand resolution” (Lapegna 2017: 186). Identifying these forms of symbolic 
violence provides a glimpse into the obstacles that rural communities and peasant social 
movements face in addressing the negative impacts of the soy boom. 
 
The case to garner the most public outrage against the soy sector was the 2003 poisoning death 
of Silvino Talavera, an eleven-year-old boy from the small campesino settlement of Pirapey 
(district of Edelira, department of Itapúa) who was sprayed by a crop duster on his way home 
from school (Hetherington 2013). While cases like this were widely rumored to have occurred 




managed to get medical proof, in the form of tests on the boy’s blood that pesticides killed him 
(Hetherington 2014). Other cases include the death of 12 indigenous mbya people from district 
of Aba’í (Caazapá department) also due to exposure to agrochemicals (La Nación 2009). In 2014 
the death of two girls in the Huber Duré colony, Canindeyú department, was again reported as a 
result of agrochemical spraying. These situations continue to this day, and there are still 
recurring cases of serious risk to the population due to the irresponsible use of pesticides for GM 
crop. For example, on 20 February 2019, a spraying company sprayed pesticides on a transgenic 
soy crop a few metres from a school and a health post in the district of Capiibary, in San Pedro, 
putting hundreds of people at risk.75 For other similar cases of fumigations close to rural schools, 
see Rodríguez and Peralta (2019). 
 
The unwillingness of the Paraguayan state to act against agrochemical spraying regardless of the 
growing scientific evidence of its damaging effects is a testament to the complete lack of 
monitoring of the social and environmental impact of agribusiness, leading to the mobilization of 
affected communities, as Marcial Gómez (leader of the FNC) and Lidia Ruiz (leader of the OLT) 
explained to me:  
 
Hay leyes ambientales de protección de comunidades campesinas y comunidades 
indígenas que no cumplen los sojeros, los grandes productores… avasallando todas 
las leyes ambientales y el Estado no hace ningún mínimo control para el 
cumplimiento de dichas leyes. Más bien ponen fuerzas represivas, respaldando las 
fumigaciones que atropellan todas las leyes ambientales vigentes; por ejemplo, el 





Estado está actuando contra la comunidad campesina, contra la comunidad 
indígena, que están resistiendo en sus comunidades, incluso exigiendo el 
cumplimiento de las leyes ambientales. (Gómez, personal interview 2015) 
 
Y el Estado tampoco garantiza la no expulsión porque la federación [FNC], por 
ejemplo el año pasado y el año antepasado, hizo mucha... una fuerte campaña de 
oposición a la fumigación, donde las familias campesinas salían y ahí fueron los 
policías a reprimirlas. Balines de goma, le pegaban, la montada, le agarraron cinco-
seis presos casi toda la semana. O sea, en vez de garantizar... y ellos [los 
campesinos] atajan los tractores fumigadores y los policías se iban y garantizaba la 
fumigación. Hacían cordones. Hay fotos así muy elocuentes de cordones de policía 
garantizando la fumigación. (Ruiz, personal interview 2015) 
 
Such an image as described by Ruiz is displayed on the front cover of Kregg Hetherington’s 
recently published book, The Government of Beans: Regulating Life in the Age of Beans 
(2020),76 when Horacio Cartes deployed police to protect the fumigation of a soybean field from 
campesino protesters (Última Hora, 3 December 2013). Describing this image (Figure 5.7) as a 
“caricature of authoritarian agribiopolitics”, Hetherington (2020: 202) “blue-helmeted riot police 
stood around the edges of soy fields where there should have been a thick wall of elephant grass. 
One barrera viva [living barrier] has been replaced by another. Only this time, rather than 
protecting neighbours from pesticides, the barrera faced outward, protecting pesticides from 
neighbors.” 
                                                             





Figure 5.7 Police guarding a soybean field in Paraguay, 2013 
 
Source: Photo by Edgar Vásquez. 
 
5.4.5.2 Violent Land Evictions 
Land conflicts in Paraguay result from a large number of overlapping factors, where historical 
injustices such as tierras malhabidas (ill-gotten lands), discussed in chapter 3, blend with the 
agro-extractive shift in the development model. When communities refuse to leave their property 
or attempt to take disputed territory through land occupations, they often face heavy repression. 
The case discussed in the following section—Tekojoja—is an example of violent dispossession, 
whereby communities in regions where agribusiness corporations are seeking to expand 





Tekojoja is a campesino camp located in the eastern department of Caaguazú. Between 2002 and 
2006, a group of several hundred campesinos in Tekojoja from the MAP were embroiled in a 
violent struggle with a handful of Brazilian soy producers from the nearby community of Santa 
Clara.77 Approximately 200 hectares were in dispute between peasants and soy producers 
attempting to purchase the land for GM soy production. The lands in dispute had been bought 
illegally by Brazilian migrants: the land in Santa Clara and been purchased from speculators in 
the 1970s, while land in Tekojoja had been recently bought from land-reform beneficiaries 
against the citizenship requirements codified in the land-reform law (Hetherington 2011: 70). 
The National Institute for Rural and Land Development (INDERT) made a shady contract 
granting thirteen agricultural lots in the region to a group of Brazilian soy producers. In response, 
peasants began a recuperation process and occupied those 200 hectares in June 2003. 
Meanwhile, the MAP initiated legal action to recognize the land as property of Tekojoja. 
Brazilian sojeros carried out two violent evictions—in December 2004, and again in June 
2005—displacing fifty-six families, burning their houses, and robbing their possessions. During 
the last eviction, two people were shot dead. 
 
Thus, on December 3, 2004, Judge Gladis Escobar ordered the eviction of the peasant settlement, 
an action which left forty-six houses burned and twenty hectares of crops destroyed. The 
peasants then reoccupied their lands. The people of the MAP relayed that, 
 
after the tractors had destroy our crops, they came with their big machines and started 
immediately to sow soy while smoke was still coming out from the ashes of our houses. 
                                                             




Next day we came back with oxes and replanted all the fields over the prepared land. When 
the police came, we faced them with our tools and machetes, we were around 70 people 
and were ready to confront them. In the end they left. (quoted in Maeyen 2008) 
 
The soy producers acted again. On June 24 2005, the attorney of Vaqueria headed another 
eviction of the land reoccupations, despite the fact that no decision had been taken by the 
Supreme Court on the case of the illegal sale of land rights (derecheras) in the region. This time, 
soy farmers aided by heavily armed men evicted fifty-six families (400 people, including 223 
children), and eventually shot Ángel Cristaldo (twenty years old) and Leoncio Torres (forty-six 
years old), without any provocation from their side. The second eviction is bitterly depicted by 
Canadian anthropologist Kregg Hetherington, who witnessed the event during his doctoral 
fieldwork.78 Hetherington writes (2011: 119),  
 
Two truckloads of riot police showed up at five o’clock in the morning and began 
pulling people out of bed. They loaded the trucks with over a hundred campesinos, 
including Joel and his wife (who was then eight months pregnant), and drove them to 
the regional jail while Opperman’s gang drove through the community on tractors, 
demolishing houses and setting them on fire. Then, as Opperman was leaving the 
location, he spotted a group of about fifty campesinos, some of whom had hidden 
during the evictions, some of whom had gathered in solidarity to discuss a reaction. 
As his convoy drove past, men in the trucks opened fire on the campesinos with 
                                                             
78 Hetherington would later played a pivotal role in the case, first by providing photographs “which proved that the 
campesinos had been unarmed when they were attacked”, and later as a key witness in court during the murder trial, 




shotguns, killing two young men and severely wounding another. 
 
The above episode is far from an isolated case. Countless examples of this process have been 
documented, often linking state and paramilitary violence to the expansion of the agro-industrial 
sector (Rulli 2007; Fogel 2013). 
 
5.4.5.3 Extrajudicial executions 
The Chokoue79 report published by the Paraguayan Coordinating Committee for Human Rights 
(CODEHUPY 2014), documents 115 victims of extrajudicial executions from February 3, 1989 
to August 15, 2013. Since the “parliamentary coup” of 2012, killings have increasingly shifted 
from occurring within the context of land conflicts—occupations and displacements—to 
assassinations carried out by hired gunmen (sicarios) either in the homes of peasant leaders or in 
public. Some examples follow.  
 
On September 1 2012, peasant leader Sixto Pérez was murdered in his home in the district of ex 
Puentesiño, Concepción. On December 1, 2012, Vidal Vega, another peasant leader, was shot at 
his home near Curuguaty by two men on a motorbike. Vega was a leader of the movement of 
landless farmers whose invasion in the department of Curuguaty precipitated the June 15th 
shoot-out that left seventeen dead and led to the impeachment of former president Fernando 
Lugo.80 For decades Vega had lobbied the government to redistribute part of a 135 square mile 
landholding illegally occupied since 1964 by Blas Riquelme, a former president of the Partido 
                                                             
79 Chokokue means peasant in Guarani, the indigenous language spoken by the vast majority of Paraguay’s mestizo 
peasantry. 




Colorado. Vega was a leader of the Comisión Sin Tierra de Naranjaty (Landless Commission of 
Naranjaty) and secretary of the recently-formed Comision de Familiares de Victimas de la 
Masacre de Curuguaty (Committee of Relatives of Victims of the Curuguaty Massacre). He had 
regularly taken food and clothing to the twelve peasants imprisoned pending the trial arising 
from the June killings, and was well known to the authorities. He himself had not been charged 
because he was away buying supplies when the violence erupted. As one among the few leaders 
not to be killed in the clash or jailed afterwards, he was expected to be a witness at their trial. 
According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on 1 December 2012, two hired 
gunmen arrived on motorcycle to the home of Vidal Vega. Police information quoted in news 
reports indicates the victim’s spouse, María Cristina Argüello, answered the door: the two 
unknown men asked for Vidal Vega and shot him with 12-caliber rifles, in the presence of his 
family (CODEHUPY 2014).  
 
On February 19, 2013, Benjamín “Toto” Lezcano, a leader of the Coordinadora de 
Organizaciones Campesinas “José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia,” (José Gaspar Rodríguez de 
Francia Coordination of Peasant Organizations) was murdered in his home by a sicario, in the 
district of Horqueta, Concepción; in March 2013, Dionisio González, a peasant leader, was 
murdered in the district of Alfonso Kue, Concepción. On April 21, 2013, in a case of mistaken 
identity, police shot Francisco Denis, a grassroots member of a peasant movement, on his way 
back from voting in the general elections in Kurusu de Hierro, Concepción. On May 31, 2013, 
Antonio Carlos Moreira, a Brazilian colonist with ties to the Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo 
(Paraguayan Peasant Movement, MCP) in the Laterza Kue land conflict, was shot in his home in 




Organización Campesina Regional de Concepción (Regional Peasant Organization of 
Concepción – OCRC), was murdered by sicarios on the streets of Yvy Ya’u, Concepción. 
Beyond these cases of cold-blooded killings, grassroots members of peasant members have also 
faced the frequent harassment and intimidation of thugs hired by agribusiness (CODEHUPY 
2014). 
 
Of the 115 executions recorded, 77.4 per cent occurred in just five departments—Canindeyú 
(25), San Pedro (21), Concepción (16), Caaguazú (15), and Alto Paraná (12).81 These executions 
thus manifest a marked regional concentration. Not coincidentally, four out of these departments 
are also the country’s most sojero departments.  
 
The CODEHUPY report also highlights the complete lack of accountability with respect to the 
extrajudicial executions of campesinos during the fourteen-year period. In fact, not a single 
person has been charged for any one of the 115 executions investigated in the report. In the few 
instances in which the negligible actions of judges and prosecutors has reached the Jurado de 
Enjuiciamiento Magistrados (Special Jury of Judges, JEM) the result has been absolute impunity 
without exception (CODEHUPY 2014: 171).  
 
National military and paramilitary groups connected to large agribusinesses and landowners in 
Paraguay have repressed, coerced, and murdered the ranks of an expanding landless peasantry 
with complete impunity (Guereña 2013; CODEHUPY 2014). Such arbitrary evictions of peasant 
and indigenous communities from land occupations have led to numerous accusations against the 
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police—and increasingly private forces—of violence, unjustified arrests, and extra judiciary 
executions. In this regard, human rights and activist groups claim that “the unstoppable 
expansion of soya crops is the cause of the harassment, attacks, and assassinations at the hands of 
the police, the paramilitary, and private armed groups who are antagonistic towards the rural 
leaders” (FIAN and Via Campesina 2006, quoted in Rulli 2007: 221).  
 
The various forms of violence discussed in the above cases exemplify how the current agrarian 
extractivist project in Paraguay is reinforced by, and even contingent on, violence perpetuated by 
the state to protect private agribusiness interests. Indeed, Paraguay would appear to exhibit the 
most acute and violent expressions of extrahección in the region. In the cases of Bolivia and 
Uruguay, for instance, the advance of agro-extractive capital has not been associated with the 
forced dispossession of small family farmers through violent and extra-economic coercion 
(McKay and Colque 2016: 605; Oyhantçabal and Narbondo 2019: 213). In the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, however, reports of peasant and indigenous leaders killed in 
land conflicts abound (e.g. Lapegna 2013). As a researcher at the Buenos Aires-based group 
Grupo de Reflexión Rural (GRR) declares, “Paraguay could be viewed as the country in which 
agri-business show their most brutal side, by evicting and attacking people with complete 
impunity. The militarization and para-militarization of the countryside are linked to the increase 
of soya cultivation and the security systems of the agribusiness” (Rulli 2007: 221). 
 





In recent years, the claim that GM crops are a necessity to “feed the world” and aid development 
in the global South have become increasingly pervasive and pronounced (see Figure 5.8). One of 
the more compelling arguments made by proponents of GM crops is that the peasant mode of 
production and small scale farmers are not well suited to innovation and investment (Collier 
2008: 71), and that the increased global demand for food—fuelled, in large part, by what Weis 
(2007) refers to as the “meatification” of diets—can only be met through a model of “large, 
technologically sophisticated agricultural companies” (Collier 2008: 73). As several scholars 
have noted, however, this particular vision is Malthusian in character: the problem is framed as 
purely a matter of supply; the solution to which is the technological innovation offered by 
biotechnology to intensify production (Brooks 2005; Alessandrini 2010; Nally 2011).  
 
Figure 5.8 “Paraguay Agroindustrial Power to Feed the World.” 
 





Paradoxically (and perversely?) this technology-as-magic-bullet idea invariably ignores “the fact 
that most transgenic crops are not even geared for direct human consumption” (Otero, 2012: 
282). In the case of soybeans, for instance, only 6 per cent of world production is consumed in 
the form of whole beans, tofu or other whole-soy and fermented foods. The other 94 per cent is 
processed into soybean meal and oil for yet further processing (Oliveira and Schneider 2016, 
168). As discussed at the start of this chapter, much of this global production is intrinsically tied 
into the emergence of “flex crops”—that is, crops that have multiple and flexible uses which 
provide global capital with a “spatio-temporal fix” for profitable investment (Harvey 2003; 
Borras et al. 2012: 404-405). Hence, this process of “flexing” has redefined soy into an industrial 
crop for livestock feed production and biodiesel, as well as an indexed commodity in financial 
markets (Turzi 2017). 
 
Within this context, the final destinations for Paraguayan soy include China and Europe, “where 
much of the import is used for animal feed and thus contributes to ‘meat security’ in those 
countries” (Elgert 2016: 551). In many instances, this necessity to feed the global industrial 
grain-oilseed-livestock complex has undermined domestic food security for producer countries 
by replacing subsistence and food crops for domestic consumption with agro-commodity 
exports—what is has been referred to as the “agrarian question of food” (McMichael 2009; 
Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009). As Elgert (2016: 551) helpfully elaborates: “The soy industry’s 
role in producing more food for a growing global population is likely little comfort to Paraguay’s 
small-scale farmers… as food security is effectively shifted from producer countries to consumer 
countries. The soy industry is overwhelmingly concentrated on the export market, with 





The move from subsistence to commercial production in Paraguay is most dramatically 
expressed in the following numbers. In 2013-2014, out the 5,637,300 hectares dedicated to 
agriculture a staggering 93.7 per cent (5,284,400 hectares) were sown with cash crops (primarily 
soy), while subsistence crops constituted a mere 6.3 per cent of the cultivated land (Pereira 
Fukuoka 2015: 68). Valdez (2019) cites a 50 per cent drops in peasant production over the 15 
years period from 2002 to 2017 (Ávila and Monroy 2018). Based on estimates of the national 
consumption of basic crops in 2017 vis-à-vis their domestic production, Imas (2020: 100–101) 
calculates a deficit in domestic production of 46,640 tonnes for potatoes, 40,326 tonnes for 
onions, 34,300 tonnes for tomatoes, 29,140 tonnes for bell peppers, and 17,950 tonnes for 
carrots. 
 
Consequently, the decrease in national production has resulted in an increase in food imports, 
primarily from Argentina and Brazil. Food imports have been steadily increasing over the past 
two decades, from a low of US$78 million in 1999, to a high of US$573 million in 2018 (see 
Figure 5.9). These figures on total imports, however, severely understate the increase in food 
dependency given the many reported cases of contraband food imports, estimated at around US$ 
100 million (5días, 1 February 2019).82 For instance, the Paraguayan Poultry Farmers 
Association (Avipar) reported that the smuggling of chickens, eggs and live birds from Brazil 
constitutes an evasion of G.2 billion (roughly $290,000) per month, and that sales of national 
production had fallen by 40 per cent since mid-January. It is estimated that at least 2,000 kilos of 





chickens enter illegally on a monthly basis, evading tax controls, and not complying with the 
chain of cold requirements, putting the health of consumers at risk (5días, 7 February 2020).83 
 
Figure 5.9 Food imports (US$ million), 1995-2018  
 
Source: own elaboration from DGEEC (various years), Statistical Yearbook of Paraguay. 
 
As a result, “food security” is largely achieved by importing products such as onions, tomatoes, 
and bell peppers rather than relying on national production of such stable crops. As Imas (2018) 
has documented, 98 per cent of domestic consumption of potatoes is imported, for bell peppers 
the figure is 60 per cent, onions (56%), and tomatoes (50%). The increasing reliance on food 
imports also has the added risk of price hikes in food prices due to currency exchanges. For 
example, while conducting field research I noticed a startling increase in the price of tomatoes at 
the supermarket (field notes 2015). As reported in the local newspaper at the time:  
 













Until only a few days ago, 20 kilos of tomatoes were bought at the wholesale market 
in Asunción [Mercado de Abasto], at a price of G.35,000 or G.40,000. This weekend 
the same product, the same quantity, came to cost 180,000 guaranies. In the 
supermarkets the red fruit is priced at about G.15,000 per kilo. The tomato is a 
product of constant demand in Paraguay, as it is consumed throughout the year. In 
2013 the country consumed, on average, about 5 million kilos each month. (Ultima 
Hora, 23 February 2015)84 
 
The peasants’ manioc (mandioca) cultivation is endangered by the government’s neoliberal 
policies under which the state has withdrawn subsidies, credit, technical assistance, and other 
services to the peasant sector (Itrago 2012). Manioc is a crop that is not only important for the 
economic survival of the peasantry, but also has cultural and symbolic significance (Finnis et al. 
2012, 2013).  
 
Undoubtedly, the rapid expansion agribusiness production can be linked to the displacement of 
campesino agriculture (Riquelme and Vera 2013) that has, subsequently, compromised access to 
food for the rural poor—reproducing, at the national level, the very dynamics of poverty and 
malnutrition that GM proponents commonly propose to eradicate on a global scale. As a result of 
these dynamics—decreased national production, increasing dependency on food imports, and the 
lack of policies for food sovereignty—the current agro-export model is predicated on a paradox: 
in a country of 7 million with vast agrarian land and production, 25 per cent of Paraguay’s 
population suffers from hunger (FAO 2012, Panorama of Food Security in Latin America, cited 





in Kretschmer 2019). Indeed, malnutrition in Paraguay has augmented, rather than diminished, 
over the past decade. The prevalence of food inadequacy,85 for example, rose from 29.8 per cent 
in 1990–92, to 33 per cent in 2011–14; while the depth of food deficit increased from 130 
calories per day to 157 (FAO 2014). At the same time, data from the FAO (2014) indicate a 
relative and absolute increase in the overall rate of undernourished population in Paraguay, from 
900,000 in people (20.2 per cent) in 1990-92 to 1.5 million people (22.3 per cent) in 2011-
2013.86 Worst still, according to a recent UNICEF report, these figures include 400,000 
undernourished children (Ultima Hora 2015).87 Therefore, while Paraguayan agriculture may be 
producing a greater share of exports of agro-commodities, its ability to feed its own people has 
decreased, becoming increasingly dependent on food imports (with a significant portion of 
contraband imports), and even increased hunger and malnutrition. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Like a bull in a china shop, the penetration of agribusiness capital has recast the dynamics of 
rural change throughout the Paraguayan countryside. Extractive capital penetrates the 
Paraguayan countryside through imported value-added commodities (GM seeds, agro-chemicals, 
machinery) which circulate through Paraguayan soil, causing unprecedented levels of 
environmental degradation and social exclusion for the rural majority, before being exported in 
commodity form as a soybean to external markets where it is further processed and fed into the 
global grain-feed-meat complex. All these features point toward the extractive nature of this 
                                                             
85 Food inadequacy ‘indicates the risk that individuals will be living on a diet that prevents them from effectively 
discharging an economic activity requiring significant physical effort’ (FAO 2014: 38). 
86 Indeed, Paraguay has the third highest rate of undernourishment in Latin America and the Caribbean, after Haiti 





rapacious model of agrarian capitalism. These dramatic changes brought on by agrarian 










Biting the Hand that Starves You: Peasant Resistance to Agrarian Extractivism 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Growing tensions between large-scale agricultural producers and agribusiness transnational 
corporations on the one hand, and local communities, peasant and rural organisations, and small-
scale farmers and landless rural workers on the other, have become a recurring and escalating 
problem across many parts of Latin America. The agribusiness-led expansion of soybean 
cultivation in southern cone of South America has triggered powerful but uneven forces of 
resistance across the subcontinent. One site of particularly acute tension that has emerged in this 
context has been the expanding agro-extractive frontier in Paraguay, where land re-concentration 
and “foreignisation” have long been at the root of violent clashes (Nagel 1999; Fogel 2001; 
Riquelme 2003; Piñeiro 2004; Ezquerro-Cañete 2017; Palau 2020). This chapter employs an 
analytical framework developed by Dietz and Engels (2020) to explore the nature and character 
of current cycle of contention in the Paraguay countryside. Building on theoretical work from 
historical materialism, contentious politics and social movement studies, Dietz and Engels 
(2020) propose an analytical framework for scrutinising conflicts over land, comprising four 
dimensions: structures, institutions, agency and narratives. Rather than creating a triumphalist 
narrative, this chapter favours a sober assessment of the vulnerabilities and challenges of this 
movement. Indeed, in examining ebb and flow of the movement over time, several instances are 
indicated when the movement has fractured or collapsed entirely. It is argued that a fundamental 
weakness of agrarian social movements in Paraguay has been their inability to produce a 




This argument is supported by a brief discussion of the memory practices of two peasant-based 
social movements and one rural guerilla movement, unveiling how the phantasms of Paraguay’s 
tragic past of national wars, civil unrest, and lack of political stability are traced over, revealing 
the continued allure of authoritarianism, which presents an important obstacle to the formation of 
emancipatory rural alternatives. 
 
6.2 A Brief history of the campesino movement88 
 
6.2.1 The peasant league movement: “nipped in the bud” 
The tardy emergence of a movement representing campesino interests reflected the low level of 
agricultural development. The highly unequal system of land tenure created by the land sale at 
the end of the Triple Alliance War remained largely unaltered until the mid-1970s. However, 
landless labour was not a characteristic feature of the rural population. This was partly due to the 
fact that large-scale migration from rural areas to Argentina acted as a “safety valve” throughout 
the twentieth century. Between 1947 and 1973, as a consequence of the political instability prior 
to 1954 and then the unfavourable political climate under the Stroessner regime, more than 
500,000 Paraguayans are said to have moved to Argentina, most of them to Buenos Aires 
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Table 6.1 Paraguayan-born Argentine residents by place of residence, 1869-2010 
National Census Argentina Buenos Aires 
Metropolitan Area 
Other Provinces 
1886 3,288 – – 
1895 14,562 9.3 90.7 
1914 28,049 11.2 88.8 
1917 93,248 12.4 87.6 
1947 155,269 13.3 86.7 
1960 230,000 29.6 70.4 
1995 250,450 73.3 26.7 
2010 550,713 75.4 24.8 
Source: del Águila (2018). 
 
The likelihood that rural leaders would successfully revolt against the oppressive political regime 
was further reduced by the colonisation programme introduced in the early 1960s by the 
Stroessner regime which alleviated pressure for land reform in the central zone near Asunción 
(discussed in chapter 3). As a result of this colonisation programme, Paraguay was the only 
country in Latin America to register an increase in the share of the total population living in rural 
areas—to 67 per cent by the mid-1970s. The effect of both international and internal migration 
was to lessen the objective conditions for social conflict in the rural areas (Kleinpenning and 
Zoomers 1991; Nickson 2015). 
 
Beginning in the early 1960s, a peasant co-operative movement arose which came to be known 
as the Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (LAC), other church-back peasant movements included the 
Juventudes Agrarias Cristianas (JAC), and the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs), which 




independent political action by the Paraguayan peasantry which had hitherto been bound by ties 
of traditional loyalty to one or other of the two major political parties established in the aftermath 
of the Triple Alliance War: the Partido Liberal and the Partido Colorado (Hicks 1971). The main 
objective of the LAC was to obtain better producer prices for cash crops, especially cotton, sold 
by its members to acopiadores.89 
 
In January 1968 it organised the inaugural congress of its Federación Cristiana Campesina 
(FCC), with 500 delegates. A more radical peasant movement also emerged, during the 1960s, 
inspired by progressive Jesuit and Franciscan priests and lay workers. Loosely grouped together 
in the Federación Nacional de Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (FENALAC), this organisation 
emphasised the autonomy of grassroots based communities (Nickson 1989), and the role of 
popular education in the progress of social change, through the formation of Escuelitas 
Campesinas de las Ligas Agrarias Cristianas, (see Valdez 2019).90 
 
By the end of the decade the LAC boasted a national membership of 10,000, more or less equally 
divided between the FCC and FENALAC, and organised in a network of regional leagues, ligas, 
throughout the country. The rapid growth of the LAC began to sap the traditional support which 
                                                             
89 An acopiador, also known as bolichero, is an intermediary in the agricultural sector, who purchases produce from 
small farmers, especially cotton, and also provides them with an unofficial source of agricultural credit for the 
seasonal purchase of farm inputs. In turn, he sells this agricultural produce to the large-scale processing and export 
companies, from which he also receives credit. The acopiador is often also a shopkeeper, selling basic consumer 
goods to the small farmers. Given the absence of state-guaranteed producer prices, the scarcity of official credit 
schemes, the absence of strong marketing cooperatives, and the repression of the small farmer movement, the 
acopiadores have long exercised a powerful role in the rural economy of Paraguay. However, with the advent of 
mechanized agriculture, their influence has declined considerably in the 21st century (Nickson 2015: 30). 





large numbers of the peasantry gave to the ruling Colorado Party. This political threat was the 
major reason for a sharp deterioration in relations between the Stroessner regime and the 
Catholic Church from 1969. Mounting repression followed against the LACs—torture and 
imprisonment of peasant leaders, destruction of Christian communities, deportation of 
progressive clergy and a media campaign denouncing communist infiltration in the Catholic 
Church. In turn this repression led to a questioning by LAC members of the non-violent 
approach which had inspired them since their formation, together with a renewed interest in the 
radical ideas associated with the theology of liberation. Faced with a common external threat, an 
attempt was made to unite the two strands of the LAC movement. In August 1971 a new unitary 
organisation, the (KOGA) was formed to which all FENALAC bases were affiliated as were 
several FCC bases and various independent groups of more recent formation (Nickson 1989, 
2015). 
 
The repression of the peasant movement reached a peak in April–May 1976. The government 
accused the ligas of involvement in an embryonic peasant-student guerrilla movement, the 
Organización Primero de Marzo (OPM).91 Almost all ligas became inoperative as over 2000 
peasant members of the LAC were arrested in a series of raids throughout the country, as well as 
a hundred students in Asunción. Twenty peasant leaders and four students were killed in the 
repression, and several hundred people were detained for over 12 months. During my fieldwork, 
I interviewed Magui Balbuena at her home in Caaguazú about her early experience in the 
Juventudes Agrarias Cristianas (JAC). She recounts the impact that this wave of repression had 
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on the movement of resistance to the dictatorship, and its severe impact on the emerging peasant 
organizations: 
 
Toda la oposición fue arreada prácticamente. Arreciada. Y se hizo escombro de estas 
organizaciones en 1976. Pero la peor parte se la llevaron las organizaciones 
campesinas: la Juventud Agraria Católica y las Ligas Agrarias, que tuvieron la mayor 
cantidad de muertos, de desaparecidos, asesinados, encarcelados, torturados, y 
exiliados también. Entonces fue una terrible represión que prácticamente diezmó a la 
organización, prácticamente la desarticuló. ¡Fue desbaratada! Entonces no había 
caso, fue muy criminal, fue así una represión muy grande que desató la dictadura que 
lo alcanzó a todo, a toda la esfera de la sociedad. Después quedó gente en la cárcel, 
personas inválidas, personas que fueron torturadas y después liberadas pero que 
siguieron enfermas o murienron al poco tiempo. Y la represión del 76 le alcanzó a 
hombres y mujeres, y a niños también. Porque varias mujeres con sus hijos estuvieron 
en la prisión de Emboscada cerca de Asunción donde se creó el campo de 
concentración para albergar a los miles de presos. Allí estuvieron más de dos mil 
presos políticos, mujeres, niños y hombres. Por eso es importante partir un poco de 
nuestra historia reciente de represión y como fueron desarticuladas las 
organizaciones sin poder recuperarse fácilmente el movimiento popular luego de toda 
esa lucha y esa represión que se ha llevado a cabo en el Paraguay (Balbuena, 






6.2.2 Rebuilding the movement in the 1980s 
The demise of the LAC coincided with radical changes taking place in the agricultural sector, 
with the emergence of export-oriented commercial agriculture, promoted by brasiguayos, and 
the rapid integration of Paraguay into the world food chain through soybeans and meat. The 
resulting rapid increase in the price of land led to the growing eviction of squatters, families who 
had exercised customary rights over land for which they had no title. Furthermore, the 
deficiencies of the colonization program of the Stroessner regime and the completion of the 
construction of the Itaipu dam, which until then had provided work for many landless peasants, 
contributed to a growing problem of rural landlessness, especially in the eastern border region. 
During the final years of the Stroessner regime, these structural conditions combined with 
political and social changes would give rise to land conflicts and the rebirth of an independent 
peasant movement, in the eastern frontier region. 
 
A striking example of the growing popular resistance to land evictions in the eastern border 
departments was the rebellion at Colonia Acaray in the department of Caaguazú in March 1980, 
which led to one of the most serious collisions with the army. Twenty farmers were killed and 
over 200 persons were arrested after discontented colonists had taken the passengers of a bus 
“hostage”, in protest against intimidation and expulsions in the eastern frontier area. The 
“rebellious” colony of Acaray was subsequently invaded and placed under military control, all 
remaining adult males being arrested and removed to detention (Nickson, 1981, 1982; 
Kleinpenning and Zoomers 1991). The brutality suffered by the women and children of the 





La comunidad de dónde vinieron fue sitiada durante casi 4 meses. Unos 5 mil 
miembros del ejército copando el río haciendo destacamentos militares... y las casas 
prohibiendo las reuniones de los vecinos durante más de 3 meses… este vecino no 
sabía si aquel vecino que está a 50 o 100 metros vive o no vive. En cada casa había 
militares custodiando la familia y comieron toda la chanchería comunitaria, las 
gallinas, toda la mandioca, todo el maíz, todas las vaquitas que tenían, se lo 
comieron todito el ejército. Un desastre hubo allá en la comunidad… 
 
…allí las mujeres fueron violadas, las niñas fueron violadas… y mira en esta casa 
solamente la familia, los policías se llevan a la señora más joven y a la niña de 13-
14-15 años se la llevan al destacamento de ahí, la violan en fila los militares, 
sistemáticamente, hasta que quedae semi-muerta, y después la dejan recuperarse 15 
días y la vuelven a violar. Fueron terribles esos momentos… y después ya de eso, 
nosotros supimos… Porque durante muchos años, las mismas mujeres no hablaron 
sobre los hechos que les sucedieron por temor, por vergüenza y por la falta también 
de... viste que las campesinas en las comunidades… se vive otra cultura otra forma 
de relacionarse. Entonces no es que uno cuenta nomás lo que está sufriendo, lo que 
le sucedió entonces.  
 
Y muchas mujeres incluso se casaron después con compañero de los que fueron 
también llevados, porque en esa comunidad todos los hombres fueron llevados a la 
cárcel de Ciudad del Este y las mujeres y los niños fueron los que se quedaron en la 




bueno, en esa comunidad sufrieron tanto las mujeres porque sufrieron atropellos, 
incluso violaciones y muchas torturas y lo más triste es que, por ejemplo, a esta 
familia les dicen que su marido, a quie se llevaron a la cárcel, verdad, “hace rato 
que murió” “tu marido ya no viene”, “tu hermano ya no viene”, “tu hijo mayor ya 
no viene”, “todos están muertos”… y ninguna mujer puede comunicarse con las 
vecinas, sino que está totalmente aislada; imagínate vivir tres meses en esas 
condiciones. Y los maridos, los hijos más grandes, los hermanos… les dicen que 
están todos muertos, pero no... los que murieron son los que iban a Asunción, 
verdad, los interceptaron por el camino, pero los otros que quedan en la comunidad 
fueron llevados a la cárcel, no los mataron, fueron torturados, pero no murieron. 
Pero a cada familia les dicen: “Su hijo, su marido, están todos muertos” y además 
les dicen: “esa tu vecina, hace rato que se levantaron todos.” O sea que fue una 
tortura psicológica y física. Terrible fue. (Balbuena, personal interview, 2015) 
 
The survivors of the LAC regrouped and emerged much strengthened and also independent of 
the Church in the 1980s. The Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo (MCP) was founded on 25 
December 1980 by former members of the LAC. Balbuena, who was involved in the formation 
of the MCP, narrates the gradual rebuilding of the peasant movement in the following terms:  
 
Culmina esa represión, pero con saldos de muertos, de asesinados, de torturados, de 
apresadas y apresados, y de exiliados y de desaparecidos. Así termina la redada 
represiva, pero queda la secuela de la represión y el movimiento popular 




Y muchas compañeras y compañeros en el exilio—yo estaba también en el exilio en 
el 1976, volví en el 1977—y nos colocamos aquí en Caaguazú y empezamos la 
reorganización campesina nacional, un comité de organizaciones nosotros hemos 
conformado con algunos compañeros y compañeras de esta zona y después 
empezamos a buscar a nuestros compañeros… porque nosotros éramos luego una 
organización nacional antes, entonces nuestros compañeros estaban en Concepción, 
San Pedro, Alto Paraná, aquí en Caaguazú, en otras zonas del país, Misiones, 
Itapuá… entonces empezamos a rebuscar por nuestros compañeros y compañeras… 
quien se ha quedado después de la represión, porque la gente… hubo una migración 
interna terrible. Los que no pudieron cruzar la frontera por la represión de su zona 
se mudaron, por ejemplo, los de Paraguarí se mudaron todos hacia el monte de Alto 
Paraná. Parte de Paraguarí y parte de Caaguazú se fueron a meterse en el monte de 
San Pedro. Y empezaron la gente a organizarse en medio del monte y a formar 
comunidades nuevamente. Y bueno tenemos que empezar a buscar el hielo de 
búsqueda de nosotros compañeros y compañeras, y así vamos aglutinado 
nuevamente para poder reorganizarnos y fundar en 1980 el Movimiento Campesino 
Paraguay (MCP). Fundamos esta organización campesina de los que fueron parte 
de la Ligas Agraria y Parte de la Juventud Agraria Católica… de los restos que 
quedaban. Y empezamos a trabajar y organizar a los sintierra… y en 1984 hicimos 
la primera ocupación de tierra después de la bárbara represión… justamente aquí 





As a result of the introduction of commercial agriculture in the eastern border region, the number 
of land conflicts rose dramatically, and a growing body of landless peasants emerged for the first 
time in Paraguay. In July 1985, the MCP organized a meeting that attracted 5,000 landless 
peasants in Caaguazú, where they founded the Permanent Assembly of Peasants without Land 
(Asamblea Permanente de Campesinos sin Tierra) (APCT). The size of this gathering marked the 
re-emergence of the movement after the destruction of the LAC a decade earlier (Nickson 1988: 
256). The MCP started carrying out land occupations which led again to its members being 
harshly repressed, imprisoned, and tortured:  
 
…realizamos la otra ocupación en Alto Paraná, es la segunda ocupación. Y allí el 
ejército y los terratenientes, que decían que era su tierra, fueron así a masacrar 
prácticamente en la ocupación en pleno monte de Alto Paraná y murieron dos de 
nuestra organización del MCP. Murieron dos jóvenes: uno de 21 años y otro de 24 
años. Fueron asesinados por los terratenientes y por miembros de la policía que 
estuvieron en el monte diciendo que allí había un campamento guerrillero. Y había 
400 familias con niños podres—que no tenía ni zapatos, ni ropa las criaturas en 
pleno monte en este campamento echo de paja y árboles—dicen que son 
guerrilleros…que si era una organización guerrillera no iba a estar allí niños y 
mujeres embarazadas. Hubo un desastre, esa represión fue terrible… fueron 
dispersados por el monte las mujeres y los niños… corrieron todos de la balacera… 
y fueron llevados… no me acuerdo si era cinco o seis, siete compañeros presos, 
cuando eso. Fueron atados a los árboles así, y allí azotados y se les derramada agua 




y se lo comían allí, delante de los compañeros atados a los árboles y apaleados. 
Terrible fue esa represión, un duro golpe otra vez que estábamos empezando 
prácticamente la reorganización del campesinado. (Balbuena, personal interview, 
2015) 
 
Despite this repression, land conflicts intensified in the mid-1980s. Most frontier land was by 
then claimed by someone, and transportation and communication networks expanded to cover 
much of the zone. New occupations were likely to occur on lands subject to opposing claims and 
where they were likely to be noticed, thus increasing the likelihood of confrontation and 
repression (Zarza 1988). Fogel (1986) found that in the first 9 months of 1984, 9 violent 
expulsions occurred, affecting 1,045 families, with 322 campesinos detained. 
 
A significant turning point in the re-emergence of rural militancy after the demise of the LAC 
was the victory of landless farmers at Tavapy II, an agricultural colony in the Department of Alto 
Paraná, following a protracted struggle from 1983 to 1986. In 1983, the 4,000-strong community 
first occupied land whose ownership was claimed by a Chilean, Engelberto Engelwar. In mid-
December 1986, a detachment of army and police surrounded the settlement, cutting it off from 
external communication. In March 1987, 300 community members traveled to Asunción where 
they carried out an unprecedented demonstration in front of the headquarters of the IBR. Despite 
positive assurances from the authorities, they were beaten up on their return and the encirclement 
of the colony was re-imposed. However, this action provoked a wave of public sympathy, which 
led to open disagreement within the leadership of the Partido Colorado over the question. On 20 




should be granted 2,300 hectares of the disputed land.92 This decision was heralded as a major 
victory for the resurgent peasant movement and it encouraged a new wave of land invasions 
(Nickson 2015: 564). 
 
6.2.3 End of dictatorship and the resurgence of the campesino movement 
The number of land invasions escalated during the 1990s, encouraged by the country’s first 
hesitant steps toward democracy following the overthrow of Stroessner. During the first days 
after the coup, hundreds of rural Paraguayans swept onto unused lands claimed by the state, the 
Stroessner family and its cronies, and foreign investors, to set up ramshackle huts and clear plots 
to grow manioc and corn. They were soon followed by thousands more. By the mid-1990s, 
observers and representatives of the occupants estimated that roughly 19,000 families had 
claimed lands totaling over 360,000 hectares (Nagel 1999: 148). 
 
In the absence of a significant industrial proletariat, these various campesino organizat ions 
quickly solidified their position as the most important and strongest social movement challenging 
the state and the political elite (Fogel 2009: 54–55). Table 6.2 provides an alphabet soup of 






                                                             




Table 6.2 Campesino organisations in Paraguay 
1963 Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (LAC) 
1968 Federación Nacional de Ligas Agrarias Cristianas (FENALAC) 
 Federación Cristiana Campesina 
1971 Coordinación Nacional de Bases Campesinas Cristianas 
1980 Movimiento Campesino Paraguayo (MCP) 
1982 Fundación de Coordinadora Regional de Agricultores de Itapuá (CRAI) 
1983 Comisión Permanente de Familiares de Desaparecidos y Asesinados (CPFDA)   
1984 Asamblea Permanente de Campesinos sin Tierra (APCT) 
 Asociación de Agricultores de Alto Paraná (ASAGRAPA) 
1985 Organización Nacional Campesina (ONAC) 
 Coordinación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas (CMC) 
1986 Coordinadora Nacional de Productores Agrícolas (CONAPA) 
 Asociación Pequeños Productores Agrícolas (APPA) 
 Coordinación Juvenil Campesina (CJC) 
1988 Asociación Campesina de Desarrollo Integrado (ACADEI) 
1989 Coordinadora Nacionalde Lucha por la Tierra y la Vivienda (CNLTV) 
1991 Federación Nacional Campesina (FNC) 
1993 Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinos (MCNOC) 
 Organización de Lucha por la Tierra (OLT) 
1994 Coordinadora Interdepartamental de Organizaciones Campesinas (CIOC) 
 Unión Campesina del Norte (UCN) 
1996 Organización Nacional de Aborígenes Intendentes (ONAI) 
 Movimiento Paraguay Pyahurâ (MPP) 
1998 Coordinadora de Productores Agrícolas de San Pedro Norte (CPA-SPN) 
 Movimiento Juvenil Campesino Cristiano (MJCC) 
1999 Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas e Indígenas (CONAMURI) 
2002 Movimiento Agrario del Paraguay (MOAPA) 
2003 Movimiento Agrario Paraguayo (MAP) 
2004 Lucha por la Defensa por la Soberanía y la Vida (CDLSV) 
2006 Movimiento Popular Tekojoja (MPT) 
2009 Coordinador de Organizaciones Campesinas e Indígenas del Paraguay (COCIP) 
2010 Liga Nacional de Carperos (LNC) 
2014 Coordinadora de Trabajadores Campesinos y Urbanos (CTCU) 
2016 Coordinadora Nacional Intersectorial (CNI) 
Source: Adapted from Riquelme (2003); Piñero (2004); Palau (2005); Palau et al. (2017); 
Tamayo Belda and Mereles Pintos (2019). 
 
 In July 1991, 15 regional organizations with 7,200 members came together in the founding 
congress of the Federación Nacional Campesina (National Federation of Peasants, FNC)—
although its origins stem from CONAPA which had been formed in 1986 (Gómez, personal 




has demonstrated the greatest capacity for mobilization. The Coordinadora Nacional de Lucha 
por la Tierra y la Vivienda (CNLTV) which had formed just before the fall of the dictatorship in 
1989, was renamed the Organización de Lucha por la Tierra (OLT) in 1993. Lidia Ruiz explains 
the significance of this change and the importance of narrowing down the organizations focus on 
the issue of land:  
 
OLT digamos como tal, como Organización de Lucha por la Tierra se queda con ese 
nombre a partir de 1993, pero antes de ellas fue una Coordinadora Nacional de 
Lucha por la Tierra y la Vivienda (CNLTTV) que se fundó en el 89 un poco antes de 
la caída de la dictadura. Y abarcaba dos ejes, digamos, la lucha por la tierra y la 
lucha por la vivienda que era más urbana. Y a partir de que había más desafío en la 
lucha por la tierra se decide, digamos, quedar como organización de lucha por la 
tierra y tener como mayor delimitación en el trabajo. (Ruiz, personal interview 
2015) 
 
The FNC and OLT later helped establish the Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas (MCNOC–Coordinating Committee of Peasant Organizations) which agglutinated 
over 35 different peasant organisations at the regional, departmental and district level. On 15 
March 1994, the founding event of the MCNOC was a massive protest march of unprecedented 
scale through Asunción to demand a reform of the government’s agrarian policy. Congregating 
close to 40,000 people, the march represented the first national mobilisation by peasant 
organisations that had previously articulated their demands only at the local or regional level. 




present their demands in a public show of their strength in numbers (Levy 2013: 36–37). In 
1998, however, leadership rivalries and ideological differences resulted in the FNC splitting from 
the MCNOC (Piñeiro 2004: 130): 
 
Tenemos mucha experiencia de alianza y de rompimiento de alianza en nuestro país. 
Nosotros, desde la FNC hemos ¿incursado? muchísimo la construcción de una 
instancia de coordinación de todas las organizaciones nacionales, departamentales. 
La MCNOC fue parte de esa experiencia, después en el 98 se rompió prácticamente 
la MCNOC por unas razones… en el 98 en Paraguay ganó otra vez las elecciones 
generales el ¿cuadrado? que estaba con Lino Oviedo, un militar golpista, autoritario 
con una línea más fascista… y ahí nosotros decíamos que tenemos que derrotar otra 
vez al fascismo, tenemos que defender las libertades públicas y eso vamos a hacer en 
la ruta con movilización… y ahí había diferencia de pensamiento en las 
organizaciones. Prácticamente en ese proceso se rompió la MCNOC con esa 
política. (Gómez, personal interview 2015) 
 
Before delving deeper into the movement’s agendas and aims, strategies and forms of collective 
actions, it is important to reflect on the internal disputes within and between the various peasant 
organizations. Ultimately, any attempt at building and consolidating a large social movement 
requires a narrative of “simplification”, often privileging unity over diversity. Any “engaged 
research” recognizes the importance of this political task, and the present study is deeply 
sympathetic to this imperative. Nevertheless, as Edelman and Borras (2016: 40) rightly stress, it 




diversity or acknowledging its roots and implications. As an “engaged scholar”, this is not purely 
an academic matter, since it is easy for scholars to be “movement hecklers” from a distance 
(Edelman and Borras 2016: 40). I agree with Edelman and Borras (2016) that acknowledging 
significant internal differentiation in a movement facilitates not only a better grasp of critical 
political issues, such as strategic alliances, but also of internal organisational struggles for unity 
in the face of differences (Edelman and Borras 2016: 40). It is in this spirit that I briefly sketch 
my ideas in the following section on the Paraguayan campesino. 
 
6.3 Class, identity, and ideological differences within the campesino movement  
As other scholars in the field of peasant studies have noted, activists tend to project an overly 
coherent picture of their movements and to overstate their support, while in reality many peasant 
organizations are often wracked by factionalism, with leaders sometimes using them as 
springboards for their own individual upward mobility (Landsberger and Hewitt 1970; Edelman 
and Borras 2016). This raises several questions regarding the leadership dynamics of these 
organizations. Such dynamics have been a constant feature of the campesino movement in 
Paraguay, which has been plagued by infighting and divisions. As the Uruguayan rural 
sociologist Diego Piñeiro (2004: chap. 3) puts it in the title of his chapter on the Paraguayan 
peasant movement, “unity is an arduous path” [la unidad es un camino trabajoso]—one that has 
rarely been achieved, and is still pending consolidation in Paraguay. 
 
Many observers have argued that the lack of a single body representing the peasantry has more to 
do with personal rivalries and competition for mass support and resources among its leaders than 




study analysing the structure of ONAC, FNC and MCNOC, concluded that while these 
organizations had an ample base of support, this “often contrasts with the elitist ways of 
exercising power by leaders” (Mora 2006). However, it is also true that more substantive 
divisions coincide with and reinforce personal rivalries. As Ramón Fogel (1997: 100) explains: 
 
Ideological differences contributed to the fragmentation of groups representing the 
peasantry. By the end of 1992, 70,000 peasants belonged to 753 grassroots 
organisations, which were divided into 53 regional organisations which, in turn, 
were affiliated to ten different national organisations. Regional and national 
organisations were distinguished from each other according to the emphasis that 
they placed on class, militancy and Christianity. 
 
The ideological persuasions of the movement’s leaders vary from those coming from the 
communist party-based framework, to those of the syndicalist tradition, from those of broadly 
liberal provenance to those influenced by Liberation Theology. For example, “the 
antiestablishment militancy of the FNC is largely a product of 1980s underground organizing, 
which adopted a hardened Marxist stance in the face of its total exclusion from public politics” 
(Hetherington 2011: 83). Thus, ideological differences and conflicts over leadership have 
contributed to the fragmentation of the groups representing the peasantry. At the same time, 
regional differences in political conditions and land-tenure structure encourage the use of 
different tactics by campesino leaders. These differences are compounded by the different base 





As Edelman and Borras (2016) rightly stress, it is impossible to understand the politics of rural 
social movements without examining their base or constituencies in particular social classes—
e.g. commercial farmers, rich peasants, small peasants, or landless labourers—as well as the 
class alliances that may exist within agrarian organizations. Indeed, recent critiques of the master 
framework within many food sovereignty movements—“unity in diversity”—have highlighted 
“the difficulty of representing all classes of peasantry within the same movement” (Henderson 
2018: 7). Within this context, “class dynamics have been, and remain, a significant factor in 
shaping peasant organization struggles. Internal class contradictions constantly threaten unity as 
a result of ongoing processes of class differentiation” (Henderson 2018: 7). At the same time, 
while class is a fundamental category of analysis for agrarian politics, it is essential to understand 
how it intersects with other social identities, such as race, ethnicity, gender, generation, 
nationality, and religion (Edelman and Borras 2016: 7). I now turn to looking at the Paraguayan 
campesino movement from these perspectives. 
 
The experience of the Paraguayan campesino movement is rich and complex, as reflected in even 
a brief survey of the large scholarly and activist literature on peasant studies, including a special 
issues of the Paraguayan journal Novapolis on “The Agrarian Question and the Campesino 
Movement in Paraguay”—with contributions from Palau (2003), Galeano (2003), Morínigo 
(2003), Parra and Soare (2003)—and several other works on forms of peasant resistance and land 
conflicts (Fogel 2001, 2006; Riquelme 2003; Piñero 2004; Palau 2005; Tamayo Belda and 
Mereles Pintos 2019). The social base of the various peasant organizations is relatively 




on conquered settlements, and smallholder producers.93 While there may well be other social 
groups and classes in the countryside that belong to the movement, they arguably have less of a 
voice within the movement and are less significant in terms of its mass base. This has important 
implications for how the movement frames issues and campaigns and builds alliances with other 
working-class movements (these points are developed further in the next section).  
 
Class intersects with other social identities, most importantly in the Paraguayan case, ethnicity, 
gender, and nationalism. In Paraguay, the questions of social liberation and the rural struggle are 
strongly infused with a revindication of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and even national claims 
(Petras 1997). A nationalist orientation has long been visible within the campesino movements. 
As Beverly Nagel explains, this is partly a consequence of the repression suffered by peasant 
organisations during the Stroessner regime: “Since class-based criticism could not be voiced, 
nationalist appeal provided the only real space for objections” (Nagel 1999: 157). This 
nationalist discourse is particularly evident near the border with Brazil where native Paraguayans 
feel aggrieved of their dispossession amidst land takeover by Brazilians and “brasiguayos” (a 
pejorative label amalgamated from the Spanish words for “Brazilian” and “Paraguayan” used to 
describe Brazilian-born naturalised Paraguayans or Paraguayans of Brazilian descent).94 The 
                                                             
93 What is missing from the literature is a recent, systematic sociological analysis of the social base and class 
composition of the many peasant organisations across Paraguay engaged at some level or in some form of the class 
struggle has not recently been recently conduced. Noticeable exceptions include Fogel’s (2012) study into the 
carperos movement, a spontaneous movement that emerged during the Lugo administration. 
94 The use of the term ‘Brasiguayos’ has been subject to particular critique for its implied dichotomy between 
wealthy Brazilian agriculturalists devoted to soybean production on the one hand, and impoverished and 
marginalised Paraguayan small-scale farmers on the other. In reality, “the majority of Brazilian immigrants in 
Paraguay are small-scale farmers who, like many of their impoverished Paraguayan neighbours, have faced constant 




arguments and the rhetoric used are decidedly nationalist, with obvious parallels to past Brazilian 
invasions (discussed further below). 
 
This nationalist rhetoric is only emphasised by the country’s linguistic distinctiveness. 
Paraguay is the only country in Latin America where a majority of the population speaks an 
indigenous language, Guaraní, despite the fact that most do not self-identify as indigenous.95 
According to the 2002 census, Guaraní is preferred by 59 per cent of the households compared 
with 35.8 per cent that preferred Spanish (DGEEC 2004). In rural areas, Guaraní remained by 
far the predominant language, preferred by 82.5 per cent of the population. As a result, there 
has been a tendency—not unbroken or free of contradictions—for the Guaraní ethno-linguistic 
composition of the Paraguayan peasant movements to stand in for as an analogue class (Fogel 
1997; Petras 1997: 21). 
 
There are still indigenous communities of different ethnicities that are organized and in part also 
recognize themselves as campesinos, some of which are represented in the National Organization 
of Independent Aborigines (ONAI). Many of these indigenous groups underscore that land has a 
multidimensional character, particularly for defending their cultural identity. Land is an essential 
aspect of the world view of the Guarani and Kaiowá indigenous population. For example, the 
Guarani and Kaiowá feel that they belong to the land, as encapsulated in the term Tekohá, used 
to refer to their territory:  
 
                                                             
95 Paraguay has a largely homogenous mestizo (mixed race) population. The 2012 census numbered the indigenous 




Tekohá goes beyond a mere description of a piece of land. The prefix teko- 
represents a series of norms and customs of the community, while the suffix -ha has 
a connotation of place. Tekohá is the physical place—including land, jungle, fields, 
watercourses, plants and remedies—where the way of life of the Guarani and Kaiowá 
indigenous peoples develops. The land is an extension of themselves and their source 
of life. In their own words, ‘the land is them, and they are the land.’96 
 
They seek historical reparation through laws that would permit them to recuperate the lands that 
belong to their ancestors (see Correia 2018, 2019). 
 
In regard to the gender dimensions of the movement, we should begin by acknowledging that, 
historically, the Paraguayan countryside has tended to be notoriously patriarchal. In 1985, the 
MCP promoted a separate women’s organization called the Coordinación de Mujeres 
Campesinas (CMC), which was formed under the leadership of Magui Balbuena who was 
introduced early. Reflecting on the origins and challenges of organizing for greater gender 
equality in the 1980s, she recounts: 
 
Y en 1985 vemos de la necesidad de la participación de las mujeres también en 
igualdad de condiciones con los varones, porque prácticamente en la asamblea si 
venían 600 personas de eso diez eran mujeres. Todo hombre y los hombres... Fue 
interesante esa época, como estamos ahora, verdad. Hay un fuerte patriarcado y 
machismo todavía en nuestra sociedad, pero pensando en 1984-85-86 como el 





machismo era mucho más fuerte y cuando empezaba había mujeres líderes naturales 
de la comunidad, líderes de la iglesia, que venía a la asamblea y cuando las mujeres 
se levantaban a hablar, a decir algunas palabras, se levantaba otro hombre hacia 
allá y decía: “Coordinador haga callar a esa mujer.  Lo que dicen las mujeres no 
sirve, no vale nada. Por favor, hágale callar a esa señora que está hablando. Está 
hablando todo de balde.” Así era. (Balbuena personal interview 2015) 
 
In another interview with Lidia Ruiz (leader of the OLT), she also discusses the work that has 
been done to strengthen women’s participation and empowerment within the movement:  
 
Se vio la necesidad de hablar y de trabajar la participación de las mujeres. Porque 
las mujeres están en todos los espacios: en la lucha por la tierra, en ocupación está, 
en movilización esta. Generalmente, en las ocupaciones son las que resisten 
mientras los varones van y trabajan para poder sostener, porque en una ocupación, 
generalmente, no hay comida suficiente, entonces... o en la campamento sin tierra, y 
a partir de ahí veíamos que bueno, la mujer participaba en todo pero no hablaba 
mucho, no estaba en las instancias de decisión y entonces la organización agarró 
que era necesario fortalecer la participación de las mujeres y sobre todo el 
empoderamiento de ellas para que pudieran asumir tareas organizativas donde se 






The continued marginalization of gender issues within the mainstream campesino movement led 
to the formation of the National Coordination of Rural and Indigenous Women (CONAMURI) in 
1999, with the objective to “to make visible the peasant and indigenous women who are part of 
society, who are citizens, who are producers, and who have rights in this country and who are the 
most discriminated against, exploited—doubly exploited—and oppressed sector of Paraguayan 
society” (Balbuena, personal interview 2015). This organisation brings together local rural and 
indigenous women workers’ organizations proposing alternative development projects to end 
class, ethnic and gender poverty, exclusion, and discrimination. This organization is a member of 
the Via Campesina international movement, which also vindicates agrarian reform. Diana 
Viveros, member of CONAMURI, places emphasis on the gendered dimension  of any such 
reform: “A comprehensive agrarian reform must ensure equality, avoid any type of 
discrimination based on gender or ethnicity, and give priority to the most disadvantaged groups 
for the distribution of land, recognizing women as subjects of rights and obligations” (Viveros 
2012: 99). CONAMURI also has ties with the urban women’s movement, collaborating on issues 
such as women’s reproductive rights and domestic violence (Levy 2013: 36–37). 
 
6.4 Agenda and aims 
By the mid-1990s, the political focus of the peasant movement had begun to shift from issues of 
producer prices to agrarian reform. The new organizations that emerged during this period 
derived their principal support from the increasing number of land-hungry families. 





Uno de los ejes principal de lucha desde el surgimiento de la Federación Nacional 
Campesina es la lucha por la tierra. El latifundio es uno de los problemas centrales 
de Paraguay y en ese sentido el programa de lucha de la FNC es la reforma agraria. 
Y los primeros años, centralmente la lucha era la por la reforma agraria, 
ocupaciones de latifundio, la exigencia a las instituciones del Estado en relación al 
desarrollo de los asentamientos que se iban conquistando de poco a poco. La 
defensa de la producción que tienen los pequeños productores… con el planteo al 
Ministerio de Agricultura (MAG) en base a apoyo técnico, crédito para el desarrollo 
de la producción agrícola… [estas] son las reivindicaciones históricas de la FNC. 
(Gómez personal interview 2015) 
 
Agrarian reform has become the overarching master frame of the movement’s land campaign. 
The FNC demands the redistribution of large private holdings to landless and land-poor peasants 
in order to create self-sufficient agricultural communities. At the same time, the FNC warns 
against projecting the struggles for land as an exclusive need of peasants. Over time, it evolved 
to underscore the need to frame the struggle within a solution to the problem of the wider 
society, and thus framing the need for broader coalitions: 
 
Después ya en el año 98, nosotros hemos desarrollado un gran debate nacional con 
diferentes sectores de la sociedad incluyendo a profesionales, intelectuales, partidos 
políticos, donde hemos colocado en el debate el problema agrario en nuestro país. Y 
como conclusión de los debates con los diferentes sectores de la sociedad, hemos 




reactivación de la producción agrícola y el desarrollo industrial” como una 
propuesta de desarrollo nacional, no precisamente para el campesino, sino que para 
el país. Y esa propuesta incluye la necesidad de la reforma agraria, la necesidad del 
desarrollo de la producción agrícola en mano de los pequeños y medianos 
productores, que históricamente viene produciendo fundamentalmente alimento para 
la población—variedades de alimentos—y materia prima industrializable en nuestro 
país. Y ligado a eso, el desarrollo industrial como salida a dar ocupación a mano de 
obra en la ciudad, dar valor agregado a la materia prima, y sobre todo... en la 
perspectiva de satisfacer la demanda interna que tiene nuestro país de producto 
estratégico para garantizar el desarrollo nacional. Y a partir de ahí, a partir de ese 
planteamiento… nosotros consideramos que pasar de las reivindicaciones 
sectoriales a reivindicaciones más sobre desarrollo nacional. (Gómez personal 
interview 2015) 
 
The FNC stresses the importance of access to land for small family farmers to support 
livelihoods and society’s interest at large, as well as the need for the integration of agrarian 
reform into the broader national-development strategy. For the OLT, agrarian reform must be 
combined with state support for production and marketing networks that would be controlled by 
small family farmers.  
 
Nosotros hablamos de que no basta con la distribución de tierra nomás. En primer 
lugar… tiene que haber distribución de tierras y también democratización de la 




además de distribuir a las familias que necesitan. Pero además de eso, tiene que 
haber toda una política de Estado para la agricultura campesina para garantizar los 
derechos básicos, porque no sirve de nada que el gobierno entregue una tierra sin 
acceso: no hay camino, no hay electrificación, no hay agua potable, o sea, las 
familias se terminan cansado y salen nuevamente de ahí porque no tienen forma de 
sobrevivir tampoco. Entonces nosotros decimos: si vamos a hacer reforma agraria 
necesitamos ver esta cuestión. 
 
También ver la agricultura campesina, la comercialización, el mercado, porque acá 
hay un problema grave que es que la agricultura campesina, que generalmente es 
familiar también, y que es la que produce comida, no tiene salida, no tiene mercado. 
Primero, no tenemos camino, no puede ni entrar ni un tercero a comprar. Hay 
puentes en situaciones que se caen. Segundo, los precios no están controlados por el 
Estado, entonces el que compra lo hace a precio ínfimo y trae el producto a 
Asunción y lo vende con un beneficio claro. La mandioca es una prueba de ello: la 
mandioca en mi asentamiento se vende a 100 guaraníes el kilo y acá en Asunción 
está 2000-2500 guaraníes el kilo. Entonces hay un grupo que se quedó con una muy 
grande cantidad de ganancia, que no es el productor. Entonces no es rentable. No es 
rentable y así pasa con las demás producciones verdad. Entonces tiene que haber 
una política de Estado que garantice la agricultura campesina y sobre todo 
garantice esa agricultura que es la comida de la gente. Porque en Paraguay la 
agricultura campesina es la que provee el 70% de la comida a nivel nacional. Y 




aceptaran los contrabandos, porque los grandes supermercados traen contrabando 
de Argentina y de Brasil, por ejemplo, en cebolla, papa, tomate... y hay también 
producción nacional, pero como el contrabando no paga impuesto, compran a un 
precio y están cruzando, no hay control, entonces es lo que, digamos, no contribuye 
a la economía campesina. Y son cuestiones que el Estado tiene que revisar y rever. 
(Ruiz, personal interview 2015) 
 
These issues all align with well established frameworks for agrarian reforms to be successful and 
truly pro-poor. The “tripod” framework, for instance, highlights the need for such reforms to be 
built on three pillars, namely “peasant-initiated”, “livelihood-creating/enhancing”, and “state-
supported” (see Akram-Lodhi et al. 2007). Sometimes, a fourth pillar is included—integration of 
agrarian reform into the broader national development strategy—which is predominantly 
emphasized by the FNC. 
 
6.5 Alliances and the issues of autonomy  
Another point about the FNC is that it has a policy of not accepting financial support from the 
state or international nongovernmental organizations (Nickson 2015: 532). It is politically 
autonomous of any electoral and/or sectarian left parties. It is largely engaged in direct action 
rather than the electoral process. Increasingly, some militant peasant organisations are calling on 
supporters to express their contempt for the “bourgeois parliamentary system” with blank votes. 
 
Nosotros venimos debatiendo el tema electoral con la gente y sobre todo la 




participación política del pueblo. Porque, los partidos tradicionales, incluidos 
algunos sectores de izquierda electoralista, ellos reducen la participación política 
del pueblo solamente al tema electoral. Y nosotros consideramos que el pueblo tiene 
que ir participando permanentemente en cuestiones políticas, no reducirse sólo al 
tema electoral. Y en la última elección [2015] nosotros habíamos participado en la 
contienda electoral, nosotros llamamos al voto protesta—votar protestando—y 
técnicamente es voto nulo, porque en los boletines de voto se ponen “yo voto por 
reforma agraria”, “yo voto por educación”, “yo voto por salud”, y técnicamente es 
voto nulo… es una forma de empezar nuestra protesta, y sobre eso generar debate en 
la sociedad. (Gómez, personal interview 2015) 
 
A rough estimate of the level of support for this form of electoral protest can be gauged by 
combing the number of invalid and wasted votes. If all wasted/invalid votes came from this 
source, the past three elections (2008, 2013, 2018) would reveal support figures of 66,303 
(38,485 wasted votes, 27,818 invalid votes), 131,703 (72,066 wasted votes, 59,637 invalid 
votes), and 134,548, respectively.97As Gómez continues explaining: 
 
Nosotros creemos que, realmente para que el pueblo elija a sus representantes, se 
tienen que transformar muchas cosas en el ámbito de la justicia electoral. Porque la 
justica electoral está actualmente en manos prácticamente del Partido Colorado, y 
toda la mafia se dirige desde la justicia electoral. Además, se utilizan la miseria del 
pueblo en los momentos electorales, se compran las cédulas, se compran los votos. 
                                                             




Son una forma de manipulación de la participación de la gente. Realmente la gente 
no decide, no elije a sus representantes, y mucho menos se discute un programa de 
gobierno para el pueblo. Solamente se pone en el debate quien es el candidato que 
tiene mayor presencia política… todos los debates se centran en los candidatos, no 
en un debate sobre un programa de desarrollo para el país, sobre un programa de 
gobierno. Nosotros allí, en la coyuntura electoral colocamos el debate sobre la 
necesidad de un programa de gobierno que realmente nos lleve a desarrollar 
políticas para el desarrollo de nuestro país. (Gómez, personal interview 2015) 
 
6.6 Strategies and forms of collective action 
While the strategies of the movement may have differed—particularly, in the way they relate to 
the power of the state and alliances with political parties—their forms of mobilization have been 
very similar: massive demonstrations, marches, land invasions, and roadblocks have, since the 
early 1990s, been campesinos’ primary extrajudicial tool for affecting government policy (Nagel 
2005). Ever since the inaugural MCNOC march in 1994, the FNC has a carried out an annual 
march in Asunción thereafter to present their demands in a public show of their strength in 
numbers. This year, the FNC was forced to cancel what would have been its 27th consecutive 
annual march through the capital—which had been planned for 26–27 March 2020—due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic (ABC Color, 16 March 2020).98 
 
6.6.1 National Marches 






Since democratization, campesino organizations make up the country’s largest organized social 
group and one of the few groups capable of mobilizing a large number of supporters at key 
moments in order to extract benefits and exert pressure on the state. The intervention of 
organized campesino groups has been decisive in at least two major political junctures since 
democratization. 
 
These collective actions, including synergistic alliances with other sectors, can be observed 
throughout recent historical events such as the so-called Marzo Paraguayo in 1999 when the 
peasant movement interlaced with students protests. This was the first of the political junctures. 
Regular peasant protests had been scheduled for March of that year, when the assassination of 
Vice-President Luis Argaña triggered a political crisis. In exchange for the forgiveness of public-
sector loans made to their members, the FNC joined student-led opposition to a coup attempt by 
General Lino Oviedo. Campesino leaders (along with student groups) were able to mobilize large 
enough numbers to defend constitutional government. As Setrini points out however, “the nature 
of this exchange was plainly clientelistic: political support for the incumbent government in 
exchange for debt forgiveness. Furthermore, leaders secured material benefits for their followers 
by betraying the political preferences of their bases, among which were many Oviedo 
supporters” (Setrini, 2010: 29; also see Hetherington, 2011: 47–56). 
 
A second key intervention occurred in June 2002, when the FNC, ONAC, and MCNOC provided 
the backbone of the Congreso Democrático del Pueblo (Democratic Congress of the People, 
CDP), which organised a large-scale demonstration in Asunción that forced the government to 




Comunicaciones (Copaco).99 During this period, the campesino movement reached 
unprecedented levels of unity and cohesion as the FNC and MCNOC were reunited within the 
CDP. The catalyst for their unity was their opposition to neoliberalism, which saw as a main 
source of impoverishment and marginalization of peasant families, although unity would prove 
temporary as old rivalries and disputes between the FNC and MCNO resurfaced: 
 
En el 2002 se logró otra vez la unidad de todos los sectores ya en el Congreso 
Democrático del Pueblo. Con esa alianza se logró parrar la privatización de la 
empresa pública que estado en ese proceso. Posteriormente vinieron las elecciones 
generales y se rompió otra vez allí la alianza porque un sector se fue al tema 
electoral, otro sector no quería participar en las elecciones. (Gómez, personal 
interview 2015) 
 
In 2004, a new coordinating body called the Frente Nacional por la Defensa de la Soberanía y la 
Vida (National Front for the Defense of Sovereignty and Life) brought together a number of 
campesino groups (primarily the MCNOC and the MAP) with urban labour unions, and began a 
series of three national days of action in August, September, and November (Hetherington 2011: 
83–84). In 2014–15 the CDP was reconstituted against public–private partnership being 
proposed by President Cartes (2013–2018) which was the main point of contestation in the 
country during the time I was conducting fieldwork.  
 
                                                             
99 Ironically, at the time, Paraguay had one of the lowest landline telecom coverage in Latin America and rural 




Hasta ahora, la alianza es sobre temas concretos, por ejemplo, tenemos 4 puntos 
concretos: luchar por la derogación de la ley de Alianza público-privada; luchar por 
la derogación de la ley de militarización, que es una modificatoria a la ley de 
defensa para que los militares salgan a hacer cuestiones internas en nuestro país; el 
tema de la lucha por la tierra; el trabajo, el empleo.  Son cuatro puntos de acuerdo, 
y sobre esos cuatro puntos de acuerdo estamos llevando adelante movilizaciones de 
lucha. Este primero de mayo [2015] vamos a hacer un acto de movilización acá en 
la capital. Desde el 18 de mayo, vamos a hacer una lucha prolongada que nosotros 
convocamos, vamos a salir el 18 no sabemos hasta cuando, para hacer 
movilizaciones y cortes de ruta en diferentes partes y departamentos del país, por 
estos 4 puntos. Hasta allí estamos llegando todavía con nuestra alianza. (Gómez, 
personal interview 2015) 
 
Although this time round, the movement was not able to halt this law, as it had done 12 years 
earlier. 
 
6.6.2 Land Occupations 
Land occupations remain the most important strategy for gaining access to land: “It is important 
to understand that in Paraguay access to land does not pass through a political decision… it is 
[achieved] through a struggle and a conquest” [lucha y conquista] (Ruiz, personal interview 
2015). Table 6.1 depicts the ebb and flow of land occupations since the transition to democracy. 
Scholars of social movements have long recognized that movements are affected by “protest 




2013). The 1990s were clearly the most dynamic period, with an apex being reached in 2004. 
The 2012 massacre in Curuguaty appears to have signaled the start of the declining phases. At 
the same time, there were clearly internal waves, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
with various peaks and falls recurring every 4–5 years, probably in line with the start of each 
new government owing to the heightened hope for success. Indeed, the second year of each of 
the last four elected regimes—e.g. Frutos (2004), Lugo (2009), Cartes (2014), Benítez (2019)—
appears to have coincided with a cyclical peak. 
 
Figure 6.1 Land occupations in Paraguay, 1990–2019 
 
Source: CDE (2007), Base-IS (2019). 
 
According to Riquelme (2015), between 1989 and 2015, over 500,000 hectares of land were 
“conquered” by peasant organizations, allowing for the formation of new colonies (colonias) in 
their place. The majority of these lands are connected to the actions of the organized peasant 


























































































































close to 300,000 hectares of land, redistributed into 40 encampments (asentamientos) on which 
over 14,000 households—about 60 thousand people—are settled (Zibechi 2014; Base-IS 
2017).100 Not all these lands were the result of organized taking; two other sources exist: old 
campesino settlements and spontaneous gains, whose occupants went to the organization after 
the conquest of the land or in the process of taking it, in pursuit of knowledge and support. For 
this reason, the FNC differentiate between occupations (ocupación), settlements (asentamientos), 
and communities (comunidades). Occupations are seized lands whose ownership is disputed with 
landowners and the state. They have not secured stability and are often persecuted. Settlements 
are colonies that are in the process of being legally recognized. Communities are lands 
adjudicated and recognized by the state long ago. The FNC only occupies properties over 3,000 
hectares, their target being large estates. In general, settlements distribute some 10 hectares to 
each family, where they produce subsistence crops, and leave a part for community use. 
Internally, they are organized by committees of families plus one director elected by an assembly 
of two representatives per committee, two young people, and two women. There is usually a 
store, a school, and an infirmary in the center of each settlement. After three or four years, they 
produce enough to sustain themselves and have surplus to sell in the market. The FNC supports 
its communities in marketing their produce directly to urban consumers through the National 
Production Fair (Feria Naciones de Producción) in Asunción, where a lot of settlement products 
are sold (Zibechi 2014).101 
 
                                                             
100 http://www.baseis.org.py/la-fnc-conquisto-cerca-de-300-mil-hectareas-de-tierra/ 
101 Produce sold includes: fresh cheese, chicken, and eggs, kidney beans, cassava, corn, pork, chipá, tomato, starch, 




Between 1993 and 2015, the OLT resettled some 11,100 families on some 52,000 hectares of 
land, predominantly in the departments of Itapúa, San Pedro, and Caazapá. In 2016, the 
organization was engaged in 18 land occupations, which, if conquered, could resettle a further 
1,000 landless peasants on some 10,000 hectares of land. Throughout this process, 19 OLT 
activists were killed in the struggle for land (BASE IS 2016):102 
 
Hemos tenido nuestros muertos en la lucha por la tierra, casi toda la historia de los 
asentamientos tiene un muerto por lo menos… un mártir en ese sentido. También 
haber pasado por violencia en el marco de desalojos, verdad, que son ejercidos por 
instituciones del Estado que deberían de estar velando por nuestros derechos, sin 
embargo, estaban respondiendo directamente a los intereses de empresas privadas, y 
acudían a hacer los desalojos y las represiones. Igualmente, si había movilizaciones, 
como cortes de ruta, o como ir a Asunción para peticionar esto en forma de 
movilización, también eran reprimidas. Entonces tenemos como mártires. Tenemos 
muchos compañeros y compañeras que pasaron por las cárceles que hasta hoy día 
también tenemos imputados e imputadas, verdad, en la lucha por tierra, varones y 
mujeres. Entonces son digamos las consecuencias y lo que nos muestra todavía la 
desigualdad que hay en el tema del acceso a la Tierra en el país. 
 
Mi asentamiento [a settlement in the town of Capiíbary in the San Pedro department] 
fue conquistado. Se hizo una ocupación… en 1990 y en el 94 recién nosotros tuvimos 
la decisión del Estado de las compras de esas tierras, eran tierras del Estado. 





Tuvimos dos desalojos. También en ese proceso le mataron a un compañero e 
hirieron a otro. Eran gemelos, uno murió y el otro sobrevivió… y también una niña 
que murió durante el desalojo por el susto. Son las historias que tenemos así en casi 
todos los asentamientos. (Ruiz, personal interview 2015) 
 
Many of these conquered territories take on the names of their “martyrs”—such as Regina 
Marecos, Mariano Díaz, Felipe Osorio, Huber Duré, Crescencio González, Sebastián Larrosa—
who have been those murdered in the struggle for land (Areco 2019). 
 
Table 6.3 charts the geographic locations of the land occupations, with the size of the land 
occupied and the number of participants, over the past ten-years (2008–2018). Of the 95 land 
occupations recorded during this period, one-third (32) occurred in the northern department of 
San Pedro. The eastern bordering departments of Canindeyú and Alto Paraná recorded 14 
occupations each. Nine and five occupations were carried out in Caaguazú and Itapúa, 
respectively. Put more starkly, the five most conflictive departments are also the five most sojero 







                                                             
103In order of land area dedicated to soybean production: Alto Paraná (976,851 ha), Canindeyú (685,851 ha), Itapúa 




Table 6.3 Land occupations by department, 2008–2018 
 Cases Landholding (ha) Area occupied (ha) No. of occupants 
Concepción 7 9,852 24,893 1,345 
San Pedro 32 269,014 59,759 5,740 
Cordillera 2 1,972 -- 350 
Caaguazú 9 54,028 13,540 1,620 
Caazapá 4 27,751 1,000 245 
Itapúa 5 15,400 9,800 2,050 
Misiones 4 6,460 4,810 575 
Paraguarí 1 600 310 100 
Alto Paraná 14 787,418 59,768 2,210 
Canindeyú 14 94,282 24,602 2,720 
Presidente Hayes 2 14,000 14,000 2,500 
Alto Paraguay 1 -- -- -- 
Total 95 1,280,777 212,482 19,455 
Source: Palau (2019b). 
 
Only 10 out of the 95 occupations resulted in favourable outcomes for the peasantry, as a total of 
14,249 hectares were occupied by 3,598 peasant families. The successful conquests occurred in 
San Pedro (5), Concepción (2), Alto Paraná (2) and Presidente Hayes (1). The majority took 
place under the Lugo administration. Of the remaining occupations, 11 cases are ongoing, 
continuing resistance in unfavourable contexts, while the rest concluded in dispossession or were 
deactivated by other mechanisms. Over this period, 2008–2019, 1,326 people have been charged 
and 862 have been detained in the context of land struggles. As important as these conquests are 
for peasants and indigenous peoples, they are still relatively small when compared with the wider 





Almost half of the occupations where carried out by local commissions—both neighbourhood 
and landless—with no ties to organizations with a longer history in the land struggles and greater 
capacity for resistance. Despite this, these local commissions find themselves leading the charge 
for land in the country. National level organization, for their part, carried out almost one-third of 
the identified occupations, divided as follows: the OLT and MCP carried out 8 each; the Liga 
Nacional de Carperos (LNC) carried out 7; while the MCNOC, CONAMURI, FNC, and Unión 
Campesina Nacional (UCN) carried out one occupation each during this period. Five occupation 
where carried out by indigenous communities, revindicating their ancestral lands. This data 
perhaps reveals, or at least should cause us to reflect on, a point raised by Edelman and Borras: 
that privileging formally constituted organizations—as done in this chapter—may be “limiting, 
since it tends to render invisible political activity that occurs outside of their bonds and to 
obscure the reality that few social movements organise more than a minority of the 
constituencies it claims to represent” (Edelman and Borras 2016: 8).   
 
In sum, during the 1990s and early 2000s, when the peasant organizations were at their strongest, 
the movement managed to extract significant concession from the government. These tactics 
were successful in pressuring the government to redistribute land or increase cotton subsides on 
several occasions in 1989 and 1990, and then again in 1999 (during the Marzo Paraguayo) and 
2002 (Kretschmer et al. 2019). The number of land occupations, however, have dropped 
dramatically in recent years, in large part due to the increasing levels of repression and 





Desde la fiscalía y el poder judicial se empieza a imputar a la gente: imputaciones, 
orden de detenciones, cada vez más se va agravando la situación de las 
comunidades y eso también ha generado para la Federación Nacional Campesina de 
tomar otra medida de fuerza, otra medida de acción frente a esa situación de 
criminalización, de persecución, de represión, que sufren los compañeros pequeños 
productores en diferentes comunidades, en los diferentes departamentos del país. 
Actualmente nosotros tenemos más de 200 compañeros y compañeras imputados, 
alguno con orden de detención otro con medida sustitutiva. Otro con un juicio oral 
que van a llegar. Así que hay un frente de lucha y de movilización permanente 
contra la criminalización y la persecución de los compañeros que están sufriendo a 
raíz del avance del modelo de la producción de soja. (Gómez, personal interview 
2015) 
 
En estos 20 años las leyes de represión en el país se han perfeccionado y aumentado. 
Hoy en día tenemos compañeros y compañeras que son imputados de asociación 
criminal, de no solamente ya invasión de inmueble, sino que como 4 tipificaciones 
ya. Y antes era solamente invasión de inmueble. Entonces las leyes que se hicieron y 
también las instituciones de represión, digamos, han cambiado respecto a la gente 
que hace lucha por la tierra. Y son nuevos desafíos que nos llaman de verdad. 
¿Cómo superar todo eso? (Ruiz, personal interview 2015) 
 
At the same time, concerns over the increasing presence of drug trafficking and armed groups in 




Leiva, leader of the Coordinadora de Trabajadores Campesinos y Urbanos (CTCU), to a peasant 
settlement in the town of San Pedro del Paraná (department of Itapúa), where the community was 
planning a land occupation. The planned invasion was abandoned, however, after it became 
apparent that an armed group had occupied the land with the aim of extorting the owner to sell 
the land (fieldnotes and informal discussion with Ester Leiva 2015). 
 
6.3.3 Class struggle against agrarian extractivism  
Peasant resistance of the 1980s and early 1990s was centred entirely on the struggle for land, 
against the latifundio system. In the current conjecture of capitalist development (agrarian 
extractivism), the class struggle also relates to conditions generated by agribusiness, and the 
operations of extractivism:  
 
Viene empezando también el incremento del modelo de producción empresarial en 
Paraguay, sobre todo en la década de los noventa, viene ya en auge la producción 
extensiva sobre todo de la soja, introduciendo la semilla transgénica de la soja 
también. Inicialmente empezaron a plantar soja en los grandes latifundios. Después 
se va remplazando inclusive en alguna zona donde había ganadería por la 
plantación de soja, trasladándose la ganadería hacia otra zona, sobre todo hacia el 
Chaco, y en la última década están avanzando sobre comunidades campesinas, 
comunidades indígenas, y ahí se va generando otro problema para la comunidad de 
campesina indígena, sobre todo, con el envenenamiento masivo que trae consigo la 
soja transgénica y la expulsión de su propia comunidad. Así que son dos situaciones 




empresas agrícolas… y ahí también nosotros hemos tomado una posición política de 
resistencia en las comunidades, en los asentamientos, contra del avance de la 
producción de soja y contra el envenenamiento… y cada vez más eso va generando 
conflictos con las empresas agrícolas y el Estado a través de la fuerza represiva que 
tiene, como la policía, empieza a resguardar la plantaciones de soja y a resguardar 
la fumigaciones y cuando hay movilizaciones contra la fumigación, o contra la 
plantación de soja alrededor de las comunidades, empiezan las represiones. Se va 
agravando la situación. (Gómez, personal interview 2015) 
 
The class struggle that the FNC is currently engaged in has developed across three main axes: 
 
Nosotros decimos que actualmente tenemos tres frentes de lucha. Por un lado, la 
organización y la lucha por el acceso a la tierra, que es una lucha contra el 
latifundio por la reforma agraria. Otro frente de lucha es la resistencia en las 
comunidades y asentamientos ya conquistados, contra el avance de la soja y contra 
el envenenamiento. Y otro frente de lucha es contra la violencia que surge de la 
represión, de la imputación, de todas las persecuciones tanto judiciales como de 
represión que sufren los compañeros de lucha. Serian como tres frentes de 
organización de lucha y movilización que estamos llevando adelante. (Gómez, 
personal interview 2015) 
 




Drawing on similar tropes of Paraguay’s authoritarian past, peasant-based social movements 
have countered Colorado nationalist rhetoric with a nationalism of their own. The following 
excerpts, drawn from various internet-based resources,104 illustrate how the peasant social 
movements remain strongly influenced by the government of Francia (see discussion in chapter 
3). At a FNC demonstration under the banner of “The national debate against the latifundio and 
for agrarian reform”, at the Plaza de Armas (Plaza of Arms) in Asunción, December 16, 2015, 
activist Ermo Rodríguez begins his speech by presenting the Nationalist Era as a glorious 
precedent, worthy of emulation: 
 
Do you know, companions and partners, that we once had an independent, sovereign, 
free country? Where there were no foreign countries that came to say what we had to 
do or how we had to do things in our country. At that time, Paraguayans and 
Paraguayans decided what we had to do in our country. That is Paraguay. And he 
directed Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, with that poor Paraguayan people, 
who knew what kind of country he wanted. And it was very clear to Dr. José Gaspar 
Rodríguez de Francia an issue, and remember this well: absolute independence. 
Neither love new nor love old. No new pattern, no old pattern. Paraguayans and 
Paraguayans were free and independent, sovereign.We already have the experience 
of an independent Paraguay. So I would like this story to be told, we think, ruminate, 
show and tell where we go, because that is the story that they hide from us and they 
want to keep hiding us. This oligarchy does not want us to remember that, in a way 
to justify that what they do is fine because they have the truth. And they lie. They say 
                                                             





our country was isolated, it was turned into an island, completely closed by Dr. José 
Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia. That is a lie that anti-Francia, anti-independence, anti-
sovereign propagandists made run. 
 
In the lead up to the 23rd annual march of the FNC, deputy general secretary Marcial Gómez 
presented at a public lecture organized by the Faculty of Philosophy at the National University of 
Asuncion (UNA), March 9, 2016: 
 
Unfortunately, all that land is in the hands of a few landowners, who appropriated it 
in different ways. And this reminds us of the history of our country, because we have 
a very rich history in the independent era, since 1811 with Dr. France and then with 
the López: the land, one of the most valuable resources that was in the hands of 
foreigners and invaders, he recovered it again to pass it to the State and use it 
according to the development we needed. And Paraguay was one of the most 
developed countries in Latin America, with an independent, sovereign policy, 
without borrowing from anyone, without asking for mercy from anyone. But the 
basis was the issue of land, from there a national development policy was generated. 
 
As in the romanticised and authoritarian Colorado narrative, the peasant activist relay stories of 
the positive legacies of the Nationalist Era, in an effort to “recuperar el pasado para cambiar el 
future”—“recover the past to change the future.” These memories include the defence of national 





Although the locus of nostalgia for the Nationalist Era is remembered in terms of the more 
egalitarian aspects of this period, it is also remembered in terms of the loss associated with 
Paraguay’s defeat in the Triple Alliance War. As Gómez continues,  
 
We know that one of the most genocidal wars in the world was that of Triple 
Alliance, from 1865 to 1870, and with that war what was eliminated was the 
independent and sovereign national development policy of Paraguay. And from that 
war, the first element as part of payment for the expenses of war was the delivery of 
the land to large transnational companies: La Industrial Paraguaya, Yerba Mate 
Larangeira, which appropriated millions and millions of hectares of our land.  
 
This memoryscape of foreign attack dovetails neatly with factors related to the current 
conjecture, allowing for the drawing of an obvious parallel between a “first” invasion of 
Paraguay during the Triple Alliance War, primarily by Brazilian troops, and a “second” invasion 
of “brasiguayos” in recent decades.105 Current outcries against foreign land ownership by peasant 
organizations usurp the nationalist rhetoric of the dominant Colorado discourse, identifying 
foreign landowner as their enemy and deploy nationalist rhetoric to justify land occupation by 
defining their autochthonous claim to the soil (Nagel 1999: 157). While this process of 
extranjerización (foreignisation) began in the 1960s with the release of state lands for private 
                                                             
105 The use of the term ‘Brasiguayos’ has been subject to particular critique for its implied dichotomy between 
wealthy Brazilian agriculturalists devoted to soybean production on the one hand, and impoverished and 
marginalized Paraguayan small‐scale farmers on the other. In reality, ‘the majority of Brazilian immigrants in 
Paraguay are small‐scale farmers who, like many of their impoverished Paraguayan neighbours, have faced constant 
marginalization’ (Blanc, 2015: 145). For a detailed study of the socioeconomic differentiation between Brazilian and 




purchase (Laíno1977; Nickson 1981), it has accelerated in the last two decades as Paraguayan 
lands are increasingly being integrated into the expanding agricultural frontiers of Brazil and, to 
a far lesser extent, Argentina (Galeano 2012). Indeed, the distinctly “translatino” (Borras et al. 
2012) character of the corporate capital involved in the country’s soy sector is more acute than 
anywhere else in the region. The correlation between land concentration and foreign ownership 
in the case of soy cultivation is indeed most striking: 64 per cent of the land cultivated with soy 
in the country’s four most important sojero departments—Alto Paraná, Canindeyú, Caaguazú 
and Itapúa—belong to Brazilians (Galeano 2012, 461).  
 
An extreme case is Grupo Favero, a company owned by the so-called ‘rey de la soja’ (king of 
soy) Tranquilo Favero. In 2018, the Spanish newspaper El País (May 24, 2018) reported that 
Grupo Favero controlled around 160,000 hectares in Paraguay, contributing 8 per cent of the 
country’s total soy production. The following excerpt taken from the Organización de Lucha por 
la Tierra’s (OLT, Struggle for Land Organization) peasant march in October 2008 outside a 
Grupo Favero grain silo in Capiibary, in the department of San Pedro in northern Paraguay, 
illustrates how the nationalistic rallying of peasant organizations are fuelled by grievances 
against land takeovers by Brazilians and brasiguayos. Leading a crowd of close to 1,000 
campesinos, Ester Leiva, a principal peasant leader in the resistance, points to the increasing 
marginalization and dispossession of Paraguayans in their own country, as she chants 
 
¡Fuera a estos invasores, que vienen a invadir nuestro país! Dicen que nosotros 
somos los invasores... nosotros solo luchamos por nuestra riqueza, por nuestras 




estos son los invasores. Estos vienen a reprimir, nos envenenan y nos matan. Por 
ello le decimos: ¡Fuera brasileros! ¡Fuera Multinacionales! 
 
[Out with these invaders, who come to invade our country! They say that we are the 
invaders... we only fight for our wealth, for our lands, for our nature. These 
Brazilians who settle in our country, these are the invaders. These come to repress us, 
poison us, and kill us. That is why we say: Get out Brazilians! Get out 
Multinationals!]106 
 
These same grievances and anti-Brazilian sentiments have also been weaponized in recent years 
by the Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP, Paraguayan People’s Army), which is, apart from the 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in 
Mexico, the only revolutionary movement to appear in Latin America since the end of the Cold 
War. Since its foundation in 2008, this small but growing rural insurgency movement has 
succeeded in galvanizing a slow but steady degree of public sympathy and logistical support 
from citizens in its area of operations, especially amongst the poor and landless peasants of 
northern Paraguay. An important factor in attracting new recruits and support for the EPP, 
Nickson (2019) outlines, has been the movement’s development of a “coherent” ideology that 
meshes together radical Catholicism, Marxism, and nationalism. Alcides Oviedo Britez, the 
acknowledged leader of the EPP, has published two texts from prison, where he is currently 
serving an eighteen-year sentence for his involvement in a kidnapping. Surveying and 
summarizing the content of these two publications, Nickson (2019) notes that 
                                                             





the texts repeatedly emphasise three interrelated and powerful nationalist messages: 
that during the nineteenth century Paraguay was one of the most developed countries 
in Latin America; that this process was halted by an imperialist war, led by 
neighbouring countries; and that the national liberation struggle led by the EPP will 
regain the independence of the country and return it to its former glory… The belief 
in the ‘heroic possibilities’ of the EPP to recover the ‘lost dignity’ of the country is a 
potent message that resonates with the ‘common sense’ understanding of Paraguay’s 
distinctly martial history. 
 
The traumas of the nineteenth century suffuse the discourse of peasant-based and rural guerrilla 
movements, impairing their ability to question their founding myths. In Ideología autoritaria 
(1987), written during the Stroessner dictatorship, the Paraguayan pensador Guido Rodríguez 
Alcalá argues that to glorify the nationalist period is to mistakenly justify an authoritarian 
tradition that has dominated Paraguayan political history and has been manipulated by a series of 
rulers to justify dictatorship, oppression, and the denial of political rights and civil freedom in the 
name of the national interest. In his own words, ‘[a]n (overly) favourable judgement of Paraguay 
and its glorious past is not dangerous if it is simply an error or analysis, but it certainly is when it 
is used for the purpose of political manipulation’ (Rodríguez Alcalá 2013: 418). The grassroots 
politics of social movements have not challenged, discarded, or significantly revised the 







This chapter has examined the growth and scope of the Paraguayan peasant movement. After 
suffering severe repression during the Stroessner regime, peasant organizations have 
mushroomed since the mid-1990s, with dizzying number of peasant organisations forming 
locally, regionally, nationally, as well as under umbrella coordinating committee groups. 
Through its history, the Paraguayan movement has oscillated between peaks of levels of unity 
and cohesion, on the one hand, and troughs of fragmentation and weakness on the other. During 
its most dynamics moments, the movement has been successful in forcing some degree of pro-
peasant policies. 
 
Sporadic but dramatic land-based political conflicts are among the more obvious symptoms of 
the persistence of the land problem. These conflicts are inflicted by legacies of authoritarian 
political and land administration, shaped by class dynamics and other social differences 
(particularly nationality), and intensified by contemporary patterns of exclusion and extraction 
related to the advance of extractive capital in the agricultural sector. Peasant organisations 










Over the past three decades, Paraguay’s agrarian model has shifted away from the small-scale 
production of a variety of agricultural crops, for both domestic consumption and export, toward 
the large-scale, mechanized production of GM soybeans for global commodity markets. This 
agrarian model is widely praised at home by the mainstream media (ABC Color), the soy 
industry’s primary lobby group (Unión de Gremios de la Producción, UGP), and is largely 
consistent with the World Bank’s (2007) “agriculture-for-development” proposal. Despite this 
praise from government and international development institutions, I have argued that 
Paraguayan agriculture is involved in a persistent and multi-faceted crisis. This crisis is not just 
internally induced; it stems also from “external” relations that increasingly interact with, and 
enforce the impact of, outside pressures exerted on agriculture. The current rural crisis is 
characterized, at the national level, by a myriad of strongly inter-related expressions, which have 
been explored throughout this dissertation and can be summarized as follows: 
 
– Crisis of peasant farming. In 2013–14, out of the 5,637,300 hectares dedicated to 
agriculture, a staggering 93.7 per cent (5,284,400 hectares) were sown with cash crops 
(primarily soy), while subsistence crops constituted a mere 6.3 per cent of the cultivated 





– Subsistence crisis. Paraguay’s export-oriented agricultural development model has 
increased the country’s dependence on food imports, making the country much more 
vulnerable to volatile commodity prices and food insecurity—far from any pathway 
towards food sovereignty. Paraguay has the third-highest rate of undernourishment in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, after Haiti and Guatemala (FAO 2014: 58). FAO data 
indicate a relative and absolute increase in the overall rate of undernourished population 
in Paraguay, from 900,000 in people (20.2%) in 1990–2 to 1.5 million people (22.3%) in 
2011–13 (FAO 2014).  
 
– Crisis of land access. Paraguay is the country with the greatest land concentration in 
Latin America, with a 0.94 Gini coefficient (Guereña 2016). 
 
– Rural labour. The expansion of soy production has been accompanied by the contraction 
of employment in the agricultural sector. In 1990, 38.9 per cent of Paraguay’s 
economically active population made its living in agricultural (ECLAC, 2005). By 2004, 
this ratio had fallen to 33.3 per cent and it had fallen further, to 22.8 per cent, by 2014 
(DGEEC 2005, 2015). A recent study by Riquelme and Vera (2013) found that the 
number of seasonal workers employed in the agricultural sector plummeted during the 
period 1991–2008, from 946,040 to 238,674—a decrease of 74.8 per cent. 
 
– Environmental crisis. Recent studies conducted on a global scale identified Paraguay as 
one of the countries in Latin America with the highest deforestation rates worldwide 




cent of the forest cover in the eastern region of the country. Another deleterious effect of 
the soy boom has been the rise in agrochemical use and public health concerns about 
herbicides drifting onto people’s farms and residences. 
 
– Crisis of rural violence and criminalization. To this day many peasant leaders are 
assassinated in Paraguay for daring to defend the interests of the rural poor. The 
Chokoue107 report published in 2014 by the Coordinating Committee for Human Rights 
in Paraguay (CODEHUPY 2014), documents 115 victims of extra judiciary executions 
within a census from February 3, 1989 to August 15, 2013. In June 2012, a violent clash 
in the Curuguaty district of Canindeyú left 11 landless peasants and six police officers 
dead, triggering the impeachment of Fernando Lugo a week later. 
 
– Political crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the Curuguaty massacre, a medley of 
conservative social forces saw their opportunity and converged around the impeachment 
and removal of the moderately left-of-centre president, Fernando Lugo (see Ezquerro-
Cañete and Fogel 2017), bringing to an end the country’s halting democratic experiment 
since 1989. Other sources of political tension include: the growing strength of 
Paraguayan drug cartels and the increasing integration of sectors of the peasantry into 
drug trading (Cardozo et al. 2016); the emergence of new radical paramilitary groups in 
rural areas, such as the Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP) and the Agrupación 
Campesina Armada (ACA) (Nickson 2019); and the 2018 occupation and burning of the 
                                                             





National Congress building in protest of talks of a constitutional amendment that would 
have allowed Horacio Cartes (2013–2018) to run for a second term. 
 
As an analytic lens emerging from the convergence between the literatures on Latin American 
neo-extractivism and critical agrarian studies, the concept of agrarian extractivism serves to fully 
account for and explain the nature and implications of the contemporary processes of rural 
transformation taking place in Paraguay. The penetration of extractive capital into the 
countryside is transforming agriculture with dramatic social, economic, ecological, and political 
implications. Dominant forms of agricultural expansion, which extract large volumes of raw 
materials with little to no processing, lack sectoral linkages and remain controlled by a market 
oligopoly, contributing to widespread environmental degradation and destruction, deteriorating 
labour opportunities, and not leading to any substantial form of industrial development inclusive 
rural development. It is a mode of extraction, appropriating the economic and ecological value 
from the land in which it operates, while excluding the rural poor as they become surplus to the 
needs of capital accumulation. As a concept, agrarian extractivism exposes the extractive 
character of this dominant model, challenging the use of “industrialization” as a form of 
discursive legitimation used by governments and corporations alike. It is important to reveal the 
very extractive dynamics of agricultural production and to stop serving a legitimating discourse 
that equates this type of agricultural production to industrialization.  
 
Building on the work of Fogel and Riquelme (2005), Teubal (2009), Gudynas (2010), Svampa 
(2013), Petras and Veltmeyer (2014), Alonso-Fradejas (2015), McKay (2017), this study has 




dynamics of rural change in Paraguay. In the context of Bolivia, McKay put forth four 
interlinked dimensions of agrarian extractivism—(1) large volumes of materials extracted, which 
are destined for export with little or no processing; (2) value-chain concentration and sectoral 
disarticulation (3) high intensity of environmental degradation; and (4) deterioration of labour 
opportunities and/or labour conditions—which this study has traced over. Additional factors 
relevant for the Paraguayan context were highlighted in chapter 5. First, it was argued that issues 
concerning low-labour absorption should be interlinked with diminishing access to land for the 
rural poor and deteriorating conditions for smallholder farmers. Taken together, these dynamics 
reveal in a fuller sense the exclusionary dynamics of agrarian extractivism: small-scale producers 
are left uncompetitive in export production, while the expansion of GM soy production is 
inducing a pattern of structural change that diminish access to land for the rural poor and dampen 
overall employment. Moreover, the failure to generate more employment in the agricultural 
sector contributes to a host of social problems associated with rural-urban migration in a context 
where other economic sectors are unable to absorb surplus population. Second, three additional 
elements were added to the analytical framework: (5) compromising domestic food production, 
risking the countries food sovereignty; (6) variegated forms of violence used to advance and 
sustain the model; and (7) threats to the very basis of Paraguay’s democratic political system, as 
discussed in chapter 4 in reference to the parliamentary coup against Fernando Lugo. 
 
Beyond the soy complex and dynamics of rural change specific to Paraguay, the concept of 
agrarian extractivism as an analytical framework for agrarian political economy can be used 
across sectors and geographic areas to analyze the socio-economic and political dynamics of 




empirical gaze of agrarian extractivism beyond its current anchoring in the corporate controlled 
production of genetically modified (GM) soybean, revealing the analytical utility and flexibility 
of the concept. Whether it is forestry in Uruguay (see Kröger and Ehrnström-Fuentes, 
forthcoming), oil palm in Colombia (see Ojeda, forthcoming), pineapples in Costa Rica (see 
León Araya, forthcoming), or agave and tequila production in Mexico (see Tetreault, McCulligh, 
and Lucio, forthcoming), agrarian extractivism as a framework for analysis can help us 
understand how new forms of capital penetration are leading rural transformation and the 
implications for society, the economy and the environment. Viewing other forms of agrarian 
transformation in Latin America through the extractivist lens invites an empirical reassessment 
of the geographical scope of the concept beyond the so-called “soy republic” of South America, 
and introduces a new set of questions about the political and analytical utility of the concept. 
 
The concept of agrarian extractivism also has important methodological and epistemological 
implications for researchers engaged in scholar activism. As Jonathan Langdon and Kofi Larweh 
(2015) have discussed, in reference to their collaborative participatory action research in Ghana 
with Ada-based activists, who formed part of a resource-defense movement called the Ada 
Songor Advocacy Forum (ASAF), participatory research methods are too often overly framed 
and designed by academics, as opposed to collectively designed with social movements. 
Building participatory relationships in such a manner runs the risk of “mining” movements for 
information as opposed to contributing to their goals and learning:  
 
the way these approaches are framed and, ultimately, constituted has deep 




extractive forms of research that mine movements for data, or parallels and 
reinforces movement processes and deepens movement reflections… Key to this 
process of framing and constituting participatory research is the research design 
process. […] [P]articipatory research, and PAR [participatory action research] in 
particular, must be owned by… social movements… rather than being used by 
academics—especially in the North—carrying out studies ultimately more concerned 
with extracting information than in responding to movement needs and priorities... 
the relationships that frame such research, along with the way in which the research 
is conceived (i.e. is it owned by the movement from the outset) is critical to avoid 
this type of extractive relationship. (Langdon and Larweh 2015: 283–284; emphasis 
added) 
 
This echoes the work of Hale (2006), Borras (2016), and other scholar activists who have 
expanded on the importance of mutually defined and owned participatory processes and goals, 
especially in contexts of struggle, ensuring widespread access and usability of knowledge for the 
social movements with which we work. It is through such activist research that 
 
we affirm a political alignment with an organized group of people in struggle and 
allow dialogue with them to shape each phase of the process, from conception of the 






Finally, as I reflect on my own research design and process, I acknowledge that while I would be 
happy to say that I was working within the spirit of scholar activism—i.e. my research was 
explicitly and unapologetically connected to the struggles of the campesino movement—the 
research methods were too rooted in my own (academic) objectives. This is a key lesson that I 
plan to take forward with me in future research. I hope to have shed some light on the great work 
and research being done by the many committed social researchers in Paraguay (e.g. researchers 
associated with CERI, BASE IS, and CDE), and I plan to continue collaborating with these 
institutions through future projects. Based on relationship-building during the fieldwork for this 
project in 2015, I also intend to work much closer with the national peasant organizations that I 
have established rleationships with—FNC, OLT, CONAMUR, CTCU—from the start of the 
research design process. The concept of agrarian extractivism can therefore serve as a potent 
reminder for researchers to engage more closely with social movements, in order to develop co-
owned research designs which allow for movement articulations to shape the project. Ultimately, 
the concept can alert researchers of the risk of replicating the extractive relationship—in mining 
movements for information—that this study has sought to uncover: “it is the way research 
relationships are formed, and the way these relationships are embedded in movement 
articulations that determine whether the research is positioned to be a synergistic addition to 
movement processes—a moving with movements—or an extractive process for academic 
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